Andean Tragedy

WAR OF THE PACIFIC

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From 1874 to 1879, the South American nation of Chile experienced a depression caused by falling copper and wheat prices, a dropping off of exports, and rising unemployment. The only bright spot in the economy was the expanding nitrate business, but its mining eventually caused war between Chile and its neighbors, Peru and Bolivia. Nitrates were mined in the Atacama Desert along the Chile-Bolivia border. Most of the work was done by Anglo-Chilean companies, which operated in the Bolivian province of Antofagasta and the Peruvian province of Tarapaca. An 1866 treaty between Bolivia and Chile set their border at the 24th parallel, with both countries able to mine nitrates between the 23rd and 25th parallels; tax revenue collected by either country along the frontier would be split with the other country. This taxation arrangement was altered in 1874 when Chile agreed to give up its share of Bolivian tax revenue in return for a promise that taxes on Chilean profits in Bolivia would not be raised for 25 years.

Though Chile had no border with Peru, aggressive Chilean miners pushed into the Peruvian desert to mine nitrates. By 1875, some 10,000 people were employed in mining and subsidiary operations in the Peruvian Tarapaca desert region. Peru had thus far said little about the Anglo-Chilean operations in its province, but in 1875 a faltering economy forced the Peruvian government to nationalize the nitrate companies. The Peruvian government paid for the companies with government bonds paying 8 percent, payable in two years. When the bonds came due, the Peruvians were unable to honor their financial commitments and the bonds’ value plummeted. The Anglo-Chilean companies were able to absorb the loss of the Peruvian assets, but 151 when the Bolivians decided in 1878 to raise taxes on the Chileans along the frontier in violation of the 1876 agreement, the loss of profits was too much to take. Chile refused to pay the higher taxes even when Bolivia threatened to nationalize the operations as the Peruvians had done. According to the 1876 agreement, an arbitrator should have been called in to handle the dispute, but Bolivia refused. The Bolivian government felt secure in its ability to back up its threats because of an 1874 secret mutual-defense treaty with Peru, but the Bolivians failed to consult the Peruvians in advance. In February 1879, Bolivia nationalized the mining companies, and Chilean troops went into action. On 14 February, they occupied the port of Antofagasta against no opposition; soon they were in control of the entire province. Not wanting to get involved in the fighting, Peru offered to mediate a peace settlement. Chile then learned of the secret treaty and, accusing the Peruvians of duplicity, declared war on them on 5 April 1879.

The combined Bolivian and Peruvian effort appeared daunting, especially since they had a combined population twice that of Chile, and Peru had a fairly good navy. However, Chile had a stronger and more stable central government, a more motivated population, a well-trained army, and a navy armed with two modern ironclads. Also, the main theater of operations was handier to Chile; the Bolivians had to cross the Andes, and the Peruvians had to cross the desert. All three countries were in economic trouble, but Chile was in the best financial shape and had the assistance of the British because the mining operations were mainly theirs. Both Bolivia and Peru had defaulted on British loans and angered the British by nationalizing the companies, so they had no qualms about supporting Chile.

The key battle of the war took place at sea on 8 October 1879, when the Chilean ironclads captured a Peruvian commerce raider, the Huascar, that had been hurting their trade and logistical operations. With control of the sea, Chile could supply its troops more efficiently, and the army was soon marching through Bolivian territory into Peru. Bolivia withdrew from the conflict in mid-1880 when Chilean troops occupied large parts of Peru. After a difficult battle, the Chileans captured the capital city of Lima in January 1881, effectively winning the war. Peruvians continued to fight a guerrilla war for two years, but on 20 October 1883 they gave up and signed the Treaty of Ancon. The treaty gave Chile the province of Tarapaca forever and two other provinces for 10 years, after which a referendum was to be held to determine their nationality. The referendum never took place, but in 1929 the two countries agreed to return the province of Tacna to Peru, while Chile kept the province of Arica.

The Bolivians signed an armistice with Chile in April 1884, in which they ceded the province of Antofagasta to Chile, but cession was not official until 1904, when a treaty was finally signed. That treaty obliged the Chileans to pay an indemnity and build a railroad from the Bolivian capital of La Paz to the coast of Arica. The railroad was completed in 1913.

With their army already mobilized, the Chilean government decided to use it to deal with the Araucanian Indians, a tribe that had been fighting for their land since colonial times. Hopelessly outnumbered and outsupplied, after two years the Indians were forced to sign a treaty in 1883 that placed them on reservations, though they were allowed to maintain tribal government and laws. Chile consolidated the rugged territory that had been the Araucanian homeland. With Peru bankrupt and Bolivia isolated, Chile became the strongest nation on South America’s west coast. Control of the area’s copper and nitrate meant an improving income, but close ties to Britain kept them from enjoying it totally. Chile decided to honor the Peruvian bonds issued when the Tarapaca mines were nationalized, and British speculators had been buying them up ever since Peru could not fulfill them. Thus, the British were able to control 70 percent of the nitrate production by 1890, as well as profit from their own construction of banks, railroads, and subsidiary businesses. Longstanding ties between Britain and the Chilean upper class made the British acquisition smoother, and some Chileans were able to profit from investments in British concerns.

References: Keen, Benjamin, and Mark Waserman, A Short History of Latin America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984); Loveman, Brian, The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Sater, William, Chile and the War of the Pacific (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986).

The Ten Centavos War

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The War of the Pacific was popularly dubbed the “Ten Centavos (cents) War.” In 1877, after a devastating tidal wave destroyed much of the port of Antofagasta, the municipal council there passed a reconstruction tax. In 1878, President Hilarión Daza and the Bolivian Congress approved the modest 10¢ tax on every 100 pounds of nitrates exported from Bolivian territory. This law directly violated the 1874 treaty, and the Chileans and foreign investors were outraged. The British and Chilean–owned Nitrates and Railroad Company of Antofagasta refused to pay the tax, and tensions mounted.

At first, cooler heads prevailed. President Daza temporarily suspended the tax, and the company agreed to an annual voluntary contribution. But then Daza ended the moratorium and demanded that the tax be paid retroactively. Once again, the foreign company refused to comply. The Chileans responded with gunboat diplomacy, and anchored an ironclad in Antofagasta harbor and mobilized their entire fleet.

This time, President Daza refused to back down. With Bolivian sovereignty seemingly besmirched, Daza canceled the mining contract of the British-Chilean consortium. On February 14, 1879, Chile occupied Antofagasta—home to 5,000 Chileans and fewer than 600 Bolivians— and issued an ultimatum: Bolivia had 48 hours to accede to international arbitration of the dispute. President Daza ignored the deadline and insisted that the port first be liberated. He also withheld news of the Chilean landing for a week until after the conclusion of the popular carnival festivities then under way.

In no mood for more wrangling, Chile occupied Bolivia’s Antofagasta province and the entire Pacific coast south of the 23rd parallel in March. On March 14, Bolivia announced a formal declaration of war, but war still might have been averted if Peru’s last-minute conciliatory diplomacy had succeeded, or if Peru had not honored its defensive alliance with Bolivia. By this time, however, word of the Bolivian declaration of war had reached Santiago, and therefore, on April 5, Chile formally declared war against Bolivia and Peru.

Defeat and Loss of the Seacoast

Bolivia was totally unprepared for war, especially one so distant from its population centers and resource base, and suffered from grossly irresponsible leadership. Despite his patriotic bluster, President Daza was inept in the military campaign. On the battlefield, he proved cowardly, self-motivated, and (according to some accounts) often drunk. Daza withdrew his crack Bolivian regiments from the field and left the allied forces to be defeated by the Chileans in the Battle of San Francisco. Although the remaining allied forces were victorious days later in the indecisive Battle of Tarapacá, President Daza’s desertion became a great national embarrassment to Bolivia.

Historians have argued that Daza wanted to protect his prized regiments as a hedge against coup attempts, but on December 27, 1879, in a clever and meticulously timed plot, officers at the front and Colonel Eliodoro Camacho, the chief of staff, overthrew Daza, and the expresident fled into exile in Europe.

In January 1880, General Narciso Campero, a distinguished career officer and division commander, was appointed Bolivia’s provisional president and assumed command of the allied forces in the field as by then both the Bolivian and the Peruvian presidents had effectively deserted command of their armies. Campero’s Bolivian-Peruvian force was decisively defeated by the Chileans in May, and Campero and his exhausted troops retreated toward La Paz. At the head of one column of survivors, Campero was met with the news that the National Assembly had formally elected him president on May 31. As the marauding horde of desperate soldiers approached the Bolivian border, a cavalry force from La Paz intercepted and forcibly disarmed them. The government feared violence when the wounded and exhausted returnees learned that they would not receive the back pay owed them. For Bolivia, the shooting war was over, although hostilities between Peru and Chile continued for three more years while Bolivia watched from the sidelines, hoping for a favorable resolution.

On April 5, 1884, Bolivia signed the Truce of Valparaiso, which gave Chile control, but not permanent transfer, of Bolivia’s coastal territory. A peace treaty was finally signed in 1904, whereby Chile formally annexed Bolivia’s Atacama province (called Antofagasta today). Bolivia was guaranteed the right to import and export its goods through the ports of Arica and Antofagasta and to set up customs stations. Duties on imports were to be divided, providing Bolivia 75 percent and Chile 25 percent.

Thus, with the stroke of a pen, Bolivia lost a fourth of its territory and became the landlocked nation that it is today. The War of the Pacific was officially over, but not Bolivia’s relentless quest to regain a seacoast.

Bolivia - On the Eve of the Great Pacific War

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No war breaks out over guano, of which little remains. It is saltpeter that throws the Chilean army into the conquest of the deserts, against the allied forces of Peru and Bolivia. Eduardo Galeano (1987, 218)

The War of the Pacific was a war over resources, although territorial rivalry was its most immediate cause. The conflict also involved geopolitics, economic rivalry, greed, corruption, and personal ambitions. Indeed, the basic ingredient of the war—rivalry for power and economic dominance—first came into play with Bolivian independence. Because of this endemic regional rivalry, some historians have argued that the War of the Pacific was inevitable.

In the 1870s, the conflict of national interests and increasing disparities in economic and political power among the three neighboring South American countries of Bolivia, Chile, and Peru reached a critical climax. The new power distribution greatly favored Chile, and Chilean statesmen seized this opportunity to consolidate and further expand their nation’s influence and control along the Pacific coast.

Since its founding as a sovereign nation, Bolivia’s survival had been tentative. At first, Lima and Buenos Aires considered Bolivia’s very existence suspect. Bolivia, after all, had been capriciously carved out of the colonial audiencias that they had jealously controlled. Once established, Bolivia was troublesome and unstable. The new country seemed unable to rule itself, much less populate and effectively administer its vast and dispersed territory. Bolivia’s rich natural resources were the constant envy of its more powerful and aggressive neighbors in the Southern Cone. Debilitated by corruption and instability, Bolivia dismally failed to preserve its territory and resources when challenged by Chile.

In great part Bolivia’s geopolitics and unique national conditions facilitated this disastrous war and the loss of its Pacific seacoast. As late as the 1880s, the altiplano region remained the geopolitical center of the shaky new republic. The majority of the country’s territory, however, was neglected and isolated from the highland by formidable natural barriers—impassable and hostile mountain ranges, rivers, deserts, and jungles. Bolivians in these frontier regions were forced to fend for themselves. Moreover, Bolivia’s population was largely indigenous with only a thin upper crust of Spaniards and other Europeans. Neither social group had the necessary mobility or motivation to migrate to the less hospitable parts of the country.

These factors had a devastating impact on settlement of Bolivia’s Atacama province. Even after the discovery of guano and nitrate deposits in the Atacama Desert, which stretched from Peru in the north to Chile in the south, the Bolivian government was unable to incorporate and fortify this distant, sparsely populated coastal province. The unexpected bonanza in natural fertilizers brought a sudden influx of new settlers, prospectors, and entrepreneurs to the region; however, this population increase only compounded Bolivia’s problems since Bolivian citizens were now outnumbered 10 to one by Chileans and other immigrants, including thousands of Chinese coolies brought here by Peru and Chile as cheap, captive laborers.

With other nations and foreign firms competing for the profits from the bird droppings and saltpeter, Bolivia’s share of the bonanza steadily shrank. The remainder was squandered by the corrupt caudillos on profligate living and ill-advised foreign concessions and loans. Bolivian entrepreneurs’ resources were depleted or invested elsewhere, primarily in the highland silver mines. As a last resort, with the economy stagnant and the country heavily indebted, Bolivian governments permitted and encouraged British and Chilean capital to exploit the desert windfall on their behalf. In short, Bolivia’s inherent political and economic weaknesses directly contributed to the outbreak of the war.

Chile, on the other hand, stood in a position of relative strength. Unlike Peru or Bolivia, Chile’s exceptional political stability and economic growth since 1830 had helped make it the dominant power in the region. Chileans held regular elections for civilian governments and enticed foreign investors by the credibility of their sound political and financial systems. Chile’s cities were modern, and its people were mostly European immigrants, rather than Indians. Its economy was more diversified, and its territory was more integrated and cohesive. Chile had what both Peru and Bolivia lacked. Indeed, one Chilean president boasted in 1858 that the country had “the honor to have proved to the world that the Spanish American people can govern themselves by their own unaided efforts and can continue to prosper” (Bader 1967, 25).

This is not to say that all was well in Chile at the time. The country had its share of shortcomings and crises, and it was precisely a national crisis—the depression of 1878—that pushed Chile closer to war. By the mid-1870s, Chilean progress had come to a halt. Chilean exports had declined and the foreign debt had skyrocketed at the same time that droughts and diseases ravaged the country. Upward of 50,000 Chileans—mostly rotos, or landless peasant farmers of European descent—were forced to emigrate. Many would slave in the grueling guano and nitrate operations in Bolivia’s Atacama Desert.

Chile’s economic decline was an incentive to resolve the territorial dispute with Bolivia aggressively. Chile saw in the great riches of the coastal desert an immediate solution to the 1878 financial crisis and reliable long-term financing for the national debt and future commercial and territorial expansion. Decades later, Chile’s foreign minister, Abraham Köning, dissected Chilean motivations succinctly: “The area is rich and worth many millions” (Siles Guevara 1960, 68). Indeed, in the 20 years from 1880 to the end of the century, the gross value of the nitrate exports from the conquered regions reached nearly 3 billion pesos. On the eve of the war, corruption in Peru and Bolivia and the economic crisis in Chile had diminished the military preparedness of all three future belligerents. Chile, nevertheless, was relatively more prepared. For several decades Chile had been locked in a fierce military and commercial rivalry with Peru and had competed fiercely over control of the western seacoast. Now, Peru, like Bolivia, was virtually bankrupt, in political chaos on the eve of the war, and outclassed militarily by Chile. War decided this rivalry and assured Chilean hegemony on the Pacific coast.

The Uncouth General Daza

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Bolivian historians have bestowed on Hilarión Daza the epithet “el soldado mandón” (the imperious soldier). According to historian Humberto Vázquez Machicado, Daza was born in the constitutional capital of Sucre around 1840 the illegitimate son of an itinerant Italian snake-oil salesman named Grossolín. As a child, Daza had difficulty pronouncing his father’s surname, and from these attempts he received the ludicrous nickname of “Chocholín.” Not pleased, he started to use the surname of his mother.

Daza received his limited education on the tough streets of Sucre as a small-time crook and con artist and in the rough barracks of the army. He showed a talent for being in the right place at the right time and rapidly rose in the military ranks with Mariano Melgarejo, whom in the end he betrayed for 10,000 pesos. Daza was overthrown in 1879, while at the battlefront in Tacna, and headed for Europe. There, he lived the good life until the enormous fortune that he had pilfered became depleted. He returned to Bolivia intent on heading another military coup but was killed in 1894.

Bolivia: The Last 19th-Century Caudillo

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The presidency of Hilarión Daza was landmark in Bolivian history. During his administration, the legislature approved the historic Liberal Constitution of 1879 (the county’s ninth since independence), which remained, with slight modifications in 1880, Bolivia’s fundamental governing charter until the 1930s. It protected private property rights and the economic concerns of Bolivia’s Big Silver industrialists and their Chilean interests.

General Daza’s rule, however, figures most tragically in the nation’s collective memory because it marked the loss of Bolivia’s access to the Pacific Ocean. His government and Congress of 1878 passed the infamous 10¢ tax on the nitrates exported by the British-Chilean Nitrates and Railroad Company of Antofagasta. This tax, which the bankrupt Bolivian treasury desperately needed, provided Chile with the perfect pretext to occupy Bolivia’s seacoast and launch a war with its neighbors.

President Daza cannot be blamed entirely for the war and the loss of the seacoast. Years before his government, Chilean, British, and U.S. capital had extended financial tentacles into virtually every profit-generating enterprise available to Bolivia: guano, nitrates, borax, even silver. The economic concessions of the Bolivian Litoral province produced an estimated 28 million pesos annually, according to historian José Fellman Velarde. By his calculations, this bonanza exceeded 14 times the Bolivian budget and eight times that of Chile at the time. This appropriation and Bolivia’s semicolonization by domestic and foreign capital caused the War of the Pacific as much as the incompetence and venality of Daza and earlier Bolivian regimes did. Already, on the eve of Daza’s military coup of May 1876, Chile in effect controlled the bulk of Bolivia’s coastal assets demographically and financially. By the time General Daza was overthrown in December 1879, the Chilean forces had also militarily occupied the entire Bolivian Litoral.

Visit the Huascar

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Pirate Huáscar

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HMS Shah and Amethyst in Action against the Peruvian Renegade Huascar, 29 May 1877 (NMM)

The dilemma of how to protect British interests overseas and police the world’s sea lanes without armored warships became apparent off the west coast of South America in May 1877, where the 6,250-ton Shah, iron-hulled but not armored, served as Pacific flagship at a time when Britain temporarily had no ironclads in the Pacific Ocean. On 7 May naval officers sympathetic to a Peruvian coup seized the 2,030-ton armored turret ship Huáscar. After leaving Callao, the Huáscar stopped at least four British merchant steamers on the high seas, stealing coal, taking mail addressed to the government of Peru, and taking some passengers prisoner. These violations of international law were brought to the attention of the British navy, and on 29 May the Shah and its escort, the 1,970-ton wooden screw corvette Amethyst, intercepted the Huáscar in the bay of Pacocha. During two hours of combat the Shah alone fired 237 rounds and the two British ships together registered more than 50 hits on the Huáscar, without seriously damaging it. The Shah also fired the first self-propelled torpedo ever used in a naval action, which missed its target. The Huáscar carried two 10-inch muzzle-loading rifles in a Coles turret protected by 8-inch wrought iron armor, but because its gunners were inexperienced and its turret had to be cranked by hand (with sixteen men manning the levers, it could make one revolution in fifteen minutes), it fired only a half-dozen rounds and registered no hits. That night, the Huáscar escaped Pacocha under cover of darkness and steamed for Iquique, where it surrendered to Peruvian authorities the following day. The incident demonstrated that even a lone relatively antiquated ironclad could defy the will of the world’s greatest naval power if the latter had no armored warship in the area. Britain responded by sending two ironclads to the Pacific, and after 1881 maintained at least one there.

Chilean Navy in the War of the Pacific

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Rear-Admiral Patricio Lynch

After opening the War of the Pacific by using the casemate ships Cochrane and Blanco Encalada and the screw corvette O’Higgins to help secure Antofagasta, squadron commander Rear Admiral Williams Rebolledo landed troops north of the 23rd parallel at the smaller ports of Cobija and Tocopilla, and on 23 March 1879 took Calama, Bolivia’s last outpost on the Pacific Ocean. By early April, after Peru committed its army and navy to the defence of Bolivia, Williams moved up the coast to blockade Iquique, main port of the Peruvian province of Tarapacá. The two navies spent the first month of the war convoying troops, the Chileans from Valparaíso north to Antofagasta, the Peruvians from Callao to Arica, main port of the province of Tacna and their southernmost unblockaded port. Meanwhile, Chilean warships continued to blockade Iquique in between. After escorting troops to Arica, the Peruvian ironclads Independencia and Huáscar continued south to challenge the Chilean blockade of Iquique, then the landings at Antofagasta, en route passing (without encountering) most of the Chilean squadron, which Williams took north to disrupt the Peruvian convoys between Callao and Arica. Off Callao Williams learned that Peru had already transported its army to Arica and had sent the Independencia and Huáscar down the coast to Iquique, where he had left his oldest operational warships, the screw corvette Esmeralda and screw gunboat Covadonga, to maintain the blockade. Williams took his squadron back down the coast at full steam but was still en route on 21 May, when the two Peruvian ironclads fell upon the Esmeralda and Covadonga at Iquique.

On the morning of 21 May 1879 the Esmeralda (Captain Arturo Prat) held its station at Iquique and engaged the Huáscar (Rear Admiral Miguel Grau) for three hours and forty minutes, taking a beating in order to enable the Covadonga (Captain Carlos Condell) to escape to the south, with the Independencia (Captain Guillermo Moore) giving chase. For much of the morning Prat positioned the Esmeralda between the Huáscar and the waterfront of the Peruvian city, forcing the ironclad’s gunners to be extraordinarily careful in order to avoid killing their own countrymen with missed shots. Prat’s strategy worked, at least until Peruvian forces ashore began peppering his ship with artillery and rifle fire. When the crossfire began to take its toll among his men, Prat made the fateful decision to leave his position, even though he had no hope of successfully breaking out of the harbour. Grau promptly closed with the Huáscar and rammed the Esmeralda three times, sinking it just after noon. In arguably the greatest act of bravado in a naval battle since John Paul Jones captured hms Serapis from the stricken Bonhomme Richard a century earlier, Prat responded by ordering his crew to board the Huáscar from the deck of his sinking ship. He was killed on the deck of the Peruvian ironclad alongside a seaman who scrambled aboard with him; when Grau rammed the Esmeralda again, Lieutenant Ignacio Serrano and a second wave of a dozen borders met the same fate. Prat’s second-in-command, Captain Luis Uribe, subsequently refused to strike his flag, and the Esmeralda sank with its colours still flying. Midshipman Enrique Riquelme continued to work one of the old corvette’s guns until the very last, and was among those who perished with the ship. While the Huáscar lost just one of its crew in the battle, 148 of the Esmeralda’s 198 officers and seamen were killed; Uribe was among those pulled from the water, taken prisoner aboard the Huáscar, then turned over to the Peruvian garrison of Iquique. During the same hours an equally compelling drama unfolded down the coast from Iquique, as the Covadonga steamed toward Antofagasta with the Independencia in hot pursuit. In the early afternoon off Punta Gruesa, the shallow-draught steamer passed safely over uncharted rocks, which trapped the much heavier Peruvian frigate. With the Independencia hard aground, Condell doubled back and placed the Covadonga across its bow, out of reach of its broadsides, and raked it repeatedly. The Peruvians returned fire with their deck rifle, but once its ammunition was exhausted Moore struck his flag. While the Esmeralda, an unarmoured ship whose captain refused to surrender, lost three-quarters of its crew that day, the Independencia, an ironclad that did haul down its colours, suffered just 5 killed and 18 wounded out of a crew of 300. The Covadonga lost 4 killed and 3 wounded out of 116. Shortly thereafter the Huáscar arrived to chase off the Covadonga, salvage the Independencia’s heavy guns and rescue the survivors. The battles of 21 May reduced by half the armoured strength of Peru’s navy, while the valiant fight of the Esmeralda made Prat a national hero.

Having secured a clear advantage at sea, Chile set about transporting more troops to the north for an eventual march on Lima. The war and navy minister, Sotomayor, appointed Rear Admiral Patricio Lynch to co-ordinate the effort, which the Peruvian navy sought to disrupt by using the Huáscar as a raider. Sometimes cruising alone, sometimes with the screw corvette Unión, the Huáscar could strike with impunity as long as neither of the two Chilean ironclads was in the vicinity. Admiral Grau developed an uncanny ability to evade them but had an early brush with disaster on the night of 9–10 July in the harbour at Iquique, where he had hoped to sink the Chilean navy’s coaling barque Matías Cousiño. He found only the screw corvette Magallanes (Captain Juan José Latorre) maintaining the blockade there but, unfortunately for Grau, Latorre sought to emulate the earlier heroism of his old classmate Prat and duelled with the Huáscar for 45 minutes, closing to within 300 metres, even though his own ship had the speed to flee. The Matías Cousiño escaped, and Latorre’s bold action detained the Huáscar long enough for the casemate ship Cochrane (Captain Galvarino Riveros) to reach the scene, turning the tables and forcing Grau to flee. In the weeks that followed the Huáscar enjoyed its greatest success, destroying a number of small cargo vessels and, on 23 July, capturing the Chilean transport Rimac off Antofagasta. This setback prompted Sotomayor to sack Williams, elevate Riveros to rear admiral and squadron commander, give Latorre the vacated command of the Cochrane, and get personally involved in formulating a plan to trap the Huáscar. In the process they all but ignored the Unión, which in August ranged as far south as Punta Arenas on the Strait of Magellan in a futile attempt to interdict merchantmen carrying arms shipments to Chile from Europe. The Chilean navy waited until after the threat of the Huáscar was removed before it launched a similar mission against merchantmen carrying weapons to Peru from the United States; eventually, over the summer of 1879–80, the Amazonas and later the corvette O’Higgins ranged as far north as the coast of Panama but had no luck in their efforts.

For the purposes of hunting down the Huáscar the Chilean squadron was split into two divisions, one consisting of Riveros’s flagship Blanco Encalada, the screw schooner Covadonga and the coaling barque Matías Cousiño, the other of Latorre’s Cochrane, the screw corvette O’Higgins (Captain Jorge Montt) and the armed transport Loa. Meanwhile Grau remained bold in his use of the Huáscar, on 28 August bombarding Antofagasta in broad daylight and engaging the Chilean warships there – the screw corvettes Abtao and Magallanes – before Riveros arrived with the Blanco Encalada to chase him off. On the morning of 8 October Latorre’s division finally spotted the Huáscar steaming with the Unión off Punta Angamos, north of Antofagasta. Grau immediately sent away the unarmoured Unión, prompting Latorre to send the O’Higgins and Loa to chase it, leaving the two ironclads to duel alone. The ensuing battle featured the first use of armour-piercing Palliser shells, which the 9-inch Armstrong guns of the Cochrane fired with deadly accuracy as the range fell to 2,000 metres and less. Riveros arrived with the Blanco Encalada some 45 minutes after the fighting began, but Latorre’s ship continued to dominate the action. By the time the Huáscar surrendered another 45 minutes later, the Chileans had recorded perhaps the best gunnery performance in the history of modern naval warfare, impressing British observers with an amazing 27 hits on 76 rounds fired. Of the 205 men aboard the Huáscar 61 were killed, including Grau. The guns in the turret of the Huáscar (which had to be cranked by hand until the installation of its steam winch in 1885) managed just three hits against the two Chilean ironclads, killing none and wounding seven aboard the Cochrane, and causing no damage to either ship. Unlike the Independencia, the Huáscar was not damaged beyond repair, and a boarding party led by Lieutenant Juan Simpson foiled the crew’s efforts to scuttle the ship. Recommissioned within weeks, it saw its first action under Chilean colours in February 1880.

Taking full advantage of Chile’s command of the sea, Rear Admiral Lynch orchestrated the transport of 9,500 troops from Antofagasta northward to Pisagua, where they were put ashore unopposed early in November 1879 after Latorre’s division, consisting of the Cochrane and three unarmoured warships, shelled the landing site. Meanwhile, Riveros took the Blanco Encalada and the rest of the squadron farther north to blockade the harbour of Arica, where he captured the screw gunboat Pilcomayo on 18 November. After escorting the convoy to Pisagua, Latorre added his division to the blockade at Iquique, where the Peruvian garrison surrendered on 23 November, finally freeing Uribe and other survivors of the Esmeralda who had been held prisoner there since May. Over the same weeks, the Chilean army marched inland from Pisagua, and on 27 November defeated a joint Peruvian-Bolivian army at Tarapacá, securing for Chile the southernmost Peruvian province of the same name. Thereafter, the action centred around Arica, principal seaport of Tacna, the neighbouring province to the north. On 27 February 1880 the old Peruvian monitor Manco Capac, anchored there as harbour watch, exchanged fire with the Huáscar when the latter arrived to shell the port. Riveros and Latorre soon arrived with the rest of the squadron, which joined in the bombardment. Army units put ashore in early March subsequently laid siege to Arica from the land side. The Peruvian garrison held out for three months, but on 6 June, sensing the end was near, the naval detachment blew up the Manco Capac to keep it out of Chilean hands. The following day Chilean troops stormed the city and forced its surrender.

In April 1880, after the initial bombardment of Arica, Riveros left Latorre’s division behind to blockade the port while he took the Blanco Encalada, the Huáscar and the rest of the squadron north to blockade Callao, in preparation for the final Chilean assault on Lima. Following the capitulation of Arica, Latorre brought the Cochrane and its unarmoured escorts to join him. Against this overwhelming force the Peruvians deployed a flotilla of torpedo boats, some improvised, others purchased in Britain over the past several months. Copying tactics used by the Russian Black Sea fleet against the Ottoman navy in the recent Russo-Turkish War (1877–8), they managed to sink the armed transport Loa in July and the screw gunboat Covadonga in September. Thereafter, fears of losing a larger or more significant warship prevented Riveros from maintaining a tighter blockade. Chile soon deployed its own torpedo boats, and the rival torpedo flotillas subsequently dominated the action in and around Callao harbour, with each losing one boat.

Because Rear Admiral Lynch’s performance as co-ordinator of troop transports in 1879 had given him such valuable expertise in the logistical side of amphibious operations, the war and navy minister, Sotomayor, appointed him to command the army’s expeditionary force for the final strike against Lima. His forces embarked from Arica and in November 1880 landed up the coast at Pisco. From there, Lynch began his march on Lima, staying near the coast so that Riveros’s squadron could provide covering fire as he advanced. The navy’s heavy guns supported the army in its decisive victory at Chorrillos (13 January 1881), which forced the Peruvians to abandon their capital. Three days later the Peruvian navy scuttled its last ironclad, the immobile Callao harbour watch Atahualpa, then surrendered. Over the following months the Chilean navy took the surrender of the smaller Peruvian ports north of Callao; the capitulation of Paita to the Huáscar in June 1881 left the entire coast of Peru in Chilean hands. The end of the campaign at sea did not bring an end to the war, since neither Peru nor Bolivia would agree to terms. After occupying Lima, Lynch co-ordinated the fight against Peruvian resistance in the interior for another two and a half years. In October 1883, three months after the fighting ended, Peru formally ceded to Chile the provinces of Tacna and Tarapacá with the ports of Arica and Iquique. At the same time, Bolivia refused to acknowledge the Chilean conquest of its Pacific coastal province and port of Antofagasta. An invasion from Peru by Lynch’s army led to a truce in April 1884, finally ending the fighting, but Bolivia was never occupied by Chilean troops and waited until 1904 to sign a formal peace treaty.

Morro Solar

2009-06-17T13:43:00.003+08:00

The Morro Solar of Chorrillos was the scene of a battle, was once an exclusive beach resort in the
1800s and nowadays is home to an observatory, some monuments and the exclusive Regatta’s club.

^{Photo: Peru Pepo} The Morro Solar as seen from Miraflores

Jutting out into the Pacific Ocean, the Morro Solar can be seen all along the city’s coast. It’s history began as home to Peru’s indigenous - as the settlement of Armatambo, long since destroyed and forgotten. After the conquest the area around the hill became known as Chorrillos and country retreats were built by Viceroyals. Later during Peru’s struggle for independence Chorrillos was used as a port - an alternative to the Spanish controlled Callao. Chorrillos eventually became more developed, the sea-front malecon was built and connections to elsewhere by road and train were constructed. Still, Chorrillos was little more than a fashionable seaside resort with large residences owned by the wealthy - the area around the Morro Solar had some of the nicest beaches
.

When Chile invaded Peru for it’s mineral wealth in the War of the Pacific, they were determined to reach Lima to ensure complete capitulation. Peru had amassed a huge army that was positioned across the desert from Chorrillos to San Juan. A series of battles took place in which the superior tactics of the Chileans saw a Peruvian defeat and the end of the war. One of these battles took place on the Morro Solar, now home to monuments to the dead. Defeat on the Morro Solar lead to the destruction of Chorrillos as Chilean troops burned and pillaged their way unopposed towards Lima.

Today, as well as monuments of the battle you will find hundreds of radio towers serving the whole southern half of Lima, the height of the Morro, of course, being an ideal place to transmit from. The radio towers are accompanied by the Planetary Observatory, the first in Peru, made by engineer Víctor Estremadoyro.

More high-tension steal towers form the shape of a huge cross where the morro meets the sea. The cross, lit up during the night and shining across the ocean, was built to welcome Pope John Paul II on his visit to the country. Next to the cross there is also a statue of the Virgin Mary that is regularly visited by devoted Catholics.

At the base of the Morro Solar is the exclusive Regattas Club, where if you have the money to pay the yearly fee, you have access to various club facilities. Away from the ocean but also at the base you will find the other extreme, invasions - homes built with no permission out of cheap available materials. Near here you will find the cevicheria Sonia and below, on the beach, a pier, fishing boats and more restaurants - continuing the area’s fishing and sea-ferring history.

Chile returns Peru’s historic books

2009-06-17T13:39:00.001+08:00

Realising that the new found mineral wealth on the pacific coast lay entirely in Bolivian and Peruvian hands, and sparked by Bolivia’s plan to tax Chilean companies extracting it, Chile launched an invasion against the two nations. After their successful land grab in the south, Chilean troops continued up the coast, burning down towns and massacring thousands. When they reached Lima, all resistance was put down and troops began ransacking Peruvian national treasures - Lima having been the centre of the Spanish empire in the new world.

Some of the many things taken were tens of thousands of books. Now, 126 years later, Chile has decided to return those books most obviously of Peruvian origin. The announcement was made some months ago, and yesterday the 3,788 books arrived in Peru’s National Library. The books, some even from the 1500s and 1600s, bare the emblems of Spanish Peru and the Library of Lima. Books from after the formation of the republic bare Peruvian emblems. Chile’s director of the National Office of Libraries, Archives and Museums said that these were the books that were obviously not Chilean property and should be returned. The antique texts are written in Spanish, Latin, Greek and French.

At the same time, Chilean businesses have been asked to create a fund to be used to return more stolen Peruvian books to their home. Of the thousands of books stolen from Peru many are now in private hands and these are the ones that Peru now hopes to have returned. Miguel Altahus of the Universidad Católica states his opinion that “the private sector should help by creating a fund under Chilean law to offer to buy books that private individuals might have and want to return”.

War of the Pacific at About Com.

2009-06-17T13:33:00.003+08:00

Called the Guerra del Pacifico, this 1879-1883 conflict involved Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and resulted in Chilean annexation of valuable disputed territory on the Pacific.

Glorias Navales
Chile annually celebrates the naval victories of the War of the Pacific on May 21. The Battle of Iquique and the capture of the iron monitor Huáscar were major turning points in the war with Peru and Bolivia.

Defeat
"No era was more traumatic for Peru than the War of the Pacific and its aftermath, in which Peru and Bolivia squared off against their southern neighbor, Chile. It had an impact on the solidity of central government and the shape of local societies well into the 20th century."

War of the Pacific
"War of the Pacific, Spanish GUERRA DEL PACÍFICO (1879-83), conflict involving Chile, Bolivia, and Peru, which resulted in Chilean annexation of valuable disputed territory on the Pacific coast. It grew out of a dispute between Chile and Bolivia over control of a part of the Atacama Desert that lies between the 23rd and 26th parallels on the Pacific coast of South America."

War of the Pacific
"The War of the Pacific, sometimes called the Saltpeter War in reference to its original cause, was fought between Chile and the joint forces of Bolivia and Peru, from 1879 to 1884."

War of the Pacific
"...war between Chile and the allied nations, Peru and Bolivia; also called the Chile-Peruvian War. The trouble began when President Hilarión Daza of Bolivia rescinded (Feb., 1879) the contract that had given a Chilean company the right to exploit nitrate deposits in Atacama, a province of Bolivia."

War of the Pacific, 1879-83
"Chile's borders were a matter of contention throughout the nineteenth century. The War of the Pacific began on the heels of an international economic recession that focused attention on resources in outlying zones."

Chile: War of the Pacific

2009-06-17T13:28:00.000+08:00

Chile's borders were a matter of contention throughout the nineteenth century. The War of the Pacific began on the heels of an international economic recession that focused attention on resources in outlying zones. Under an 1866 treaty, Chile and Bolivia divided the disputed area encompassing the Atacama Desert at 24° south latitude (located just south of the port of Antofagasta) in the understanding that the nationals of both nations could freely exploit mineral deposits in the region. Both nations, however, would share equally all the revenue generated by mining activities in the region. But Bolivia soon repudiated the treaty, and its subsequent levying of taxes on a Chilean company operating in the area led to an arms race between Chile and its northern neighbors of Bolivia and Peru.

Fighting broke out when Chilean entrepreneurs and mine-owners in present-day Tarapacá Region and Antofagasta Region, then belonging to Peru and Bolivia, respectively, resisted new taxes, the formation of monopoly companies, and other impositions. In those provinces, most of the deposits of nitrate--a valuable ingredient in fertilizers and explosives--were owned and mined by Chileans and Europeans, in particular the British. Chile wanted not only to acquire the nitrate fields but also to weaken Peru and Bolivia in order to strengthen its own strategic preeminence on the Pacific Coast. Hostilities were exacerbated because of disagreements over boundary lines, which in the desert had always been vague. Chile and Bolivia accused each other of violating the 1866 treaty. Although Chile expanded northward as a result of the War of the Pacific, its rights to the conquered territory continued to be questioned by Peru, and especially by Bolivia, throughout the twentieth century.

War began when Chilean troops crossed the northern frontier in 1879. Although a mutual defense pact had allied Peru and Bolivia since 1873, Chile's more professional, less politicized military overwhelmed the two weaker countries on land and sea. The turning point of the war was the occupation of Lima on January 17, 1881, a humiliation the Peruvians never forgave. Chile sealed its victory with the 1883 Treaty of Ancón, which also ended the Chilean occupation of Lima.

As a result of the war and the Treaty of Ancón, Chile acquired two northern provinces--Tarapacá from Peru and Antofagasta from Bolivia. These territories encompassed most of the Atacama Desert and blocked off Bolivia's outlet to the Pacific Ocean. The war gave Chile control over nitrate exports, which would dominate the national economy until the 1920s, possession of copper deposits that would eclipse nitrate exports by the 1930s, greatpower status along the entire Pacific Coast of South America, and an enduring symbol of patriotic pride in the person of naval hero Arturo Prat Chacón. The War of the Pacific also bestowed on the Chilean armed forces enhanced respect, the prospect of steadily increasing force levels, and a long-term external mission guarding the borders with Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina. In 1885 a German military officer, Emil Körner, was contracted to upgrade and professionalize the armed forces along Prussian lines. In subsequent years, better education produced not only a more modern officer corps but also a military leadership capable of questioning civilian management of national development.

After battling the Peruvians and Bolivians in the north, the military turned to engaging the Araucanians in the south. The final defeat of the Mapuche in 1882 opened up the southern third of the national territory to wealthy Chileans who quickly carved out immense estates. No homestead act or legion of family farmers stood in their way, although a few middle-class and immigrant agriculturalists moved in. Some Mapuche fled over the border to Argentina. The army herded those who remained onto tribal reservations in 1884, where they would remain mired in poverty for generations. Like the far north, these southern provinces would become stalwarts of national reform movements, critical of the excessive concentration of power and wealth in and around Santiago.

Soon controlled by British and then by United States investors, the nitrate fields became a classic monocultural boom and bust. The boom lasted four decades. Export taxes on nitrates often furnished over 50 percent of all state revenues, relieving the upper class of tax burdens. The income of the Chilean treasury nearly quadrupled in the decade after the war. The government used the funds to expand education and transportation. The mining bonanza generated demand for agricultural goods from the center and south and even for locally manufactured items, spawning a new plutocracy. Even more notable was the emergence of a class-conscious, nationalistic, ideological labor movement in the northern mining camps and elsewhere.

Prosperity also attracted settlers from abroad. Although small in number compared with those arriving in Argentina, European immigrants became an important element of the new middle class; their numbers included several future manufacturing tycoons. These arrivals came from both northern and southern Europe. People also emigrated from the Middle East, Peru, and Bolivia. Although most immigrants ended up in the cities of Chile, a minority succeeded at farming, especially in the south. In the early twentieth century, a few members of the Chilean elite tried to blame the rise of leftist unions and parties on foreign agitators, but the charge rang hollow in a country where less than 5 percent of the population had been born abroad.

”LOS HEROES OLVIDADOS“

2009-06-03T23:54:00.001+08:00

LA GUERRA DEL PACIFICO 1879 – 1883
”LOS HEROES OLVIDADOS“
Por: Dr. Cesar Augusto Salomón

CAMPAÑA NAVAL
MUERTOS Y HERIDOS

COMBATE NAVAL DE IQUIQUE 21 Mayo 1879
MONITOR “HUASCAR”
Capitán de Fragata: RAMON FREYRE
Teniente Segundo: JORGE VELARDE
Artillero: ALVARO TRELLES
Marineros: MANUEL CARDENAS
BASILO CHAVEZ
MANUEL PINEDA
Soldados: ANACLETO ALARCON
JOSE M. ESTEBAN

FRAGATA“INDEPENDENCIA”
Capitán de Corveta: RUPERTO GUTIERREZ
Alférez de Fragata: GUILLERMO GARCIA GARCIA

COLUMNA CONSTITUCION:
Subteniente: LUIS BALLESTRA
Sargento Primero: MANUEL CARRILLO
Soldados:
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
JOSE DEL CARMEN HEREDIA
MANUEL LANDA
JUAN CARDENAS
DOMINGO GARCIA
LUIS BENTANCOURT

GUARNICION:
Cabo: JULIO SALAS
Soldados:
ELIAS GUTIERREZ
MANUEL HUAMAN
MANUEL SILVA
NORBERTO DOMINGUEZ
ANTONIO URQUINO

TIPULACION:
FEDERICO NAVARRETE
JACINTO SANTA CRUZ
JOSE PEREYRA PABLO POLIVIAN
JAMES HERLY
FABRONIO GARCIA
JOSE ARIAS

COMBATE DE ANTOFOGASTA 28 AGOSTO 1879
MONITOR “HUASCAR”
Teniente Segundo: CARLOS DE LOS HEROS
Marinero: ALCIDES GUTIERREZ

COMBATE DE AMGAMOS 8 OCTUBRE 1879
MONITOR “HUASCAR”
Contralmirante MIGUEL GRAU Comandante de la Primera División Naval y del “HUASCAR”

ESTADO MAYOR:
Capitán de Fragata: MANUEL MELITON CARVAJAL
Mayor: JOSE N. UGARTECHE

Oficiales de Guerra:
Capitán de Corbeta: ELIAS AGUIRRE
Tenientes Primero:
DIEGO FERRE
JOSE MELITON RODRIGUEZ
PEDRO GAREZON
Tenientes Segundos:
FERMIN DIEZ CANSECO
ENRIQUE PALACIOS
GERVACIO SANTILLANA
Alférez de Fragata: RICARDO HERRERA
Capitán Infantería: MARIANO BUSTAMANTE
Oficiales de Mar:
NICOLAS DUEÑAS
FEDERICO NOGUERA
MANUEL PINEDA
JOSE SALAS
JOSE SELENDON
TIBURCIO RIOS
WILLIAN LEONARD
LUIS LANDA
JOSE DEL C. GOMEZ
WILLIAM MICHEL
EDUARDO FORD
ESTEVES JEEVES

Oficiales Mayores:
Cirujanos:
SANTIAGO TAVARA
FELIPE MIGUEL ROTALDE
Practicante de Medicina: JOSE IGNACIO CANALES
Aspirantes:
FEDERICO C. SOTOMAYOR
DOMINGO VALLE RIESTRA
GRIMALDO VILLAVICENCIO
Artilleros:
ALVERT AVENELL
JOHN DUNNET
EDUARDO PERRY
SAMUEL VARNISH
ATANACIO CALOYERAS
JULIO FELIPPE
ENRIQUE VEGESSE
JAMES ANDERSON
MANUEL GEORGIADES
GEORGE HARRIS
FEDERICO MEIGGS
MICHAEL MURPHY
HENRY OTTO
MANUEL PANAY
GEORGE SMITH
JULIO PABLO
JONHN LUMBY
FAUSTINO COLAN
TOMAS SALAZAR
JOHN DEVINE
Marineros:
PEDRO UNANUE
APARICIO ROBLES
JOSE VELASQUEZ
PEDRO RODRIGUEZ
JOSE FELIX TORRES
Grumetes:
JOSE MANTILLA
SATURNINO MEJIA
MIGUEL VACARCEL
ARTURO MASIAS
Fogonero: ISIDRO ALCIBAR
Carbonero: JUAN DAVILA

Columna “Constitución”.
Soldados:
QUITERIO GALLARDO
VICENTE JIMENEZ
JUAN VILLARREAL
MODESTO RUIDIAZ
ISIDORO ORUE

Batallón “Ayacucho”
Sargento Primero: FRANCISCO RETES
Sargentos Segundos:
ANACLETO ALARCON
MIGUEL SALAZR
Cabo: FIDEL CALVO
Soldados:
GUILLERMO BARRIOS
AMBROSIO FERNANDEZ
FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ
MARIANO VILCAHUAMAN
MARIANO ZEGARRA
HIPOLITO BELTRAN
FIDEL TALAVERA
MANUEL BORJA
JOSE CALDERON
CELESTINO VALDIVIA

RUPTURA DEL BLOQUEO DE ARICA 17 MARZO 1880
CORBETA “UNION”
Sargento: LUIS HIDALGO
Marineros: LORENZO PALACIOS
JOSE VELASQUEZ
Calafate: JUAN APOSTOL

ACCIONES EN EL CALLAO 22 ABRIL 1880
CORBETA“UNION”
Artillero: JOHN GRANT
LANCHA “ARNO”
Marinero: ZENOBIO NOEL
Civiles:
VICENTE MURIETA
JOSE M. MEDINA
JUAN LOYOLA

23 ABRIL 1880
LANCHA “URCOS”
Teniente: JOSE M. DELGADO
Alférez de Fragata: DOMINGO VALLE RIESTRA

10 MAYO 1880
TRANSPORTE “LIMEÑA”
Guardiamarina: JOSE I. ARBULU
Grumete: MANUEL RAMOS
Marineros:
MELCHOR MEDINA
CARLOS VIDELA
JOSE M. CARRILLO

CORBETA “UNION”
Artillero:
EUGENIO HILLER
AVELINO MENDRAL
MANUEL VARGAS
Marinero: MARINO FERRE

TRANSPORTE “OROYA”
Artillero: JUAN HERCELLES
Calafate: JUAN CHAMABA

CAMPAÑA DEL SUR
COMBATE DE PISAGUA 2 NOVIEMBRE 1879
MUERTOS
Comandante: N. RIVADENEIRA
Mayor: ABEL LATORRE
Capitán: JOSE VICENTE RODRIGUEZ
Tenientes Primeros:
MANUEL HERRERA
LUIS TAMAYO
Sub Teniente: HIGINIO MORALES
Inspector: N. BARRO
Civil: FRANCISCO LOZANO

COMBATE DE GERMANIA 6 NOVIEMBRE 1879
MUERTOS
Comandante: JOSE B. SEPULVEDA
Tenientes:
TEODOMIRO PUENTE ARNAO
JOSE SOSA
CARLOS MESIAS
N. DEL POZO
JOSE LOZA
OCTAVIO DEL MAZO

BATALLA DE “SAN FRANCISCO” 19 NOVIEMBRE 1879
Comandantes:
LADISLAO ESPINAR
MANUEL ROSELLO
RAMON CASTILLO
Mayor: MANUEL CORDOVA
Capitanes:
JOSE ALFARO
MANUEL PRIETO
Tenientes:
JOSE MOSCOSO
LUIS AGREDA
Sub Tenientes:
MARIANO ARAUJO
PALMA
BERNARDO GODOY
WENCESLAO BRACHO

BATALLA DE TARAPACA 27 NOVIEMBRE 1879
MUERTOS Y HERIDOS

PRIMERA DIVISION
Batallón “Cazadores del Cuzco”:
Sub Teniente: ENRIQUE VARGAS
Batallón “De la Guardia”:
Capitanes:
CARLOS ALBERTO ODIAGA
ENRIQUE VARGAS

SEGUNDA DIVISION
JEM CORONEL: ISAAC RECAVARREN
Batallón “Zepita”:
Comandante: JUAN BAUTISTA ZUBIAGA
Mayor:
BENITO PARDO FIGUEROA
JUAN CALDERON
LUIS LAZO
Capitanes:
FRANCISCO PARDO FIGUEROA
JULIAN CRUZADO
Teniente: TELEMACO DELFIN
Sub Tenientes:
JUAN A. CACERES
FEDERICO RAMIREZ
JUAN MENESES
Corneta: MARIANO MAMANI

Regimiento “Dos de Mayo”:
Coronel: MANUEL SUAREZ
Comandante: MARIANO MORAN
Capitán: MANUEL ARENAS
Teniente: DANIEL TORRICO
Sub Tenientes:
MANUEL OSORIO
LUCAS GAO
TOMAS BERENGUEL
GUILLERMO BELLO
PEDRO TORRES
JOSE TORRES PAZ

TERCERA DIVISION
Batallón “Ayacucho”
Capitán: JUAN DE DIOS VERA
Tenientes:
JUAN B. TAFUR
MANUEL PONCE

Batallón “Guardias de Arequipa”:
Capitán: CLODOMIRO CHAVEZ VALDIVIA

CUARTA DIVISION
Batallón “Lima”:
Capitán: MARIANO VERNALES
Teniente: JOSE MARIA OCHOA
Soldado: MANUEL CONDORI

QUINTA DIVSION
Jefe: Coronel: JOSE MIGUEL DE LOS RIOS

Columnas Navales:
Comandante: JOSE MARIA MELENDEZ
Capitán: SIXTO MELENDEZ
Teniente: PEDRO PORTILLO

Columna “Los Bolivianos”:
Capitanes:
ANICETO RIVERA
JUAN RODRIGUEZ
Sub Tenientes:
NICANOR MONJE
ADOLFO VARGAS
RUBEN CORDOVA

Columna “Tarapacá”:
Mayor: FRANCISCO PERLA
Capitanes:
ANTONIO ROSENDO CARRION
FEDERICO RIVERA
AMBROSIO GUIMARAES
Sub Teniente: JOSE GAVILANO

Batallón “Iquique”:
Coronel: ALFONSO UGARTE
Mayores:
LORENZO INFANTAS
ROSENDO BALLON
Capitán: JOSE OLIVENCIA
Sub Tenientes:
ALBERTO GIL
MARIANO ARIAS

SEXTA DIVISION
Batallón “Primero de Ayacucho”:
Mayor: LEONARDO ESCOBAR
Teniente: ELISEO VALENCIA
Sub Tenientes:
ISMAEL CORNEJO
MANUEL LOZADA

Batallón “Provisional de Lima”:
Comandante: OSWALDO PFLUCKER
Capitán: JOSE GARCIA

REGIMIENTO GUIAS
Coronel: JUAN GONZALES

BRIGADA DE ARTILLERIA
Mayores:
JOSE R. DE LA FUENTE
GUILLERMO GUERRERO
FRANCISCO PASTRANA
Capitán: ELOY CABALLERO
Tenientes:
JOSE G. CACERES
NICANOR MALAGA
Sub Tenientes:
FEDERICO PEZET
CARLOS ARANCIBIA
ENRIQUE VARELA

BATALLA DEL ALTO DE LA ALIANZA 26 MAYO 1880
MUERTOS
JEMG DEL EJERCITO ALIADO GENERAL BOLIVIANO JUAN JOSE PEREZ

EJERCITO PERUANO
PRIMERA DIVISION
Batallón “Lima”:
Mayor: FELICIANO SALGUERO

Batallón “Granaderos del Cuzco”:
Capitanes:
SEBASTIAN VASQUEZ
FEDERICO AGUIRRE
Tenientes:
ISAAC CUADROS
NICANOR ALVAREZ
ANTOLIN FLORES
NICANOR CHAVERA

SEGUNDA DIVISION:
Comandancia General:
Comandante: FELIPE S. CRESPO
Capitán: LUIS CHACON

Batallón “Zepita”:
Comandante: CARLOS LLOSA
Capitán: PEDRO SUAREZ
Tenientes:
TOMAS BERENGEL
RONUALDO PALOMINO
Sub Tenientes:
WASHINGTON LA ROSA
JOSE RODRIGUEZ

Batallón “Cazadores del Misti”
Coronel: SEBASTIAN LUNA
Mayor: CLAUDIO IGARZA
Capitán: MARIANO VERA
Tenientes:
EDUARDO Camacho
JULIO CARDENAS
PEDRO LOPEZ

TERCERA DIVISION
Comandancia General
Mayores:
FRANCISCO HEROS
ANTONIO SERRUTO

Batallón “Arica”
Comandante: JULIO MAC LEON
Capitán: M. MONJE
Teniente: TOMAS SALAS
Sub Tenientes:
N. ARIAS
E. ALCALDE
N. GAMARRA

Batallón “Pisagua“:
Comandante: JOSE LUIS ESPINOZA
Mayores:
VICENTE ESPINOZA
MANUEL MATHEUS
Capitanes:
FERMIN DALON
JOSE VILLENA
Tenientes:
ISMAEL CUADROS
ENRIQUE CHOCANO
CARLOS MOOR

CUARTA DIVISION
Jefe: Coronel: JACINTO MENDOZA

Batallón “Huáscar”
Coronel: BELISARIO BARRIGA
Mayor: JOSE ANTONIO RUEDA
Capitanes:
MANUEL FERNANDEZ
N. SILVA
NAZARIO TOLEDO
FEDERICO JIMENEZ
Sub Tenientes:
AURELIO PEREZ
EDUARDO MORANCI

Batallón “Victoria”
Sub Teniente: LUIS AMAT

QUINTA DIVISION
Comandante General:
Comandantes:
FEDERICO BARRETO
LEONIDAS BARRIOS VALOIS

Batallón “Ayacucho”
Capitanes:
GROCIO PRADO
JOSE MANUEL SALAS
Teniente: CLAUDIO VELANDO
Sub Tenientes:
JUAN LOPEZ
ELEODORO PAZ SOLDAN
LEANDRO MOLINA

Batallón “Arequipa”
Mayores:
ABEL BELLATIN
FRANCISCO COLMENARES
LEONCIO DELGADO
Teniente: ADOLFO GOMEZ

SEXTA DIVISION
Batallón “Cazadores del Rímac”
Coronel: VICTOR FAJARDO
Mayor: LUCIANO VELARDE
Tenientes:
JOSE SOLOGUREN
VICENTE OQUENDO

DIVISION GENDARMES DE TACNA
Columna “Gendarmes”:
Comandante: NAPOLEON VIDAL

Columna “Agricultores de Para”
Capitán: SAMUEL ALCAZAR
ARTILLERIA
Capitán: ELIAS BODERO

CABALLERIA
Regimiento “Húsares de Junín”
Comandante: LUIS REYNA
Mayor: GUILLERMO BYRNE
Teniente: JOSE M. PEÑA

OTROS
Coroneles:
FEDERICO CASTILLO
W. ESPINOZA
Capitanes:
ENRIQUE OSMA
SAMUEL ALIAGA
MANUEL MATOS
JOSE MARIA SOTO
ANTONIO SERRES
Tenientes:
MANUEL JERI
DOMINGO ARENAS
MARIANO ROMERO
JOSE FELICIANO SALGUERO
O. CARDENAS
OTONIEL BYRNE
MANUEL FAICO
Sub Tenientes:
ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ
JULIO SEPULVEDA
RICARDO PALOMINO
MANUEL SOVERO CAMACHO
JUAN LOPEZ
AURELIO PEREZ
JOSE SOTO
Cabos:
ALBERTO TELLEES Y CASAS
JOSE VASQUEZ
CARLOS VIDAL
ENRIQUE VILLAR

EJERCITO BOLIVIANO
Jefe: General: CLAUDIO ACOSTA

PRIMERA DIVISION
Batallón “Alianza Colorados”
Comandante: FELIPE REVELO
Tenientes:
NEREO SANJINES
ENRIQUE MOJE

Batallón “AROMA”
Soldados:
JOSE ZEVALLOS
ZACARIAS RIVERO
MANUEL CARI

Batallón “Loa”
Teniente: GREGORIO GANDARILLAS
Soldados:
JUAN ROSALES
AGUSTIN EDUARDO

SEGUNDA DIVISION
Batallón “Sucre Amarillos”
Soldados:
MANUEL CORRALES
BALDOMERO PEDRAZA
DEMETRIO MARIACA

Batallón “Viedma”
Soldados:
ANDRES ZEVALLOS
ANTONIO BRAVO
TOMAS CAMACHO

Batallón “Padilla”
Capitanes:
JULIO ACHA
JUAN ZAVALA
Tenientes:
DELFIN BUITRON
JOSE MARIA OVANDO
JUSTO PASTOR RIVERA

TERCERA DIVISION
Batallón “Grau”
Soldados:
JUAN TEJERINA
JULIAN TORRES
BASILIO MERIDA

Batallón “Tarija”
Soldados:
NAZARIO ZAMORA
VENENCIO MIRANDA
JUAN JIMENEZ

Batallón “Chorolque”
Capitán: BENJAMIN VILLEGAS
Tenientes:
ALEJANDRO PORCEL
MARIANO GRANDI

DIVISION VANGUARDIA
Batallón ”Murillo”:
Sub Teniente: JULIO DUCROCK
Sargentos.
WERTER RIVERA
LIZANDRO ALTUZARRA

Regimiento “Libres del Sur”:
Capitán: ADOLFO VARGAS
Teniente: ANGEL SALGUERO

Escuadrón Escolta:
Rifleros:
PASTOR FLORES
GREGORIO GARCIA

BATALLA DE ARICA 7 JUNIO 1880
Muertos y Heridos

JEFE DE LA PLAZA: CORONEL: FRANCISCO BOLOGNESI
Capitán: DANIEL CORZO
Tenientes:
AURELIO CARDENAS
PEDRO URETA
Sub Tenientes:
N, MUNAR
CIPRIANO RUIZ

SETIMA DIVISION
Jefe: Coronel: JOSE JOAQUIN INCLAN
JEM Coronel: RICARDO O’DONOVAN

Batallón “Granaderos de Tacna”
Coronel: JUSTO ARIAS Y ARAGUEZ
Mayores:
FELIPE ANTONIO ZELA
TOMAS CHOCANO
JUAN IZUSQUIZA
MIGUEL ESPINOZA
Capitanes:
ORDONER VARGAS
PEDRO CORREA
FELIPE LEON
MANUEL MOYANO
Tenientes:
VITALIANO BECERRA
ESTEBAN GILES
ARISTIDES SOLOGUREN
ASCENCIO RIVERA
MARIANO BENAVIDES
Sub Tenientes:
NESTROR BIRNE
RICARDO TELLEZ
LIZARDO ZEVALLOS
AURELIO GOMEZ GARCIA
JULIO BARRIOS
NOE BICOAGA
MANUEL TELLEZ
MIGUEL ORTIZ
CARLOS MURPHI
Inspector:
MANUEL JENI

Batallón “Artesanos de Tacna”:
Coronel: MARCELINO VARELA
Mayor: LUIS ARMANDO BLONDEL
Capitanes:
MANUEL LARA
PEDRO VIDAURRE
OLEGARIO ROSPLIGIOSI
MANUEL QUELOPANA
Tenientes:
FEDERICO BASADRE
CLODOMIRO BUSTAMANTE
ABEL ZELA
JOSE SOTO
SEBASTIAN CESPEDES
JOSE QUELOPANA
Sub Tenientes:
ARMANDO BASADRE
JUAN ALAY
JOSE RODRIGUEZ
LEONIDAS ARRIAGA

Batallón “Cazadores de Tacna”
Comandante: FRANCISCO CORNEJO
Mayor: GENARO VIZCARRA
Capitán: MIGUEL REVELLO
Tenientes:
RICARDO BARREDO
GUILLERMO SANTANA
MANUEL POZO
JOSE SOTO
ANDRES BELAUNDE
RUFINO VARGAS
Sub Teniente: ISAIAS MEDINA

OCTAVA DIVISION
Jefe: Coronel: ALFONSO UGARTE
JEM Coronel: MARIANO BUSTAMANTE

Batallón “Tarapacá”
Comandantes:
RAMON ZAVALA
BENIGNO CORNEJO
Capitán: JUAN GARLAND
Tenientes:
FEDERICO BERASTAIN
SIMON GRADOS
PEDRO HELMES
ALEJANDRO MONTFOR
Sub Tenientes:
ELEODORO ZEVALLOS
ANIBAL CHAVEZ
RAMON OSORIO

Batallón “Iquique”
Comandante: ROQUE SAENZ PEÑA
Mayores:
ISIDORO SALAZAR
CARLOS ESCOBAR
Capitán: DAVID CUELLAS
Tenientes:
VICENTE ALMONTE
MANUEL SILVESTRE ARO
ENRIQUE HERNANDEZ
JOSE NACARINO
Sub Tenientes:
ELIAS LOAYZA
VICENTE RODO
FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ
FEDERICO CASTILLA
FEDERICO ALVAREZ
MANUEL GARCIA
CARLOS MORE

BATERIAS DEL MORRO
Capitán: JUAN GUILLERMO MORE
Mayor: MANUEL MARTINEZ
Capitanes:
CLETO MARTINEZ
ADOLFO KING
Tenientes:
TOMAS G. OTOYA
EMILIO DE LOS RIOS
MIGUEL ESPINOZA
FRANCISCO RAMIREZ
TORIBIO TRELLES
ALBERTO CADERONI
Sub Tenientes:
FRANCISCO ALLAU
GUSTAVO MONTERVI

BATERIAS DEL NORTE
Comandante: JUAN PABLO AYLLO
Mayor: MANUEL MARTINEZ

BATERIAS DEL ESTE
Mayores:
FERMIN MACARINO
ISMAEL MEZA
Capitán: JUAN RAMIREZ
Tenientes:
NEMESIO BOUNHUMEN
ANTONIO MORENO
MANUEL SEROJ
MANUEL TARY
Sub Tenientes:
LIZARDO PEDRAJA
EUSEBIO NAPURI
ENRIQUE ZAPATA
MANUEL MOYANO
JOSE BELAUNDE
Cabo: ALFREDO MALDONADO

BATERIAS FLOTANTES
Monitor “Manco Capac”
Capitán de Fragata: JOSE SANCHEZ LAGOMARSINO
Capitán de Corbeta: ROMULO TIZON
Tenientes:
BERNARDO SMITH
JOSE PIZARRO
JUAN TABOADA
EULOGIO SALDIAS
NICANOR ASIN
Sub Tenientes:
RAMON BUENO
DANIEL DURAN
Guardia Marina
CARLOS LEGUIA
CARLOS BARANDIARAN
LUIS A. ARCE
FELIPE ALCORTA
JUAN MULGRUW
FRANCISCO ESCURRA
Maquinistas:
TOMAS COLPUHOUN ANIBAL ALAYZA
MANUEL HIDALGO
TORIBIO VILLALOBOS
ALCIBIADES MALDONADO
TOMAS BONAR
BENJAMIN ARCE FOLCHS
Ayudante:
MANUEL SALAS
JOSE ZAVALETA

LANCHA TORPEDO “ALIANZA”
Teniente: MANUEL FERNANDEZ DAVILA
Alférez: DAVID FLORES
Guardia Marina: JUAN DE MORA
Maquinistas:
CLODOMIRO GONZALEZ
CARLOS CARRANZA

CAMPAÑA DE LIMA
BATALLA DE “SAN JUAN” 13 ENERO 1881
Muertos

Comandancia General:
Coroneles:
JOSE DIAZ
JOSE GONZALES

Estado Mayor:
Coronel: JUAN MANUEL MONTERO ROSAS
Comandantes:
MAXIMO BENAVIDES
CIPRIANO NICANOR ROSAS
CIPRIANO NICANOR RIVAS
Mayores:
JOSE MARIA FRIAS
JOSE LUIS ELCOLOBARRUTIA
MANUEL MEDRANO SILVA
MANUEL MORAN SILVA
FEDERICO LA ROSA
Capitanes:
M. PORTOCARRERO
CARLOS GONZALES LARRAÑAGA
ANTONIO OLIVERA
Teniente: JOSE PORTOCARRERO
Sub Teniente: ENRIQUE MORENO
Guardia Marina: FEDERICO DE LA ROSA
Ayudantes:
Comandante: FRANCISCO GARCIA
Mayores:
JESUS MORALESS
JUAN CARTASUSA
JUAN CASTILLA
Administración:
Comandantes:
OSCAR DE LA BARRERA
JUAN ANTONIO PINTO
Teniente: BALTAZAR ZAMBRANO
Ambulancia: Practicante: GREGORIO MONTES
Ingenieros:
Teniente: JUAN MIGUEL BALCAZAR
Oficial: PEDRO DUGNE

A LA DERECHA
I CUERPO DE EJÉRCITO
Jefe: SEGUNDA DIVISION EJÉRCITO DEL NORTE
Coronel PABLO ARGUEDAS

Batallón “Guardia Peruana” No. 1
Comandante: MANUEL MARIA SEGUIN
Mayor: PEDRO ALCOCER
Capitán: JOSE Gabriel TORRES
Tenientes:
JUAN ANTONIO GARCIA
ANTONIO REYES
Sub Teniente: MANUEL GARCIA
Sargento: JOSE GAMBOA
Cabos:
JUAN IZAGUIRRE
BELIZARIO MORENO

Batallón “Tarma” No. 7
Coronel: M. MENDIZABAL
Mayores:
NESTOR BERMUDEZ
ADOLFO BERMUIDEZ
Capitán: BUENAVENTURA REY
Tenientes:
ANTONIO BUCKINGHAM
ANTONIO CARDENAS
JUAN MENDIZABAL

Batallón “Callao” No. 9
Mayores:
JUAN JOSE OCHOA
Capitán: ANTONIO AVILES
Teniente: MANUEL WAGNER
Sub Tenientes:
ABELARDO RUBIO
JOSE CEFERINO OCHOA
PABLO CASTORINO DIAZ
Sargentos:
JOSE OCHOA
MANUEL ALBA
PEDRO GRANTHON
Cabo: CARLOS CAMACHO
Soldado: SIMON SHURITS

Batallón “Libres de Trujillo” No. 11
Capitanes:
MAXIMO ALVARADO
JOSE ASCENCIO MORALES
MANUEL MORALES COVERO
Tenientes:
ABELARDO RUBIO
LEOPOLDO ARIAS
BERNAQRDINO CRUZ
MANUEL RUBIO CARRION
Sub Tenientes:
VICENTE NUÑEZ LARREA
FEDERICO UGARTE
Soldado:
PABLO ALAS
MANUEL PAGADOR

Batallón “Junín” No. 13
Comandante: DANIEL SIMON VELEZ
Mayor: MANUEL CASOS
Sub Teniente: JOSE MANUEL ROSAS MEDINA
Sargento: BELISARIO CARMONA

Batallón “Ica” No. 15
Comandante: RICARDO MURGA
Capitán: JOSE MARIA BENAVIDES
Tenientes:
MANUEL FEDERICO PAZOS
ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ

Batallón “Libres de Cajamarca” No. 21
Coronel: JOAQUIN BERNAL
Comandante: JOSE GAMARRA
Mayores:
MANUEL GAMARRA
ALEJANDRO IGLESIAS

ARTILLERIA
Comandantes:
FRANCISCO MORENO
MANUEL ODICIO
Mayores:
ENRIQUE DELHORME
MARIANO CASANOVA
DANIEL GALLES
RAMON DAGNINO
DIEGO MEDINA
DANIEL GARCES
FERNANDO DE LAVALLE Y PARDO
Capitanes:
N. ROMANO
MANUEL RUBIÑOS
VICENTE ESPANTOSO
PEDRO ZELAYA
ANTONIO OLIVERA
MIGUEL RAMIREZ
Tenientes:
DAVID LEON
GABINO SALAZAR
MANUEL FUENTES
MANUEL ROCAVERO
MANUEL VIDAL
AUGUSTO BOLOGNESI
MANUEL ZELAYA
BALTAZAR DEL VALLE
JOSE ALBUJAR
MAXIMO PIEROLA
Sub Tenientes:
EDUARDO BRYTOS
ALBERTO SEMINARIO CORTEZ
ENRIQUE VILLAR
JUAN MAXIMILIANO CARRANZA
ENRIQUE DEL VALLE
JULIO S. MOPRALES
Sargentos:
ISAIAS OLIVIO Y ROCA
ESTEBAN TUESTEN
CLODOMIRO ZAMBRANO MOYANO
MANUEL FLORES
Cabos:
LORENZO MORALES
SATURNINO MORALES
EMILIO ABAD
PABLO SANCHEZ
MANUEL RAMOS
Soldados:
MANUEL CASTAÑEDA
JOSE MERCEDES REVOREDO

CENTRO
IV CUERPO DE EJÉRCITO
Jefe Primera División Ejercito del Centro
Coronel DOMINGO AYARZA

Batallón “Lima” No. 61
Tenientes:
CESAR RODRIGUEZ
LIZARDO ALZAMORA
Sub Teniente: ELIAS CALMET
Cabo: JUAN DAVALOS
Soldados:
LUIS ZAPATA
ANTONIO CAMISARO
NICANOR GUERRERO

Batallón “Canta” No. 63
Mayor: JOSE MARIA VILCHEZ
Teniente: MARIANO CAMPOS
Sub Teniente: GUADALUPE HUARE

Batallón “28 de Julio” No. 65
Capitán: AURELIANO BLAKE
Soldado: BERNARDINO FARFAN

Batallón “Pichincha” No. 73
Capitán: ADOLFO GUZMAN

Batallón “Piérola” No. 75
Coronel: REYNALDO DE VIVANCO
Capitanes:
FRANCISCO BEJARANO
JUAN PABLO BERMUDEZ
HERACLIDES CABRERA
BERNARDINO ROMERO
LORENZO LOZANO
MANUEL TOMAS PEREZ
Tenientes:
RAMON GUERRERO
AGUSTIN ORTEGA
LORENZO JAUREGUI
FRANCISCO VVALLEJOS
Sub Tenientes:
FRANCISCO BENTACOUR
SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ
JUAN HERENCIA ZEVALLOS
FELIPE VALLE RIESTRA
DANIEL TIMORAN
Sargento:
JULIO BOUQUET
Soldados:
MATIAS GOMEZ
VIVIANO PAREDES
MANUEL ARIAS
MANUEL JARAMILLO

Batallón “ARICA” No. 79
Comandante: JOSE MANUEL SILVA
Tenientes:
LIZARDO BASURTO
JULIO RODRIGUEZ
Sub Tenientes:
JOSE FAUSTINO FAJARDO
MANUEL PALOMINO
Sargentos:
JOSE MARIA AGUILAR
MANUEL MEDRANO
Soldado: SIBILINO RUIZ

Batallón “Manco Capac” No.81
Comandante: ADOLFO MARTINEZ
Teniente: BELIZARIO MORENO
Sub Tenientes:
TORIBIO SEMINARIO CORTEZ
SAMUEL BERNALES LEON
MANUEL GARCIA
MANUEL BARRETO

Batallón “Ayacucho” No. 83
Coronel: MARIANO PASTOR SEVILLA
Mayor: DANIEL MENDOZA

A LA IZQUIERDA
III CUERPO DE EJÉRCITO

Batallón “Piura” No. 67
Mayor: IGNACIO SEMINARIO
Sub Teniente: JUAN GUERRA

Batallón “23 de Diciembre” No. 69
Capitanes:
JULIO VICTOR AGUIRRE
JUAN A. VALENCIA
JUSTO NAVEDA
Sub Tenientes:
LIZARDO BENAVIDES
JULIO BELLIDO
Cabo: CESAR ESCOBAR
Soldados:
RAMON CACERES
CALIXTO GONZALES
ISMAEL ESCOBAR

Batallón “Libertad” No. 71
Sub Teniente:
BLAS OCHOA
ELISEO CALMET GOMEZ

Batallón “Cazadores de Junín” No. 89
Capitán: GERMAN LAPEYRE
Teniente: FILIBERTO ROMERO
Sub Teniente: ADOLFO VIEIRA

Batallón de “Reserva Movilizable” No. 40
Soldado: CELSO RODRIGUEZ

Columna de la “Guardia Civil”:
Inspectores:
JOSE GAVINO HIGINIO
PEDRO SILVA ARRIAGA
ANTONIO JOSE TERRY
ENRIQUE VALLEJOS
MANUEL OSAMBELA
PABLO SANCHEZ
ANDRES DOMINGUEZ
ANTONIO FERREYROS
Teniente: MARCOS DAVILA
Sargentos:
POLICARPO RIVERA
SABINO ARANDA

CABALLERIA
Comandantes:
BELISARIO GRADOS
LORENZO RONDON
AUGUSTO BARRENECHEA
Capitán: ESTANISLAO GOMEZ FERNANDINI
Sub Teniente: ALEJANDRO TIRADO

OTROS
Coronel: MANUEL CANO
Comandante: BALTAZAR GRADOS
Mayor: NICANOR MENDOZA
Capitanes:
MANUEL GALINDO
JUAN MONTOYA
GABRIEL TORRES
Tenientes:
MANUEL BEZADA
SEBASTIAN CLAVERIA
Sub Teniente: MARIANO CARRANZA
Sargento: JOSE VILLARAN
Combatientes:
JOSE ALBUJAR
FRANCISCO ARANA
JUAN BARRERA
DIONICIO CAMPOS
MANUEL CARBAJAL
CARLOS GIL
GREGORIO MIRANDA
NEMESIO NORIEGA
MANUEL VALLEJO
REYNALDO VIVANCO

BATALLA DE SAN JUAN 13 DE ENERO 1881
RESERVA
II CUERPO DE EJÉRCITO
Batallón “9 de Diciembre” No. 5
Sargento: MAXIMO BENAVIDES

Batallón “Huánuco” No. 17
Capitán: MANUEL ELISEO ASANZA
Teniente: LEOPOLDO ZAMBRANO
Soldado: ISIDRO SALAZAR

Batallón “Paucarpata” No. 19
Coronel: JOSE MANUEL CHIARIARSE
Mayores:
CESAR RAMIREZ FRANCIA
JUAN REGAL
Sub Teniente:
JULIO GRIAL
Sargento: ENRIQUE RAMOS
Cabos:
REYNALDO AZAÑEDO OBREGON
MANUEL RAMOS
MANUEL LOBOS
MANUEL MARIN PEÑA
Soldados:
FELIPE SILVA
FRANCISCO GIL
MANUEL LEON

Batallón ”Jauja“ No. 23
Coronel: JULIAN ARIAS Y ARAGUEZ
Comandante: NICOLAS CALDERON
Mayor: JUAN L. RODRIGUEZ
Capitán: JUAN PEÑA
Sargento: PEDRO VILLALOBOS

Batallón “Ancash” No. 25
Teniente: JOSE MARIA CORONEL ZEGARRA

Batallón “Zuavos o Zepita” No. 29
Capitán: JUAN MENDIZABAL
Tenientes:
VICENTE URRETI
MANUEL J. ZEVALLOS
MARIANO ALVARADO OBREGON
ENRIQUYE MULLER
Sargentos:
IDELFONSO FUENTES
FORTUNATO LEON
BUENAVENTURA UBILLUS
DOMINGO ESCOBEDO
DAVID ORTEGA
Cabos: JOSE LUIS BAUTISTA
BELISARIO LEON
JOSE VILLALBA
Soldados:
JUAN DE DIOS BEDOYA
N. ESCURRA
RAMON GUERRERO
CARMEN SALINAS
LIZARDO CHOZA MALDONADO
Porta Estandarte:
Teniente: JOSE ANDRES TORRES PAZ

OTROS
Mayores:
JUAN CARRILLO
RICARDO COLMENARES
JUAN VELEZ
Capitanes:
JOSE MARIA BUSTAMANTE
JOAQUIN OTOYA RAMIREZ
HERNANDO VALLE ARIAS
JOSE E. PACHECO
PEDRO OLIVEIRA
TOMAS SANCHEZ
ANTONIO BARBARAN
Tenientes:
ALBERTO DEL CAMPO
JOSE ITURREGUI
AGUSTIN LANGUE
GUILLERMO VARGAS
MANUEL TELAYA
MANUEL PORTOCARRERO
JOSE ROCA
Sub Tenientes:
JOSE MANUEL CASTILLO
GERMAN AMEZAGA
ADRIAN LECHU
PEDRO BRACHO
PEDRO CHAVARRI
ERNESTO DIBARBU
ANTONIO SALAS
AQUILINO TERAN
ENRIQUE VILLAR
Sargentos:
ROMAN BALAREZO ZAPATA
NICANOR HERNANDEZ
Combatientes:
NICOLAS DEL AGUILA
BASILIO DEL AGUILA
ESTEBAN AGUILA RENGIFO
JUAN JOSE ALVAREZ
DIONICIO ANGULO
SAMUEL BARBARAN VELA
HIGINIO CARO
MANUEL CARO
MAMUEL CARRERA
FACTOR ANGULO
CARMELO ANGULO
DOMINGO AREVALO
FRANCISCO AREVALO
JUAN AREVALO
LIBERATO AREVALO
MATIAS CORAL
SATURNINO CHUMBE
MANUEL CHUMBE
ILDEFONSO DAVILA
ANDRES EGAZ
FRANCISCO ESTRELLA
BELISARIO FLORES
EGIDIO FRANCO
BENJAMIN GOMEZ
JOSE GOMEZ PEREZ
TEODORO GUERRA
JOSE CRUZ GUERRA
MANUEL LOPEZ
RAYMUNDO LOPEZ
MANUEL LOZANO
JUAN GUALBERETO MACEDO
TOMAS MEJIA
CARMEN MELENDEZ
MARECELINO MENDOZA
PASION MESA
MIGUEL MONCADA
DAVID MONCADA
CARMELO MORENO
ANTONIO MORI
JUAN MUÑOZ
ESCOLASTICO MURRIETA
JUAN MURRIETA
ERNESTO NORIEGA
ISAAC NORIEGA
MARCELINO NUÑEZ
PASION OCHOA
TORIBIO OCHOA
NINO OLORTEGUI
FRANCISCO DE PAULA PEÑA
SANTIAGO POMA
FAUSTINO PERES
VIVIANO PERES
ANTONIO PERES
PEDRO PESEA
JOSE DEL CARMEN PINEDO
FROILAN PORTOCARRERO
PABLO RAMIREZ
NICOLAS REATEGUI
PASCUAL REATEGUI
JOSE MANUEL REBOREDO
AURELIO RENGIFO
FERNANDO RENGIFO
AVELINO RENGIFO
SILVERIO RENGIFO
RUPERTO RIOS RUIZ
TORIBIO RIOS
JOSE DEL CARMEN RODRIGUEZ
SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ Y DENCH
BONIFACIO RODRIGUEZ
ANSELMO ROJAS
MANUEL ROJAS
VENTURA ROJAS
PEDRO RUIZ
JUAN DE DIOS RUIZ
JUAN RUIZ M.
ABRAHAM SALDAÑA
ESPIRITU SALINAS
FERNANDO SANCHEZ
PASION SANCHEZ
JUAN SANDOVAL MATA
EUGENIO SILVA
JORGE SOLANO
MATEO SOSA
JUAN VARELA
JUAN JOSE VARGAS
LUIS VARGAS
JESUS VASQUEZ
ELIAS VASQUEZ PEREZ
MIGUEL VELASQUEZ LOPEZ
EDUARDO VELA
SANTIAGO VELA
BENJAMIN VILLALOBOS SAMANIEGO
ENRIQUE VILLAR
FRANCISCO VILLASERLO
ENRIQUE VILLEGAS RUEDA

BATALLA DE MIRAFLORES 15 ENERO 1881
Muertos
ESTADO MAYOR.
Coroneles:
MAXIMO ISAAC ABRIL
MARIANO ARRIS
Comandantes:
JUAN MANUEL VERASTIAGA
MAXIMO BENAVIDES
N. VILLAGARCIA
Ayudantes:
Comandante: HIPOLITO DE LA MELENA
Capitanes: FRANCISCO DE PAULA UGARRIZA
MAXIMIANO VELARDE
Tenientes:
JUAN VELARDE CONCHA
DAVID MORENO
Sargento: MANUEL RUIZ MORENO
Ingeniero: BARTOLOME TRUJILLO
Ambulancia:
GREGORIO INFANTAS FONSECA
BENJAMIN FAJARDO Y OLIVA
JOSE RAMON DE LOS HEROS
Administración:
Tenientes:
ENRIQUE DELUCCI
ENRIQUE GUIMARAES
FRANCISCO JAVIER FERNANDEZ
JUAN ANDRADE
JUAN DE LA FUENTE
VENANCIO AVILA

SECTOR CACERES
DIVISION NORIEGA
Batallón “Guarnición de Marina”
Capitán de Navío: JUAN FANNING
Mayores:
MANUEL PINO DIAZ
AUGUSTO UGARTE
Capitanes;
MANUEL ASANZA
MANUEL PINO MORENO
Tenientes:
RICARDO ALVARADO
MANUEL BOZANO
AURELIO HURTADO Y HAZA
MOISES PATRON
Sub Tenientes:
FRANCISCO HIGGINSON
Sargento: IDELFONSO FUENTES
Soldados:
MANUEL PAREDES
GREGORIO VINCES
TRANQUILINO VELARDE
JUAN EZEQUIEL COCKBRUON

Batallón GUARDIA CHALACA
Capitán de Fragata: CARLOS ARRIETA
Capitanes:
MANUEL CANTAS
VICENTE ESPANTOSO
Teniente: MANUEL SICTO GELOS
Sub Tenientes:
VICENTE MARIZALDE
JOSE CLOTALDO PLO
MANUEL ALCEDO
SIXTO DEUSTUA
MANUEL GERMAN POBLET
Sargentos:
PEDRO CABALLERO
ANTONIO DE LA HAZA
ANIBAL ESTRADA
ANTONIO RUIZ
Cabos:
JOSE DOLORES VILLA
SANTIAGO FIGUEROA
FRANCISCO MUÑOZ
IGNAQCIO ORELLANA
SANTIAGO PORTAL
RAFAEL RUIZ
Soldados:
FEDERICO ALVARO
JOSE ARREDONDO
PEDRO BACHO
LAUREANO CORREA
JUAN CARRILLO
RAMON CORTEZ
TORIBIO CUBILLAS
MIGUEL DIAZ
JULIO ESTRADA
JUSTO FLORES
NICOLAS FONSECA
JORGE FRENCH
JOAQUIN GONZALES
JUAN GRILLO
SAMUEL ALEGRIA
JUAN GORDILLO
JUAN LANDAVERI
CESAR IUND
ANDRES MADUEÑO
MANUEL MANALLA
FRANCISCO MELLADO
MANUEL MOLERO
ANSELMO MONTES
MARTIN OLAYA
JUAN OLMOS
MANUEL PAREJAS
TOMAS PERLA
JUAN F. PEREZ
EDILBERTO PONCE DE LEON
MIGUEL REYES
ZENON RIVERA
ATANACIO SALCEDO
GUSTAVO ADOLFO SANTILLANA
ISAAC SANTILLANA
CLODOMIRO SOTELO
MIGUEL TRASMONTES
AGUSTIN UGARTE
MANUEL VASQUEZ
OCTAVIO VASQUEZ
JUAN VILLANUEVA

Bomberos
CAIDOS EN DEFENSA DE LA PATRIA
APELLIDOS Y NOMBRES COMPAÑÍA FECHA INMOLADO EN
1 Alarco Espinoza, Antonio Lima Nº 4 02/05/1866 Combate del 2 de Mayo
2 Ugarte Y Moscoso, Manuel S. Lima Nº 4 25/05/1880 Rada del Callao
3 Placencia, Ernesto Cosmopolita Nº 11 02/06/1880 Batalla del Alto de la Alianza
4 King Loane, Adolfo Martín Unión Chalaca Nº 1 07/06/1880 Batalla de Arica
5 Torres, Gabriel (Fundador) Lima Nº 4 13/01/1881 Batalla de San Juan
6 Ayarza, Domingo Garibaldi Nº 6 13/01/1881 Batalla de San Juan
7 Bargna, Felipe Garibaldi Nº 6 13/01/1881 El saqueo de Chorrillos

8 Chiappe, Lucas Garibaldi Nº 6 13/01/1881 El saqueo de Chorrillos

9 Cipillini. Ángel Garibaldi Nº 6 13/01/1881 El saqueo de Chorrillos

10 Descalzi, Ángel Garibaldi Nº 6 13/01/1881 El saqueo de Chorrillos

11 Leonardo Juan Bautista Garibaldi Nº 6 13/01/1881 El saqueo de Chorrillos

12 Marzano, Pablo Garibaldi Nº 6 13/01/1881 El saqueo de Chorrillos

13 Nerini, Enrique Garibaldi Nº 6 13/01/1881 El saqueo de Chorrillos

14 Ognio, Juan Garibaldi Nº 6 13/01/1881 El saqueo de Chorrillos

15 Orengo, José Garibaldi Nº 6 13/01/1881 El saqueo de Chorrillos

16 Pauli, Juan Garibaldi Nº 6 13/01/1881 El saqueo de Chorrillos

17 Risso, Pablo Garibaldi Nº 6 13/01/1881 El saqueo de Chorrillos

18 Strana, Lorenzo Garibaldi Nº 6 13/01/1881 El saqueo de Chorrillos

19 Valentini, Egidio Garibaldi Nº 6 13/01/1881 El saqueo de Chorrillos

20 Aguirre, Julio Salvadora Lima Nº 10 13/01/1881 Batalla de San Juan
21 Carbajal, Manuel A. Salvadora Lima Nº 10 13/01/1881 Batalla de San Juan
22 Fajardo, Jesús P. Salvadora Lima Nº 10 13/01/1881 Batalla de San Juan
23 De la Cuba, Nicasio Cosmopolita Nº 11 13/01/1881 Batalla de San Juan
24 Braccio, Pedro Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
25 Caballero, Pedro Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
26 Cauto, Miguel Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
27 Estrada, Justo A. Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
28 Grillo, Juan Aquilino Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
29 Herrada, Miguel Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
30 Higginson, Guillermo Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
31 Lund, César Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
32 Muñoz, Francisco Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
33 Olmos, Juan Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
34 Orellana, Ignacio Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
35 Pardo De Figueroa, Santiago Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
36 Paulet, Germán Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
37 Rivera, Zenón Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
38 Villanueva, Juan Unión Chalaca Nº 1 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
39 Barrón, Enrique Lima Nº 4 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
40 Del Campo, Enrique F. Lima Nº 4 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
41 Paz Soldán, Eleodoro Lima Nº 4 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
42 Rellis, Juan Lima Nº 4 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
43 Richardson, Carlos Lima Nº 4 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
44 Rioja, José Lima Nº 4 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
45 Sáenz, Agustín Lima Nº 4 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
46 Villarán, Samuel Lima Nº 4 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
47 Geloz, Manuel S. Salvadora Callao Nº 9 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
48 Barrionuevo, Manuel Salvadora Lima Nº 10 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
49 Del Campo, Enrique Salvadora Lima Nº 10 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
50 Del Pino, Marcelo Salvadora Lima Nº 10 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
51 Morales, Tomás L. Salvadora Lima Nº 10 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
52 O'Hara, Santiago Salvadora Lima Nº 10 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
53 Panizo, Vicente Salvadora Lima Nº 10 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
54 Portocarrero, Daniel Salvadora Lima Nº 10 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
55 Rivera, Belisario Salvadora Lima Nº 10 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
56 Sagales, Ismael Salvadora Lima Nº 10 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
57 Alfaro, Juan Cosmopolita Nº 11 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
58 Cantuarias, Arturo Cosmopolita Nº 11 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
59 Castillo, Emilio Cosmopolita Nº 11 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
60 De tena, Emilio Cosmopolita Nº 11 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
61 Moreno, Gerardo Cosmopolita Nº 11 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
62 Ortega, Enrique Cosmopolita Nº 11 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
63 Pinoleti, Ismael Cosmopolita Nº 11 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
64 Velarde Maximiliano Cosmopolita Nº 11 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
65 Velarde, Tranquilino Cosmopolita Nº 11 15/01/1881 Batalla de Miraflores
66 Lange, Augusto Victoria Nº 8 16/01/1881 Guardia Urbana calle "La Pelota"
67 Sotomayor, José A. Salvadora Lima Nº 10 10/07/1883 Batalla de Huamachuco
68 Távara Renovales, Santiago Agustín Salvadora Callao Nº 9 22/08/1897 Sobreviviente del Combate de Angamos
69 Giraldo Vega, Lorenzo Salvadora Callao Nº 9 03/10/1948 Revolución Civil
70 Upiachigua Cárdenas, Julio La Punta Nº 34 03/10/1948 Revolución Civil

Batallon “Guardia Peruana”.
Comandante: CARLOS RICHARDSON
Capitanes:
FELIX FRANCISCO GIL
NUMA GENARO LLONA
Tenientes:
JUAN ARANA
OBDULIO FERREYRA
AUGUSTO HURTADO
VICENTE HURTADO
FRANCISCO MORALES
Cabo: JOSE NAUPARE
Soldado: MANUEL VIDAL

Batallón “Callao”
Sargentos:
JULIO ALCAZAR
VICTOR BALCAZAR
Cabo: MANUEL RISCO
Soldados:
ALFREDO BOCANEGRA
GRIMALDO CHOZA
NATALIO HERRERA
WENCESLAO ROMERO

Batallón “CANTA”
Capitán: BRAULIO SUAREZ BANDINI
Soldado: ISIDRO POMAR

Batallón “28 de Julio”
Sargento: ANIBAL ESTRADA

Batallón “Trujillo”
Sub Teniente: ARTURO SUAREZ
Soldado: CARLOS ALCORTA

Batallón “Jauja”
Teniente: FELIPE SANTIAGO MURO

DIVISION ZEVALLOS
Batallón “Concepción”
Sub Teniente: FEDERICO MONASTERIO

Batallón “Paucarpata”
Soldados:
MAXIMILIANO BENITES NARANJO
BENIGNO REYES DURAND

Reducto No. 1
Batallón de Reserva No. 2
Capitán: MANUEL VILLARAN
Tenientes:
HERMILIO FERNANDEZ
FERNANDO TERAN
JUAN VELARDE Y SANCHEZ
Sub Teniente: DANIEL MORENO
Cabo: ISMAEL PIÑATELLI
Soldados:
FRANCISCO MINDREAU
JOSE RUFINO TORRES
LUIS SEGUNDO TERAN
WENCESLAO CABREJOS
ENRIQUE LUIS BARRON
JOSE JOAQUIN ESCOBAR
PEDRO LUIS FALUCCI
MANUEL JOSE MALARIN
MARTIN MARTINEZ
ENRIQUE OLIVA FRANCISCO SEGUIN
ANTONIO VELASQUEZ

REDUCTO No. 2
Batallón de Reserva No. 4
Coronel: MANUEL MARIA GOMEZ
Coronel: MANUEL MARIA GOMEZ
Mayor: JOSE OSORES
Capitanes:
MANUEL ARELLANO BARBOZA
JUAN BERMUDEZ
SATURNINO DEL CASTILLO
Tenientes:
MOISES PATRON
MANUEL PINO
GUILLERMO LEON
MANUEL CAVENECIA
Sub Tenientes:
MAXIMO GARCIA CALDSERON
GERARDO MORENO
JOSE SOTO
Sargentos:
JOSE MANUEL BARRIONUEVO
DANIEL PORTOCARRERO
GERMAN CARRASCO
Cabo: EMILIO CAVENECIA
Soldados:
FELIX OLCAY
MANUEL RAMOS HERRERA
MANUEL SANCHEZ
ANTONIO ASPILLAGA
MANUEL CABALLERO
JOSE GONZALEZ
ZENON RIVERA
JUAN DIONISIO RIVERA
JOSE MARIA SEGUIN
MANUEL SIXTO PATRON
CARLOS PIÑATELLI
JOSE RODRIGUEZ
DEMETRIO RUIZ
MANUEL HARRIS
RICARDO OLMEDO
CARLOS L. RICHARDSON

REDUCTO No.3
BATALLON DE RESERVA No. 6
Coronel: NARCISO DE LA COLINA RUBI
Comandantes:
NATALIO SANCHEZ
ENRIQUE DEL CAMPO
Mayor: REINALDO DEL CAMPO
Capitanes:
JUAN PABLO BERMUDEZ
ADOLFO DE LA JARA BERMUDEZ
Tenientes:
EMILIO BERMUDEZ
MANUEL NEMESIO REYES
LUIS DE LA JARA BERMUDEZ
MANUEL GUMERCINDO IBERICO
JULIO CALERO
MANUEL FRANCO
TEODORO GARRIDO LECCA
EDUARDO GALLO
Sub Teniente: MANUEL DAGNINO
Sargentos:
LEONIDAS LASERRE PALOMINO
SAMUEL BERNARDO MARQUEZ
ROBERTO GARCIA
Cabos:
JOSE ASTETE
ULDARICO CABEZAS
EDUARDO CADENBACK
MARIANO ARREDONDO
FEDERICO MAYORGA
TEODORO CARDENAS
MANUEL IRIGOYEN
JUAN CANCIO MONTEROLA
Soldados:
MANUEL PALOMINO OSORES
CARLOS RODRIGUEZ
MANUEL SANCHEZ PAJUELO
PEDRO SANCHEZ
MANUEL VILLANUEVA
GREGORIO ZEGARRA
EULOGIO CABADA
JOSE HERNANDO
JOSE N. IBERICO
JOSE HERRERA
EDUARDO EZCURRA
JOSE ENRIQUE DEL CAMPO
JOSE ORMEÑO M. REYES VELANZUELA
CLEMENTE SOLIS
JUAN VILLANUEVA
MANUEL ARANA
BARTOLOME BUSTAMANTE
MANUEL ELCOROBARRUTIA
MANUEL CACERES
MANUEL COVARRUBIA
JOSE FAJARDO
JOSE MARIN
ADOLFO CAVERO
ARTURO CESPEDES
ADOLFO CACERES
MANUEL BONILLA
JOSE PEREZ
JUAN DE LA FUENTE
RAMON DE LOS HEROS
EDUARDO ESENORA
EDUARDO VALLE
ANDRES PONCE
PEDRO NIETO
EDILBERTO LLANOS
MANUEL ARREDONDO
MANUEL ARIAS

SECTOR SUAREZ
DIVISON CANEVARO
Batallón “Huánuco”
Sargentos:
DIDEMO GILES
ADRIAN SARA
RAFAEL VALER
WENCESLAO ZAVALA
Cabo: ROSENDO LEDER
Soldados:
N. AZALDEGUI
FRANCISCO CASTILLO
DIONICIO GILES

Batallón “Ica”
Sargento: JOSE RUIZ

Batallón “Junín”:
Teniente: EDUARDO RICHARDSON

DIVISION IGLESIAS
Batallón “Manco Capac”
Soldado: ANTONIO CONDE

Reducto No. 4
Batallón de Reserva No. 8
Capitan: JUAN ALFARO
Sargentos:
GERMAN CARRASCO
DANIEL PORTOCARRERO
Cabos:
VICENTE IANIO
JOSE CONTRERAS
GERMAN ZICHA
Soldados:
EMILIO SANDOVAL
JOSE MANUEL VALERO
PEDRO GONZALEZ MUQUI
PEDRO GONZALES ABREGU
JUAN HERRAN
DANIEL MARTINEZ
ANDRES GUZMAN
TOMAS GUZMAN
AMBROCIO DE LOS HEROS

SECTOR PASTOR DAVILA
Jefe Tercera División Ejercito del Norte
Coronel: BUENAVENTURA AGUIRRE

Batallón “Libres de Cajamarca”
Mayor: JOSE LUCIO MALDONADO
Capitanes:
JOSE DEL CARMEN BERNAL
SAMUEL VILLARAN
Sub Teniente: julio i. bellido
Soldado: MANUEL CORTEZ

Batallón “23 de Diciembre”
Mayor: NICOLAS CALDERON

Batallón “Unión”
Teniente: GREGORIO BALAREZO

OTROS
Columna Exploradores
Comandante: JUAN DEL CARMEN VERASTEGUIO

Brigada Morochucos
Comandante: MANUEL MIOTA

Gendarmes a Caballo
Capitán: MANUEL S. MORALES

ARTILLERIA
Mayores:
MARIANO ODICIO
MARIANO PORTOCARRERO
Capitanes:
BALTAZAR VALLE
ENRIQUE BOLOGNESI

Batallón Ayacucho
Capitanes:
FELIPE GIL
ARMANDO CASTAÑEDA

Batallón Ancash
Teniente: PEDRO BARRETO
Batallón Arica
Sub Teniente: JOSE MANUEL PALOMINO

Batallón Zepita
Mayor: BENITO FONSECA
Capitán: JOSE ANTONIO CARRERA

Batallón Huacho
Soldado: ANGEL CASTILLO

Batallón Mirave
Sargento: N. BALAREZO

Batallón Tarma
Mayor: JUAN CASTILLA COLICHON
Sargento: SANTIAGO CAMPANO

Batallón Piérola
Teniente: ENRIQUE LAPEYRE

Batallón Camaleros
Cabo: FELIPE PALMA
Soldado: JOSE GENERO SANCHEZ

Batallón Guardia Civil
Inspectores:
EDILBERTO ANDRACA
MANUEL BOZANO
BARTOLOME BUSTAMANTE
ARTURO CESPEDES
MANUEL DURAN
JUAN MANUEL IRRIBARREN
FRANCISCO OLIVERA
JOSE PEREZ
JOSE RAMON RUIZ
MANUEL MARIANO RAMOS
JULIO RODAVERO
ALEJANDRO RODAVERO
MANUEL REYES
EDUARDO SANCHEZ
MELITON SALCEDO
CLODOMIRO SILVA
SOSE SILVA
LUIS TERON
JOSE MANUEL VALERA
CECILIO VELASQUEZ
Teniente: JOSE NEYRA
Guardias:
SANTOS LEIVA
EUSEBIO MEDINA
LUIS VALLADARES

Cuerpo de Tipógrafos
NAZARIO ALVAREZ
BENIGNO ANTEZANA
DANIEL AYALA
JOSE N. BANDINI
BARTOLOME BUSTAMANTE
NICOLAS CAMACHO
ANDRES CARREÑO
N. CASANOVA
JOSE F. CAVENECIA
ISAAC CAVENECIA
MIGUEL DIAZ
CIRILO EFFIO
JOSE FAJARDO
NARCISO FLORES
ROBERTO GARCIA
FEDERICO GONZALEZ
MATIAS GONZALEZ
URBANO GUARDAMINO
ENRIQUE LEMBECKE
FRANCISCO VELASQUEZ
JULIAN VILLAFUERTE
NICANOR GUERRERO
DANIEL GUEVARA
PEDRO HEVIA
EUGENIO LAZO
LUIS LEVANO
MANUEL LIRA
FEDERICO MAYORGA
AGAPITO MESINAS
MANUEL MORALES
ESTEBAN MORENO
SANTIAGO O’HARA
FULGENCIO ORMEÑO
JOSE FELIX PAREDES
BELISARIO RIVERA
MANUEL SANCHEZ PAJUELO
PABLO SERRA
JOSE SERRANO
RICARDO SIERRA
IGNACIO SOROGASTUA
ANTONIO TORRES
VICENTE URRESTI
JUAN VANDICK

EJERCITO PERUANO OTRAS UNIDADES
Coroneles:
CIPRIANO LLANOS
JOSE A. LOPEZ
Mayor: J, M. LA FERMOSA
Capitanes:
JOSE COLMA
CESAR FIGUEROA TOLEDO
LEOPOLDO LAZO
JOSE LOPEZ
Tenientes:
JOSE NEYRA
DOMINGO ALVAREZ
DANIEL ARRIZ
JUAN BERMUDEZ
BELISARIO CARRILLO
JUAN FUENTES
MANUEL GARCIA
LEPOLDO MEZA
ANGEL MORALES
VICENTE PANIZO
N, SANTA GADEA Y BAMBAREN
MARCOS TOLEDO
ANGEL VALENZUELA

JEFES HERIDOS EN LA DEFENSA DE LIMA
Generales:
RAMON VARGAS MACHUCA
ANDRES SEGURA
PEDRO SILVA
Coroneles:
ANDRES AVELINO CACERES
CESAR CANEVARO
CARLOS PIEROLA
JUSTINIANO BORGOÑO
PEDRO MÁS
JOAQUIN BERNAL
MANUEL PAJARES
ISAAC RECAVARREN
OSWALDO FLUCKER
FRANCISCO LA ROSA
ANDRES SUAREZ
Mayores:
JOSE ANTONIO SARRIO
JOSE M. HERMOSA
MANUEL ARCE DE LA OLIVA

CAMPAÑA DE LA BREÑA
Muertos y Heridos
COMBATE DE SANGRAR 26 JUNIO 1881
Alférez: CLIMACO FALCON
Soldados:
PRAXEDES PAZ
CLEMENTE IZAGUIRRE
JOSE MERCEDES VALEZ IGREDA
JOSE DOROTEO MOLINA

COMBATE DE PUCARA 5 FEBRERO 1882
Comandante: AMBROSIO NAVARRO
Capitanes:
ABRHAM BALLENAS
JOSE MARIA ECHENIQUE
Tenientes: MANUEL MONTENEGRO
FEDERICO MORALES
Sub Tenientes;
DEMETRIO MERCADO
MANUEL BENDEZU
JOSE MARIA LOPEZ
PEDRO E. MUÑIZ
RUPERTO GUERRA
MANUEL DOMINGUEZ

COMBATE DE SIERRAIUME 2 MARZO 1882
Montoneros:
MARCELINO ALVAREZ
LORENZO BALDEON
MELCHOR CARDENAS
NORBERTO CORDOVA
N. PACHAS ALIAGA
GUILLERMO TORPOCO

COMBATE DE SICAYA 19 ABRIL 1882
Montonero: Joaquín Ávila de lindo

BATALLA DE CHUPACA CAFATO 19 ABRIL 1882
MOLINOSPATA
Montoneros:
PATRICIO REYES
PABLO RUTTI
MANUEL ZURUCHASQUI
LUIS SOCOALAYA
SANTOS APOLAYA
BERNANRDO LAZO

LLACUAZ
Montoneros:
VALENTIN MELGAR
ROSA PEREZ

HUAMAPATA
Montoneros:
ASCENCIO SOALAYA
ESTANISLAO ORELLANA

PLAZA PRINCIPAL
Montoneros:
FELIPE ESPONDA
BASILIO JIMENEZ
HIGIDIO CANGALAYA
N. PAREDES
CAYETANO BUSTOS
SEBASTIAN CERRON
EUSEBIO IBARRA
ANTONIO ALONSO
BERNARDO GALVAN
JOSE IBARRA
MANUEL MELGAR
HERMENEGILDO ROJAS
JACINTO SALVATIERRA

MILOALMA – YAUYO Y PICHINCHA
Montoneros:
FABIAN BARRERTO
RUFINO CONDEZO
MANUEL ORIHUELA
JOSE MARCALAYA
LIDERATO RUIZ
BERNARDO LAZO
MARIANO OROCAJA
AGAPITO GUZMAN
FRANCISCO LAZO
MANUEL MOSQUERA
NAZARIO GOMEZ
GREGORIO HUAMALAYA
JOSE TOPALAYA
FERNANDO SOCOALAYA
SIMON SOTOMAYOR
CEFERINO CERRON

VILCAURCO Y MORRO DE CHUPACA
Montoneros:
ADRIANO ORIHUELA
MARCOS GALVAN
ISIDORO ORIHUELA
N. LLANTUY
JULIAN SOTOMAYOR
MARIANO ORIHUELA
FRANCISCO GOMEZ
ANDRES ORIHUELA
CALIXTO CACHICO
ISIDORO SALVATIERRA
ANDRES OCHOA
CIPRIANO ORELLANA
SANTIAGO LAZO

COMBATE DE HUARIPAMPA 22 ABRIL 1882
Muertos y Heridos
R.O. BUENAVENTURA MENDOZA
Montoneros:
ALEJO HUATUCO
TOMAS NINAHUANCA
PEDRO SOTO
TORIOBIO RAMOS
WENCESLAO NINAHUANCA
BUENAVENTURA OROSCO
ESTEBAN SANCHEZ
EDUARDO CUYUBAMBA
JOSE N. CERVANTES
ASCENCIO OROSCO
VICENTE CUYUBAMBA
AGAPITO VILLARREAL
BRUNO CARDENAS TORIBIO GUZMAN

COMBATE DE ANTOSHPAMPA 22 ABRIL 1882
Montoneros:
LEONOR ORDOÑEZ
FELIPE VILCAHUAMAN
PEDRO TIZA
ANTONIUO GUANAY
AGUSTIN SANDOVAL
BARBARITO CENTENO
GREGORIO QUISPE
BERNARDO PORTOCARRERO
PANCRACIO CENTENO

COMBATE DE MARCAVALLE – PUCAPA – CONCEPCION 9 Y 10 JULIO 1882
Coronel: DOMINGO CABRERA
Comandantes:
ANDRES A. PONDE
JOSE MANUEL MERCADO
FRANCISCO CARBAJAL
Mayor:
NICOLAS BERROSPI
Capitán COSME CURRO
Teniente ANTONIO VERA

Sargento:
ESTEBAN GONZALES
Montoneros:
JUAN DE LA MATA SANABRIA
MARCOS CHAMORRO
ESTEBAN ALZAMORA
TOMAS ASTUCURI
CIPRIANO COCOCACHI
PAULINO MONGE
GREGORIO MALDONADO
BONIFACIO PANDO

COMBATE DE SAN PABLO 13 DE JULIO 1882
Columna de Honor
Coronel: EUDOCIO RAVINES
Capitanes:
ELOY HERNANDEZ
EUGENIO NOVIENO
CESAR PIZARELLO
JUAN QUIROZ
Tenientes:
JOSE COBELLO
ALBERTO GOMEZ
JUAN PIZARRO
CLEMENTE RAVINES
JOSE MANUEL QUIROZ
JOSE NOVOA
MELCHOR SALAZAR
EDMUNDO SILVA
GREGORIO PITA
JOSE RODRIGUEZ
UBALDO SANCHEZ
MANUEL VILLAVICENCIO
JOSE MANUEL SILVA
Sub Tenientes:
JUAN ARROYO
JOSE BRIONES
ROBERTO CABANILLAS
JOSE CRUZ CEPEDA
FRANCISCO CASTREJON
JOSE CRUZETA
VICENTE LINARES
JUAN PIO MARREROS
JOSE PORTAL
FELIPE MATUTE
TORIBIO LOSADAS
M. QUIROZ
JOSE ZAFRA
MANUEL ZAFRA
MANUEL RAMIREZ

LUIS SANCHEZ
JUAN SORIANO
LORENZO VALERA
ENRIQUE VILLANUEVA

COLUMNA BAMBAMARCA
Mayor: DOMINGO MEJIA
Tenientes:
JOSE MANUEL ROMAN Y CAVERO
GONZALO MEJIA

ESCUADRON VENGADORES DE CAJAMARCA
Obrero: JOSE DOLORES CUESTAS

BATALLON CALLAO NO. 2
Capitán: MANUEL BAHAMONDE NAVEDA
Teniente: ARISTIDES DEL CARPIO

BATALLON CHOTA NO. 7
Coronel: ANTONIO SANCHEZ
Comandante: DOMINGO MEJIA
Sargentos:
SATURNINO CUBAS
MARIANO VASQUEZ NUÑEZ
JOSE DEL CARMEN CAMPOS
Cabos:
DANIEL BENAVIDES
MANUEL SAAVEDRA
Soldados:
JOSE MARIA RUIZ
ANDRES CONTRERAS
EUSEBIO NUÑEZ
MATIAS MEJIA
MANUEL ASCENCIO CUBAS
SIMON REGALADO
SINFOROSO BENEVAIDES
RAMON NUÑEZ
JUAN REGALADO
PEDRO CUESTAS
LUCIANO NUÑEZ
ENRIQUE VILLANUEVA

COLUMNA LIBRES DE TRUJILLO NO. 11
Comandante: JULIAN CRUZADO
Capitanes:
PEDRO VARGAS MARQUEZ
FERNANDO CACERES
Tenientes:
JOSE MANUEL MONTERO
MANUEL PALACIOS
Sub Teniente:
MANUEL DEZA
Teniente Niño Héroe: NESTOR BATANERO

COMBATE DE SAN JUAN CRUZ 16 DE JULIO 1882
Capitán: ERNESTO FLORES
Teniente: JOSE PAULET

BATALLA DE HUAMACHUCO 10 DE JULIO 1883
Muertos y Heridos
COMANDANCIA GENERAL
JEFE ESTADO MAYOR DE LOS EJERCITOS DEL CENTRO Y DEL NORTE
Coronel: MANUEL TAFUR

APOSENTADOR GENERAL
General: PEDRO SILVA GIL
SECRETARIA
Comandante:
FLORENTINO PORTUGAL
Mayor: WENCESLAO DEL CARPIO
AYUDANTES
Capitanes:
PABLO JOSE ESLAVA FUENTES
LORENZO AMPUERO
DARIO ENRIQUEZ

EJERCITO DEL CENTRO
PRIMERA DIVISION
Comandante General:
Mayor: JOSE F. CHILET
Capitán: SANTIAGO RAZURI
Teniente: FERNANDO CARRION

BATALLON TARAPACA No. 1
Mayor: MANUEL LOPEZ
Capitanes:
N. BERMUDEZ
M. SANCHEZ

BATALLON ZEPITA No. 2
Coronel: JUSTINIANO BORGOÑO
Mayor: ISAAC GOMEZ
Capitanes:
PEDRO P. MONTENEGRO
N. BARRANTES
REYNALDO SANTILLAN
Tenientes:
RUPERTO GUERRA
MARIANO QUINTANILLA
N. RANGEL
JOSE SORIA
FERMIN YAÑEZ
Sub Tenientes:
JOSE LA ROSA
PEDRO LUQUE
MELCHOR RODRIGUEZ
Abanderado: Sub Teniente: ARNALDO RODO

SEGUNDA DIVISION
COMANDANCIA GENERAL
Jefe: Coronel: JUAN GASTO VALDERRAMA
Comandante:
DEMETRIO ARAUCO

BATALLON MARCAVALLE No. 6
Coronel: FELIPE SANTIAGO CRESPO

BATALLON CAZADORES DE CONCEPCION No. 7
Coronel: PEDRO JOSE CARRION ZERPA
Mayor: CRISANTO MEZA
Capitanes:
NARCISO CORDOVA
GUILLERMO EYZAGUIRRE
SEBASTIAN MONTES
JOSE MORENO
AGUSTIN ORBEGOSO
JOSE ROMAN
REYNALDO A. SORIA
Tenientes:
RICARDO CARDENAS
MANUEL CORRALES
JUAN PEDRO LUQUE MAYORGA
JOSE M. RIVERA
Sub Tenientes:
EMETERIO RECUERDO
ANDRES ROJAS
GERMAN I. ALVA
Soldado: LORENZO YUPANQUI BERRIOS

BATALLON TARMA No. 11
Mayor: FORMIDORO VASCONES
Capitán: ENRIQUE OPPENHEIMMER
Sub Teniente: LIBORIO DELGADO

TERCERA DIVISION
COMANDANCIA GENERAL
Jefe. Teniente Coronel: MAXIMO TAFUR

BATALLON CAZADORES DE JAUJA No. 9
Tenientes:
CARLOS LECCA
LEONIDAS PANIAGUA
Sub Tenientes: FRANCISCO MONTERO

BATALLON JUNIN No. 3
Coronel: JUAN CANCIO VIZCARRA
Capitanes:
BENJAMIN ALVARADO
ADOLFO PAULINO RIVAS
AVELINO CASAÑA
Tenientes:
JACINTO FRIAS
MANUEL SILVA
Sub Tenientes:
MANUEL JESUS FRIAS
ARTURO PINOCHET

CUARTA DIVISION
COMANDANCIA GENERAL
Jefe: Capitán de Navío: LUIS GERMAN ASTETE
Teniente:
WASHINGTON QUINTANILLA

BATALLON SAN GERONIMO
Mayor: JUAN LUIS DEL MAR
Teniente: MARIANO MEZA

CABALLERIA
ESCUADRON CAZADORES DEL PERU
Mayor: SANTIAGO ZAVALA

OTROS
Mayores:
MANUEL EULOGIO DEL RIO
JOSE MARIA LOPEZ
NICANOR RUEDA
RAFAEL RUEDA
ADOLFO TARZABOADA
Capitán de Corbeta: MANUEL H. ARRIAGA
Capitanes:
BENJAMIN CACERES
ADOLFO RIVAS
JULIO BASURTO
MANUEL RIVAS
JOSE DIAZ
COSME COBOS
JOSE MARIA SANTILLANA
RAYMUNDO SANTILLANA
N. SORIA
JOSE ANTONIO SOTO
Mayor: COSME GUTIERREZ
Tenientes;
MANUEL GAMERO
EMILIO ORCASITAS
ARTURO SANONI
Guardia Marina: HECTOR VILLARAN
Sub Tenientes:
MANUEL BASURTO
EUSEBIO COBO
SANTIAGO CABEZUDO
MARCOS CORNELIO
N. MESTANZA PALACIOS
ANDRES A. MONTOYA
JOSE MARIA LOPEZ
JUAN DE DIOS REVILLA
JOSE ANTONIO ZARRIA
JOSE MARIA PILARES
MANUEL ACUÑA

EJERCITO DEL NORTE
COMANDANCIA GENERAL
Jefe: Coronel ISAAC RECAVARREN
Comandante: EMILIO JOSE VILA
Teniente: FRANCISCO AMORIN
Sub Teniente: ENRIQUE MINFLES

QUINTA DIVISION
Jefe: Coronel: MARIANO ARAGONEZ

BATALLON PUCARA No. 4
Comandante: N. PONCE DE LEON
Mayor: MELCHOR RAMIREZ HURTADO
Capitán: FRANCISCO CARREÑO

SEXTA DIVISION
Jefe: Teniente Coronel: CIRIACO SALAZAR

BATALLON HUALLAGA No. 12
Mayor: MIGUEL REVELLO CABRERA
Teniente: FRANCISCO GAMERO

OTROS
Capitanes:
ADOLFO RAMOS
AQUILES ZAVALETA

INMOLADOS EN DIVERSAS ACCIONES
AÑO 1880
25 ABRIL CALLAO Comandante PEDRO RUIZ GALLO
27 DICIEMBRE EL MANZANO Comandante: BALDOMERO AROSTEGUI

AÑO 1881
13 ENERO CHORRILLOS
Cabo: BELISARIO MORENO
Bomberos:
LORENZO ASTRANA
ANGEL CEPOLLINI
LUCAS CHIAPE
ANGEL DESCALIZ JUAN LEONARDI
PABLO MARZANO
ENRIQUE NERINI
GIOVANNI OGNIO
JOSE ORENGO
FELIPE PARGNA
JUAN PAULI
PABLO RISSO
EGIDIO VALENTIN

15 ENERO LIMA
Tipógrafo: RAMON LIONS

8 ABRIL SAN JERONIMO
Teniente: ARISTIDES MENDEZ

10 MAYO PACHACHACA
Gobernador: FRANCISCO DAVILA

31 MAYO VILCABAMBA
JOSE VASQUEZ
FOITACION RAMOS

15 JUNIO CHONGOYAPE
Mayor: CIPRIANO JIMENEZ

25 JULIO LIMA
Capitanes:
FRANCISCO BALZAN
JUAN GRANDA
ESTANISLAO OTAROLA

2 SETIEMBRE PACHIA
Mayores:
CARLOS DE LA TORRE
ABDEON MENA

23 DICIEMBRE LIMA
MANUEL GUERRA
MANUEL HILARION ROLDAN

AÑO 1882
CHUPACA
Teniente: PEDRO PATIÑO

ENERO MOROCOCHA
Comandante: TOMAS PORTUGAL

7 ENERO CHICLAYO
Capitán: FRANCISCO SARAVIA FLORES

22 ENERO YAULI
N. ARMAS

16 FEBRERO ICA
JOSE EMILIANO CASTILLO

24 FEBRERO RUNATULLO
BARTOLA VASQUEZ

10 ABRIL MALPASO
ESTANISLAO CONDOR

19 ABRIL LA MEJORADA
Mayor TEODORO PEÑALOZA

19 HUAMANCCACCA
ANDREA ARAUCO DE PEÑALOZA

19 ABRIL ORCOTUMA
EMILIO HURTADO
JUAN PABLO HURTADO
RAMON PADILLA

22 ABRIL HUAMANMARCA
TOMAS GUTARRA
ENRIQUE ROSADO
VICENTE SAMANIEGO VIVAS
23 ABRIL HUANCANI
MARIANO QUISPE

28 ABRIL SAN JERONIMO
MAXIMO AGUILAR

29 MAYO ICA
MANUEL MARTINEZ

11 JUNIO HERVAY BAJO
Coronel: PABLO SOTO

22 JUNIO LA ENSENADA
HUSARES:
JUAN MENDEZ
AGUSTIN CAMPOS
BENITO RONDON

GUARDIA NACIONAL:
FRANCISCO EGUILUZ
RAMON CACERES

28 JUIO CHINCHA
SIMON ZARATE

AGOSTO CAÑETE
RUPERTO VERGARA
JOSE ORE
JUSTINIANO PEREYRA

10 AGOSTO CAÑETE
MIGUEL GUTIERREZ

16 AGOSTO MONTEJATO
Mayor: JOSE GUTIERREZ

18 AGOSTO SUNAMPE
MARIANO MEJIA

25 AGOSTO LA QUEBRADA
JUAN GARCIA

29 AGOSTO CAÑETE
MANUEL DE LA CRUZ ALIAGA
MAXIMILIANO MONTALVAN
IGNACIO CARDENAS
SANTOS PARRAGA

1 SETIEMBRE GUADALUPE
N. ESCALANTE
BASLIO ESPINOZA

14 SETIEMBRE CONDORILLO
SANTIAGO CASTILLO

15 SETIEMBRE CHINCHA
N. MONDRAGON
CALIXTO UGARTE

7 OCTUBRE CAUSANI
Coronel: GREGORIO ALBARRACIN LANCHIPA
Teniente: ALBARRACIN BERRIOS

14 DIEICMBRE LUNAHUANA
R. P. MANUEL ROMERO

AÑO 1883
14 FEBRERO UNGARA
N. CABRERA

15 FEBRERO SAMA
Comandante: NICOLAS ORTIZ HUAMAN

MARZO CANTA
Capitán: MATIAS MARTINEZ

26 ABRIL BALCONCILLO
Mayor: LUIS P. SACRAVILKCA

27 ABRIL HUAMANTANGA
Mayores:
JOSE MARIANO VILLEGAS
MANUEL VARGAS
NOLASCO LOPEZ
Capitanes:
JOSE MARIA TORO
MANUEL LOPEZ
Teniente: MANUEL BUITON
Sub Teniente: MANUEL TAGLE
Soldados:
MANUEL RUIZ
JOSE ARTURO VILCHEZ
FRANCISCO LOPEZ

JUNIO CHAVIN DE HUANZA
Teniente: HERMINIO URDANIVIA

12 JUNIO AGUAMIRO
Mayor: ENRIQUE PARDO
Teniente: NICANOR ICAZA

6 JULIO PACOA
Coronel: MILCIADES RIOS

8 JULIO JACTAY
Soldado: APARICIO POMARES

15 JULIO HUAMACHUCO
Coroneles:
LEONCIO PRADO
MIGUEL EMILIA LUNA
Capitanes:
JUAN ANTONIO PORTUGAL
BELIZARIO CACERES Y OSMA
Soldados:
PATRICIO LANZA
FELIPE TRUJILLO

31 AGOSTO COLCA
TOMAS CABRERA

11 NOVIEMBRE PACHIA
Capitán: JUAN HERRERA
24 NOVIEMBRE QUEQUEÑA
JUAN DE DIOS ACOSTA
JOSE MARIANO AVILA
ANGEL FIGUEROA
LIBORIO LINARES
MANUEL LINARES
CIPRIANO RUIZ

La Guardia Nacional

2009-05-25T15:40:00.000+08:00

(El pueblo en armas)

por Jorge Ojeda Frex

Como ya sabemos, al invadir Antofagasta, el ejército chileno contaba con unos 2.500 hombres, solo 23 meses después, más de 41.000 chilenos cargaban las armas, de ellos solo la cuarta parte eran soldados profesionales, las otras tres cuartas partes pertenecían a una organización denominada "Guardia Nacional", el presente trabajo pretende entregar una visión sobre este cuerpo de tropas tan fundamentales para la victoria, sus orígenes, su armamento, organización y evolución.

La Guardia Nacional era una organización de antigua data, podemos considerarla heredera de las antiguas milicias de tiempos coloniales.

Para comprender mejor a esta organización se hace necesario primero que nada entender la lógica que permitía su existencia, cosa que puede resultar un tanto complejo hoy en día de comprender, toda vez que se cruzan elementos teóricos como fácticos, mismos que intentaré separar a fin de que sea más simple de comprender.

El Estado no es más que una creación de las personas que lo componen, las teorías que lo justifican son las clásicas ideas del pacto social(1), la comunidad que antes de la existencia del Estado vive en un "estado de naturaleza", a través del concierto de todas las voluntades suscribe este "pacto social" en virtud del cual crea al Estado, que es el que velará por el bienestar de la comunidad, es por esta razón que una de las primeras tareas del Estado es cautelar la seguridad de la comunidad, por eso crea las fuerzas armadas. Ahora bien teniendo en cuenta la vieja ley económica que nos señala que las necesidades son múltiples y los recursos limitados(2), no siempre los recursos del Estado eran suficientes para garantizar la protección del cuerpo social, por lo que para enfrentar estas contingencias era necesario arbitrar otro tipo de recursos, ahora bien si el estado al protegerse así mismo en realidad protege a la comunidad, y digamos si un ciudadano(3) defiende al Estado, en realidad se está protegiendo así mismo, es perfectamente lógico que se prepare para estas "circunstancias extraordinarias", esta lógica permite la existencia de la Guardia Nacional, esto es de ciudadanos que sin ser militares reciben algún tipo de instrucción militar, ojo que está respuesta a la necesidad no es la única posible, otra respuesta sería claramente el actual "Servicio Militar Obligatorio". Entonces, la Guardia Nacional no era otra cosa que la idea de "Colectividad en armas".

Ahora bien, vistos los argumentos teóricos que posibilitan la existencia de la Institución es necesario ver los hechos fácticos que determinan la elección de esta opción por sobre otra como pudo ser el Servicio Militar Obligatorio, la realidad era que se trataba de un instrumento político, Diego Portales, padre de la institucionalidad chilena, al crear esta institución tiene en mira el hecho de que necesita un contrapeso institucional al ejército, que a pesar del pequeño número del mismo(4) fue un importante factor para el "cambio" de gobierno o sistema, hasta la década de 1830, interesante es el hecho de que se dio la paradoja que Portales creo un equilibrio en base a la creación de un brazo armado para hacer "contrapeso" al otro brazo armado del Estado.

Lo cierto es que en muchas ocasiones los Guardias Nacionales también fueron participes de revoluciones o cuartelazos, pero en realidad no se puede desconocer que por regla general fueron valiosos auxiliares de las fuerzas leales a los gobiernos, mismas que sofocaron dichos cuartelazos o revoluciones.

En su gran prueba de fuego, la Guerra del Pacifico, fueron de todas maneras absolutamente decisivos para lograr la victoria; en Pisagua la primera oleada de desembarco estuvo compuesta en sus 2/3 partes por los Guardias Nacionales del Batallón "Atacama", en Dolores, fueron los Guardias Nacionales de los batallones "Atacama" y "Coquimbo" los que rechazaron a los aliados en su ataque a la batería Salvo, en Tarapacá, junto a los soldados de línea cayeron los Guardias nacionales del batallón "Chacabuco", en Los Angeles nuevamente el batallón "Atacama" fue la unidad que realizó la peligrosa escalada que permitió la victoria, en Tacna de un total de 1.975 infantes caídos, 104 fueron Policías, 760 Soldados de Línea y 1.111 Guardias Nacionales, en Chorrillos y Miraflores se batieron por el lado chileno 13 batallones del Ejército de Línea, 1 de Policías y 30 de la Guardia Nacional, finalmente fueron los soldados de los batallones de la Guardia Nacional "Talca" y "Concepción" quienes apoyados por dos Compañías del "Zapadores" los que derrotaron definitivamente al General Cáceres en Huamachuco, posibilitando la firma del tratado de Ancón y el final de la guerra.

Bueno, hecho este pequeño recorrido debemos saber que hacía 1877 la Guardia nacional agrupaba un total de 24.287 hombres, cifra que por razones económicas se redujo drásticamente a solo 6.687 hombres ese año, al ser disueltas 31 unidades.

Respecto a la instrucción, las unidades de la Guardia Nacional se reunían los fines de semana y por una o dos horas realizaban ejercicios consistentes en evoluciones y formaciones(5).

En lo orgánico, como ya hemos dicho, estas unidades no pertenecían ni dependían directamente al ejército, sino que se encontraban subordinadas a mandos locales denominados "Comandancias Generales de Armas"; a nivel superior, dependían de una "Inspección General de la Guardia Nacional".

Las unidades se encontraban bajo el mando de un oficial del Ejército de Línea, y se agrupaban en Compañías, Escuadrones, Brigadas y Batallones de las tres armas(6).

Como podemos imaginar el nivel de instrucción con este sistema estaba lejos de considerarse optimo, podemos imaginar que en realidad esto se reducía a saber formarse y desfilar.

En 1879, al producirse la ocupación de Antofagasta el gobierno reorganizó rápidamente la Guardia Nacional, fueron decretados numerosos acuartelamientos y movilización de nuevas unidades a fin de acelerar la instrucción de estos contingentes, a medida que transcurrió el tiempo este acuartelamiento fue racionalizado.

Muchos fueron los contingentes de Guardias Nacionales que fueron separados de sus unidades y enviados al norte para completar los cuadros de las unidades de línea(7).

Así y todo lo expuesto algunas unidades de la Guardia Nacional alcanzaron con increíble prontitud niveles de instrucción bastante satisfactorios(8), lo cual habla bastante bien de los comandantes de dichas unidades.

Respecto a la reorganización de las unidades, se crearon dos niveles de movilización, así encontramos la Guardia Nacional "Movilizada" y la "Estática" o "Sedentaria", al primer nivel correspondían las unidades que permanecían acuarteladas y realizaban una vida e instrucción tal cual el ejército, así mismo podían servir en cualquier punto del país, en tanto las del segundo nivel seguían el mismo régimen de tiempos de paz.

En cuanto al armamento, como es comprensible, las tropas fueron armadas con lo que se encontró, dejando el mejor armamento para las unidades de la Guardia Nacional Movilizada en el teatro de operaciones, de esta manera en Julio de 1880, cuando las compras alcanzaron un nivel suficiente las tropas de la Guardia Nacional Movilizada se armaba con fusiles Comblaim y Gras en el caso de las unidades de primera línea, mientras las de segunda línea estaban armadas con fusiles Beaumont(9) y en menor medida con viejos Chassepots, las unidades de la Guardia Nacional Estática estaban armados con los antiguos fusiles Snyder, Minie y Chassepots e incluso anticuadisimos fusiles franceses rallados.

Por aquellas mismas fechas la Guardia Nacional Movilizada agrupaba a 2 regimientos y 19 batallones de infantería y 3 escuadrones de Caballería, con un personal teórico de unos 14.550 hombres, mientras la Guardia Nacional Estática por su parte agrupaba 40 batallones, 24 brigadas y 5 Compañías de Infantería, 11 batallón, 13 brigadas y 1 compañía de Artillería y 1 regimiento, 10 escuadrones y 2 compañías de Caballería; seis meses después, para la campaña de Lima cuando la organización alcanzó su peak, la Guardia Nacional Movilizada agrupó a 20 regimientos y 15 batallones de infantería, 1 brigada de artillería y 6 escuadrones de artillería con un personal teórico de unos 35.000 hombres.

Tras la toma de Lima numerosas unidades fueron retornadas a Chile y sus hombres licenciados, pero muchas otras permanecieron en labores de ocupación hasta el final de la guerra.

A principios del siglo XX, la Guardia Nacional fue abolida, en su reemplazo apareció el Servicio Militar Obligatorio, con la Guardia Nacional terminaba una gran y noble institución que a lo largo de su alrededor de 70 años de existencia cumplió noblemente con su deber, mucho más de 50.000 chilenos pasaron por sus filas durante de la Guerra del Pacifico(10) de ellos varios miles murieron.

Posteriormente en la década de 1930 una nueva organización denominada "Milicia Republicana" surge bajo la misma lógica de la vieja Guardia Nacional, pero al cabo de unos pocos años fue abolida, ya que comenzó a transformarse en una institución de Corte Fascista.

NOTAS

Ideas que pueden resultar cuestionables pero que no lo haré por no ser un tema de este trabajo, y además sin este presupuesto no podríamos realizar el presente ejercicio, solamente remitiré a quien desee enterarse más sobre el tema al "triunvirato" clásico de autores Hoobes, Locke y Roseau.

Esto no es un eufemismo en el caso del Estado de Chile, que a lo largo de gran parte del Siglo XIX vivió una crónica escasez de recursos que determinaba que cualquier gasto del Estado fuera criticado, un buen ejemplo creo sería la gran polémica por la compra de mobiliario para el Palacio de La Moneda, los muebles fueron comprados a precio de mercado pero de todas maneras algunos alegaron que se habían excedido los gastos.

En este caso estamos dando al término "ciudadano" una acepción más amplia a la de sujeto con derechos políticos, podríamos hacerla homologa al término "nacional", es decir en este caso de chileno.

En circunstancias normales el Ejército chileno hasta el estallido de la Guerra del Pacifico nunca superó las 4.000 plazas.

Es de hacer notar que los peruanos utilizaban un sistema muy similar para adiestrar al ejército de reserva, para la campaña de Lima.

Dos observaciones, normalmente los oficiales que comandaban estas unidades eran sujetos caídos en desgracia en el Ejército de línea, como Juan Martínez.

Por ejemplo 300 hombres del batallón de la provincia de Atacama fueron enviados para completar los cuadros del regimiento 2º de Línea.

Ejemplo de esto son los batallones "Atacama", "Coquimbo" y "Artillería Naval".

Los fusiles Beaumont, Gras y Comblaim eran equivalentes, modernos y tras pequeñas modificaciones en los dos primeros utilizaban la misma munición que los Comblaim.

El equivalente a unos 350.000 hombres, tomando en cuenta la población actual.

Civiles en la guerra

2009-05-25T15:37:00.001+08:00

por Jorge Ojeda Frex

En este pequeño trabajo pretendo mostrar quienes fueron los civiles chilenos más importantes en la guerra del pacifico, indicando sus fortalezas y virtudes, pero también sus debilidades y flaquezas.

Comenzemos entonces con Anibal Pinto Gramendia, al iniciarse la guerra era el presidente de la república, con anterioridad había sido ministro de Federico Errázuriz, era en realidad un pacifista, pero se vio arrastrado a la guerra por su ministro del interior Fierro, pero a pesar de considerar la guerra la mayor desgracia que podía ocurrirle al país, la enfrentó con decisión, es tal vez el presidente más probo de la historia de Chile, tanto así que al culminar su periodo salió en una situación que casi rayaba en la pobreza, su mayor defecto fue el desconfiar demasiado de los militares, realizó los nombramientos de los generales en jefe del ejército no poniendo a los hombres más capaces como Lynch o Villagrán, sino que lo hizo teniendo en cuenta factores netamente políticos ya que veía con preocupación que un General vencedor sería ungido como candidato presidencial del partido conservador, sus rivales.

Otro de los más importantes civiles fue el ministro del interior Fierro, este político guío de manera agresiva la política chilena, a fines de 1878, ante las presiones argentinas, a las cuales siempre se había cedido, respondió enviando la escuadra al sur, cuando se le informó que su homóloga transandina había zarpado rumbo a Punta Arenas, en un bluff de fuerza. Ante el conflicto con Bolivia, su reacción también fue firme y decisiva, envió tropas a ocupar Antofagasta. Presionó a Pinto y excitó a la opinión pública a fin de que se pronunciara por la guerra, su principal debilidad era su irritabilidad, cuando Pinto le dio la espalda en una conversación, este le hizo un gesto obseno al presidente, el cual le vio por el reflejo de un espejo, lo que determinó su pronta salida del ministerio, apagándose su estrella política para siempre. Pero sin embargo fue Fierro quien al iniciarse el conflicto realizó grandes y eficaces esfuerzos con vistas a la guerra que se le venía a Chile.

Antonio Varas, el famoso ministro de Manuel Montt, reemplazó a Fierro, su prestigio en el concierto americano le precedía, su intervención fue decisiva en el Consejo de Estado cuando se discutía si se podía declarar la guerra a los aliados, dada lo poco preparado que se encontraba el país para una guerra, según se afirma, Varas señaló yo apoyo la declaración de guerra por que la creo justa, halla veremos como la hacemos que un hombre no debía revisarse el bolsillo para ver si cargaba una pistola cuando se le escupía el rostro. Sin embargo su figura no suscitaba la unidad del mundo político, quienes miraban con miedo el retorno del “mott-varismo”, por lo que pronto debió renunciar.

Domingo Santa Maria, perteneció al ministerio Varas, y luego encabezó el que le siguió, finalmente dirigió el país desde Septiembre de 1881 hasta el termino del conflicto, considerado un hombre inteligentisimo, sin embargo cuando le tocó gobernar mandaba el ejército de operaciones uno de los más capacitados jefes del ejército chileno, Patricio Lynch, fue el gran promotor de la 2° campaña al departamento de Junín aún contra la opinión de Lynch, lo que terminó con un rotundo fracaso del ejército chileno, esto le motivo a no interferir más en la dirección de la guerra, por lo que dejó actuar a Lynch al año siguiente y de esta manera derrotar a Cáceres, volvió a intervenir de manera decisiva presionando al Coronel Velázquez a fin de que apurara la campaña de Arequipa, y solo el miedo a ser destituido empujo a este jefe a ocupar el último centro de resistencia peruana.

Rafael Sotomayor, para la gran mayoría es el civil más importante de la guerra, organizador del ejército chileno, es sin lugar a dudas el héroe más importante de la guerra, su único anelo consistió en desear obtener la victoria, se ganó el respeto de practicamente todos los militares y marinos chilenos, salvo por Escala y Williams, Baquedano jamás le consideró un "Cucalón" intruso, a pesar de tener amplios poderes que le conferia su cargo de "Ministro de Guerra en Campaña", jamás los uso, preferia sugerir a imponer, sacrifcó todo por su país, se negó a dejar su trabajo cuando su hija agonizaba, su peculio personal desapareció estando tan imbuido de organizar el ejército, tanto sacrifico todo, que finalmente entregó su vida en visperas de la batalla de Tacna, murió de un ataque de apoplejía a causa del exeso de trabajo.Incomprendido por sus contemporaneos quienes le vieron como un oportunista en busca de la suseción presidencial, es pues uno de los máximos héroes de la guerra, pero también uno de los más olvidados.

Otro civil importantisimo fue José Francisco Vergara, pero el merece un reportaje aparte.

Uniformes

2009-05-17T18:11:00.001+08:00


Soldado del BI "Daza", Nº1 de Cazadores de la Guardia, también conocido como colorados	Subteniente abanderado del BI 2º de Línea	Infante Chileno

Batallas

2009-05-17T18:07:00.000+08:00

Heridos chilenos durante la batalla de Miraflores el 15 de Enero de 1881, estos hombres presumiblemente pertenecen a la 3º División del Coronel Pedro Lagos, ya que es posible distinguir las tres cintas blancas, distintivas de la unidad, en el brazo izquierdo del soldado del extremo derecho de la fotografía.

Asalto de Pisagua del 2 de Noviembre de 1879, se puede apreciar a las tropas chilenas desplegándose después de desembarcar y tomando posiciones defendidas por la infantería Boliviana.

Vista del balneario de Chorrillos destruido en los combates del 13 de Enero de 1881

Una de las fotografías más espectaculares de la guerra, pocas horas después de la toma del morro de Arica, tropas chilenas izan la bandera entre los cadáveres de los defensores, esta fotografía debió ser tomada algunas horas después de la batalla, puesto que se aprecia en el extremo izquierdo una pieza de artillería chilena.

En la pintura se aprecia el momento culmine de la batalla de Chorrillos, la infantería chilena a desalojado a las tropas peruanas de las alturas de San Juan, y el General Baquedano (a la izquierda montado en su potro negro "diamante") ordena a la caballería cargar sobre las tropas peruanas en retirada.

Se aprecian dos Escuadrones de Granaderos lanzándose al ataque, junto a Baquedano (saludándolo con el sable en alto) es posible apreciar al Comandante del regimiento "Granaderos", Teniente Coronel Tomás Yabar, quien momentos después caerá muerto.

Batalla de Chorrillos, el 13 de Enero de 1881, en ella se aprecia al Comandante de la 1º División Patricio Lynch y su Estado mayor recorriendo el campo de batalla en la extrema izquierda de la línea de batalla, al fondo se aprecia al enlace naval quien entusiasmado por participar en la batalla a tomado posesión de un cañón el que dispara sobre el morro Solar.

Imagen que representa la crueldad de la guerra, un soldado chileno intenta rematar a un soldado herido, al tiempo que una rabona se interpone.

Chorrillos 13 de Enero de 1881, otra imagen de la crueldad de la guerra, un grupo de soldados chilenos saquea una casa al tiempo que se disponen a violar a una de sus moradores, estos actos fueron comunes por parte de las tropas chilenas, escapándose de control aún para los oficiales, el relato de Alberto del Solar, respecto a lo señalado por un oficial peruano que trato de detener una violación sin éxito, y que culminó dando muerte a la mujer en cuestión para evitarle el trance es más que decidor.

En la Imagen, durante la noche del 9 al 10 de Julio de 1882, la guarnición chilena del pueblo de Concepción se lanza al asalto, con la intención de rechazar el ataque de las fuerzas peruanas

Sobrevivientes de la guarnición chilena de Concepción, parapetados esperan un nuevo ataque (9 al 10 de Julio de 1882)

La carga final de la batalla de Huamachuco, el 10 de Julio de 1883, la última gran batalla de la guerra, luego de las tropas peruanas no podrán resistir y serán finalmente vencidas

EVOLUCIÓN DE LA INFANTERÍA CHILENA A LO LARGO DE LA GUERRA

2009-05-17T18:06:00.002+08:00

Esta arma se organizo en torno a los cuerpos de línea existententes al momento de la declaración de guerra, estos cuerpos fueron ampliandose gradualmente en número de compañías y soldados hasta llegar al standart que se mantuvo hasta el termino de la campaña de Lima.

Así los primitivos batallones fueron transformados a regimientos, estas nuevas unidades se componían de una pequeña plana mayor, usualmente el comandante de rango Teniente Coronel, el segundo comandante de rango identico al anterior o Sargento Mayor, un Capitán Ayudante de mayor jerarquía que los demás capitanes, un oficial abanderado, normalmente un teniente un par de subtenientes que hacían las veces de ayudantes y los ordenanzas (soldados rasos encargados de prestar todo tipo de servicios a los oficiales, como por ejemplo cocinarles, remendarles la ropa, etc.) luego el regimiento se componía de dos batallones, que solo eran una agrupación de cuatro compañías, dos de ellas de fúsileros, en tanto las otras dos recibían el nombre de compañías de granaderos y de cazadores, pero que en la practica no se diferenciaban de las de fusileros, el total de tropas que componía las compañías eran cuatro oficiales (un capitán, un teniente y dos subtenientes)y 150 soldados y suboficiales en el caso de las compañías de fúsileros y 149 en el caso de las de granaderos y cazadores. Lo anterior nos da un total aproximado de 600 hombres por batallon y 1200 por regimiento. Pero por regla general producto de las bajas producidas principalmente por enfermedades, el número de hombres se acercaba en la practica a unos 120 hombres por compañía, 500 por batallon y unos 900 a 1000 hombres por regimiento, así tenemos finalmente la infantería organizada en cuatro regimientos, cinco posteriormente de organizarse el regimiento de línea "Santiago".

El regimiento de "Artillería de Marina", mantubo una organización que escapa a toda la lógica anterior, puesto que siguió actuando como una fuerza de infantería, pero reforzada con
algunos cañones de bronce, su número fue aumentado también hasta 1.200 hombres pero en
estricto rigor, jamás contó con tal número, puesto que las guarniciones de los barcos de la escuadra como ya se sabe provenían de este cuerpo, así como la guarnición de la estrategica colonia de Punta Arenas, en el estrecho de Magallanes, es así como en Tarapacá presenta unos 500 hombres a la campaña, en Tacna unos 650 y menos de 400 a Lima.

Por otro lado la guardia nacional se organizo en principio por regla general en Batallones, solo el "Lautaro" y el "Esmeralda" fueron organizados como regimientos analogos a los de línea,
los batallones podían ser de dos tipos; analogos a los de los regimientos de Línea, reforzados
por una pequeña plana mayor, es decir cuatro compañías con un total de 600 hombres. O bien
organizados en base a una plana mayor y seis compañías, cuatro de fusileros, una de Granaderos y otra de Cazadores, cada una de estas con cuatro oficiales y 98 a 100 soldados, dependiendo si se trataba de granaderos o cazadores, o bien fusileros, pero como ya se dijo con anterioridad esta
distinción carecia de efectos practicos. Al igual que los batallones de los regimientos de línea el
número real de tropas tanto en los batallones del primer tipo (4 compañías), como los del segundo (6 compañías) era de 500 a 550 hombres. El batallón "Naval" fué una exepción al tiempo de la campaña de Lima, puesto que se organziaba en seis compañías pero del mismo tamaño que los batallones de cuatro compañía, con lo que en la practica tenía casí tanto personal como algunos regimientos (unos 800 hombres).

Sin embargo a medida que el conflicto se extendió, en tiempo y magnitud, la mayor parte
de los batallones que primitivamente operaron en Tarapacá o Tacna, hacía el tiempo de la campaña de Lima se habían transformado en regimientos idénticamente organizados a las unidades de Línea.

Solo la Policía de Valparaíso organizada como Batallón escapo a la regla general de la organización de dichos cuerpos, se le organizó en solo tres compañías, con un total de unos 350
hombres. Este cuerpo fue enviado devuelta a Chile, luego de la campaña de Tacna y reemplazado
por una nueva unidad con el mismo nombre pero no organizado como un batallón sino como un
regimiento, realizo esta aclaración pues normalmente esta unidad provoca confusiones.

Al termino de la campaña de Lima, se reorganizaron los cuerpos, es así como al "Santiago" se le redesigna como 5º de línea, así mismo dos cuerpos cívicos que se distinguieron en las campañas fueron transformados en unidades de línea el "Chacabuco", que se convirtió en el 6º de Línea y el "Esmeralda" que paso a denominarse 7º de Línea. la reorganización fue mucho más allá, es así como los regimientos se transforman en Batallones de seis compañías, al estilo del batallón "Naval" es decir teóricamente con 900 hombres.

En el plano del armamento, los cuerpos de línea estaban armados con el excelente fusil Belga Comblaim, modelo 1876, un arma bastante nueva y mortífera, por su parte a los cuerpos de la Guardia Nacional se les equipó con el mismo fusil Comblaim o bien con el fusil Francés Grass, es decir en las unidades chilenas a diferencia de las peruanas tenían una bien homogénea masa de armamentos, lo cual unido a que ambos fusiles tenían el mismo calibre (11 mm), y podían utilizar las mismas municiones, simplificaba tremendamente el trabajo de los servicios logísticos. Finalmente en el plano de armamentos es necesario decir que las tropas de guarnición en el territorio chileno, usaban el fusil francés Beaumont, también de 11 mm.

Luego de la toma de Lima, las tropas armadas con fusil Grass, cambiaron este armamento por los Comblain de los cuerpos repatriados, transformándose este fusil en el estándar de la infantería durante el resto de la guerra.

En el plano de equipamiento, los soldados calzaban excelentes medias botas cafés, los pantalones eran de tela, y por lo general los cuerpos de línea usaban el uniforme francés (chaqueta azul marino corta, solo hasta la cintura, y pantalones rojos), en cuanto al Kepí, en este se colocaba un símbolo distintivo para la unidad, además los soldados que habían participado en batallas llevaban sobre el pecho cintas (una por acción en la cual se hubiera participado), en la campaña de Lima antes de Chorrillos, habían soldados que llevaban hasta siete cintas, estas después fueron cambiadas por medallas. Este uniforme descrito es muy distinto al que lucieron en la parada militar 2000 la 4º Compañía del Batallón "Chacabuco", quienes inexplicablemente lucían uniformes con grandes errores, chaquetas largas, botas negras y con cordones, lo que nos demuestra lo "acuciosos" que son los soldados cuando nos preparan estas sorpresas.....

Camarada fiel del soldado en las marchas por el desierto era la "Caramayola", cantimplora esférica, con capacidad para dos litros de agua, y un cinturon porta balas, este cinturón tenía veinte pequeños estuches donde se guardaban 200 balas, a razón de 10 por estuche, pero muchos de estos tenían los estuches sin la parte superior por lo que las balas se perdían por montones cuando los soldados se tendían.

Respecto del personal, la tropa del ejército de tiempos de paz era lo que se podía conseguir con la oferta que se tenía, a cambio de mucho riesgo, representada por muertes terribles en la campaña contra los Araucanos, poca comida, condiciones sanitarias deplorables, malos tratos, una ordenanza general de Ejército Draconiana y un sueldo de pellejerías, además de estar obligado el soldado a reponer cualquier pieza de su equipo que se perdiera, obviamente solo los desesperados o aventureros podrían elegir esa profesión, como se comprenderá la única forma de mantener a esta tropa bajo control era a través de la más estricta disciplina, de ahí se sigue lo que señalaba antes, como Ordenanza General de Ejército tan dura. Con el estallido de la guerra este personal fue cambiado, millares de hombres pidieron una plaza o fueron reclutados, entre estos encontramos una heterogeneidad tremenda, desde oficiales de sala de la Corte de apelaciones (como el caso de Justo Abel Rosales, quien ingresa al ejército como Sargento 1º), estudiantes púberes (Como Arturo Benavides) o huasos chillanejos (como Hipólito Gutiérrez). En general los soldados mostraban una buena capacidad e iniciativa a la hora de combatir, pero por sobre todo en los momentos de dificultad mostraban una tendencia a resistir hasta las últimas consecuencias, prueba de ello es el combate de Tarapacá, donde el RI 2º de Línea por ejemplo sufrió alrededor de un ¡40% de bajas!, y de 2.300 hombres que componían la expedición, se perdieron aproximadamente un 32% y de ellos sol cayeron prisioneros solo un 2,6% del total de combatientes. También es posible encontrar esta actitud en combates como el de Concepción y Tambo de Mora.

La jefatura del ejército no era, como algunos los han pintado, un grupo de genios a la altura de los más grandes generales de la historia, sino más bien se trataba de hombres limitados, su experiencia de guerra se basaba principalmente en las campañas araucanas, y en un grupo muy pequeño (Arteaga, Sotomayor, Santa Cruz, Ramírez) además por el estudio de manuales extranjeros, pero en general incluso este reducido número de hombres se mostraron más bien rígidos y carentes de iniciativa, como por ejemplo no olvidemos que Sotomayor pensaba dar batalla a Buendia en el llano de Santa Catalina, Arteaga se olvidó por completo de la más elemental logística al marchar sobre Tarapacá, Santa Cruz no se atrevió a plantear combate con sus fuerzas en Tarapacá aún viendo que el plan original estaba fracasado, y Ramírez aún sabiendo que era un error del porte de una ballena el descender a la quebrada con su regimiento, obedeció rígidamente. Ahora si estos eran la oficialidad intelectual, que queda para los otros como Escala y Baquedano por ejemplo; el ejército se vio limitado a movimientos elementales, el ataque frontal de Baquedano en Tacna, Chorrillos y Miraflores son una prueba de ello, se venció es cierto, pero el costo fueron baños de sangre.

Pero no todo es negativo en el comando chileno, es posible apreciar una notable evolución gracias a la mejor de las escuelas, la guerra misma, y es así como personajes que aparentemente estaban destinados a ser secundarios brillaron, Lagos, Velásquez y Gorosteaga, y otros más inteligentes recuperaron su fama, como Sotomayor, quien realizó tal ves el movimiento táctico más espectacular de la guerra transformado la orden de Baquedano, de carga frontal, en el derrumbamiento del centro peruano en San Juan.

Nada más podemos decir, hubo que luchar una guerra, se hizo con lo que se tenía a mano, se enfrentó a un enemigo decidido y valiente, pero la infantería chilena salió triunfante.

por Jorge Ojeda Frex

LA MOVILIZACIÓN EN CHILE

2009-05-17T18:06:00.001+08:00

Como se ha señalado con anterioridad al iniciarse el conflicto, el ejército chileno estaba compuesto por cuatro batallones de 300 hombres cada uno, más un batallón de Zapadores, dos regimientos de caballería uno de tres y otro de dos escuadrones, cada uno de estos escuadrones de 125 hombres, un regimiento de artillería armado con 16 piezas modernas y un batallón de artillería de marina, que servía las guarniciones de la escuadra, de 300 hombres.

La pregunta que debe surgir de manera casi inmediata es como sobre la base de este pequeño conjunto de tropas de línea de no más de 3.000 hombres se pudo movilizar una gran fuerza que al término de la campaña de Lima, luego de solo 23meses había movilizado 60.000 hombres.

La respuesta es que la eficiencia del gobierno chileno fue extraordinaria, esto pensando que la movilización se realizó sobre la base del enganche voluntario, El primer contingente de voluntarios estuvo dado por la Guardia Nacional, una milicia de civiles voluntarios, que se había disuelto en 1878, pero que fue rápidamente reclamado, estas tropas de mala calidad, organizada en Brigadas (unidades intermedias entre batallones y compañías) y Batallones, agrupaba a unos 6.000 hombres, el gobierno decidió que lo mejor era junto con aumentar el tamaño de las unidades de línea, crear rápidamente más cuerpos de Guardia Nacional, los cuales entregarían una instrucción básica a los voluntarios y de esta manera sin perturbar gravemente a la sociedad aumentar los contingentes.

La Guardia Nacional estaba ligada a su ciudad, y realizaban solo algunos ejercicios básicos sin salir de ella a menos de recibir orden expresa vía Decreto Presidencial, en este caso el Gobierno llamaba a servicio a una cantidad determinada de hombres de una unidad de la Guardia Nacional y los enviaba luego a las unidades de línea a completar su instrucción, pero a la vez se decidió que era necesario movilizar algunos batallones de Guardias Nacionales completos, entonces poco a poco el ejército creció en número de tropas y de unidades.

Por otra parte el gobierno de Perú entregó también varios millares de voluntarios para el ejército chileno, al decretar la expulsión y confiscación de los bienes de los chilenos residentes en Perú. No solo la medida creó un sentimiento de ira entre los más de 15.000 chilenos expulsados, sino que inevitablemente, muchos de los funcionarios encargados de esta medida actuaron de manera vejatoria, aumentando la ira de los expulsados, que muchas veces se vieron obligados a vivir en condiciones precarias asilados en lanchones hasta que fueron rescatados por la escuadra chilena y remitidos al sur, donde se peleaban los puestos en los batallones y regimientos para volver al norte y cobrar venganza.

En honor a la verdad hay que señalar que dentro de todas esta actitud del gobierno peruano fue la más sensata, que otra cosa podía hacer, esos 15.000 chilenos de quedarse representaban un peligro en potencia, la otra solución internarlos, también era un error, el Perú no podía desviar recursos para la manutención de un número tan grande de civiles, y aún de haberlos podido desviar, basta recordar que aún hoy en los campos de reclusión las condiciones de vida son muchas veces miserables, el Perú pudo cargar con lo que hoy conocemos como delitos de lesa humanidad, sin lugar a dudas la acción de expulsar a los miles de chilenos de Perú fue la alternativa más humanitaria que se pudo haber tomado y de hecho se hizo así.

Cuadro de Movilización Chileno:

1.- 1879 antes de la declaración oficial de guerra:

Creación de un nuevo batallón de Línea, que no recibió número, si no solo el nombre de "Santiago", fue puesto bajo el mando del Teniente Coronel Pedro Lagos.
Se transformaron los cinco batallones de infantería de Línea en Regimientos de 1.238 hombres (26 de Marzo).
A las fuerzas de artillería destacadas en Antofagasta se transforman en una brigada (Grupo) independiente, siendo puesto bajo el mando del Teniente Coronel José Velásquez (26 de Marzo).
El Regimiento de Caballería "Cazadores" es aumentado en un Escuadrón (29 de Marzo).
Finalmente se empezaron a acuartelar, pero no a movilizar, las unidades de la Guardia Nacional.

2.- Después de declarada la guerra, mes a mes:

Abril:

Se acepta el ofrecimiento de la municipalidad de Valparaíso, en cuanto a movilizar a la Policía del puerto como un batallón, sin costo para el fisco, siendo designado con el nombre de "Valparaíso", puesto bajo el mando del Teniente Coronel Jacinto Niño (6 de Abril).
Se acepta el ofrecimiento de la municipalidad de Santiago, en cuanto a movilizar a la Policía de la ciudad como un batallón, sin costo para el fisco, siendo designado con el nombre de "Bulnes" (9 de Abril).
Se moviliza a la brigada cívica de Recoleta (22 de Abril), un poco más tarde es transformado en Batallón y recibe el nombre de "Chacabuco", siendo puesto bajo el mando del Teniente Coronel Domingo Toro (26 de Abril).
La brigada de Artillería de Antofagasta es transformada en un Batallón de Artillería (24 de Abril)
Se moviliza en Valparaíso el batallón Cívico "Naval" bajo el mando del Teniente Coronel Urriola (29 de Abril).
Es movilizado el Batallón Cívico "Legión Extranjera" (29 de Abril).

Mayo:

Es movilizado en Valparaíso el Batallón Cívico "Lautaro".
Es movilizado el Escuadrón de Caballería "Carabineros de Yungay", usando como base el III Escuadrón del Regimiento "Cazadores", creado como recordaremos el 29 de Marzo y es puesto bajo el mando del Teniente Coronel Manuel Bulnes, hijo del General Bulnes y sobrino del Presidente de la República (8 de Mayo).
Es movilizado el Regimiento de Infantería Cívico "Valdivia" y puesto bajo el mando del Teniente Coronel Egidio Gómez.
El batallón "Legión Extranjera" es rebautizado como "Cazadores del Desierto", estando bajo el mando del Teniente Coronel Bouquet(14 de Mayo).
Es movilizado en Santiago el Batallón Cívico "Carampangue" (31 de Mayo).
Se racionaliza el acuartelamiento de las unidades de la Guardia Nacional, quedando sólo las acuarteladas las siguientes unidades aún sin orden de movilización; Batallón Cívico de Atacama, un Batallón del Regimiento de Artillería Cívico "Andes" de Valparaíso, las Brigadas Cívicas de Coquimbo y Caldera.

Junio:

El batallón "Lautaro" es transformado en Regimiento", siendo puesto bajo el mando del Coronel Mauricio Muñoz. (5 de Junio).
Es creada en Antofagasta una compañía de "Pontoneros" (6 de Junio)
El batallón "Carampangue" es transformado en Regimiento y rebautizado como "Esmeralda" y puesto bajo el mando del Coronel Santiago Amengual (9 de Junio).
Es movilizado en Copiapó el Batallón Cívico "Atacama", y puesto bajo el mando del Teniente Coronel Juan Martínez (30 de Junio).
Es movilizado en Coquimbo el Batallón Cívico "Coquimbo" N°1 (30 de Junio).
Es movilizado en Chillán el Batallón Cívico "Chillán" (30 de Junio).
Es creado el Ejército del Centro o de Reservas, bajo el mando del Coronel Cornelio Saavedra, las unidades que lo componen son; los regimientos "Valdivia", "Lautaro" y "Esmeralda", así como el batallón "Cazadores del Desierto", el regimiento de artillería y el Escuadrón "Carabineros de Yungay" (26 de Junio).

Julio:

Al parecer debido al rápido crecimiento de las fuerzas, durante este mes no se crearon nuevas unidades.

El Escuadrón "Carabineros de Yungay" N°1 del comandante Bulnes es capturado completo por el monitor "Huascar", mientras era transportado hacía Antofagasta a bordo del transporte "Rimac"(27 de Julio).

Agosto:

Se ordena movilizar el Escuadrón de Caballería "Carabineros de Yungay" N°2, bajo el mando del Teniente Coronel Emeterio Letelier, sobre la base de 14 Granaderos (2 Alféreces, 4 Sargentos 2°, 4 Cabos 1° y 4 Cabos 2°) (4 de Agosto).
Se establece el mando del Ejército de la Frontera, siendo designado como su comandante el General de División Urrutía.
El Batallón de Artillería de Antofagasta es transformado en el Regimiento de Artillería N°2 (29 de Agosto).

Septiembre:

La Compañía de Pontoneros es transformada en el "Cuerpo de Ingenieros" y puesto bajo el mando del Teniente Coronel Arístides Martínez (3 de Septiembre).
Es disuelto el Regimiento "Valdivia", su personal es enviado al norte a fin de completar el personal de los cuerpos ahí acantonados(13 de Septiembre).
Con personal del disuelto Regimiento "Valdivia" que no tuvo colocación en el Ejército del Norte, es creado en Santiago el Batallón Cívico "Valdivia", y puesto bajo el mando del 2° Comandante del disuelto Regimiento, Teniente Coronel Lucio Martínez (13 de Septiembre).
Debido al envío de el último gran convoy al Norte, es disuelto el mando del Ejército del Centro (22 de Septiembre).
Con el resto del personal sobrante del disuelto Regimiento "Valdivia", se crea en Santiago el Batallón "Caupolican" y puesto bajo elmando del Teniente Coronel Felix Valdés (29 de Septiembre).

Octubre:

Al parecer durante este mes debido a la inminencia de la salida a campaña del Ejército del Norte no se crearon nuevas unidades.

El ejército de Reserva pasa al mando del General de Brigada Villagrán.

Es nombrado Comandante General de la Infantería el Coronel Luis Arteaga

Noviembre:

A fin de suplir las bajas que se produjeran en el Ejército del Norte, se creó en Santiago el "Deposito de Reclutas" (6 de Noviembre)
Es movilizado en Colchagua el Batallón Cívico "Colchagua" (15 de Noviembre)
Es creado el Escuadrón "Carabineros de Maipú" (18 de Noviembre)
Es movilizado en San Felipe el Batallón Cívico "Aconcagua" (22 de Noviembre).

Diciembre:

No se tiene noticias de movilización de unidades.

Pero el Ejército del Norte es reorganizado, siendole subordinas 4 divisiones.

3.- 1880:

Enero:

Es creado en Copiapó el batallón Cívico "Atacama" N°2
Es creado en San Felipe el batallón Cívico "Aconcagua" N°2

Febrero:

Parece ser que en este periodo no fueron movilizadas más tropas a causa de que se abrió la campaña de Tacna.

Marzo:

Es creado en Talca el batallón Cívico "Talca" (6 de Marzo)
Es creado en Rengo el batallón Cívico "Rengo" (6 de Marzo)
Es creado en Curicó el batallón Cívico "Curicó" (6 de Marzo)

Abril:

Mayo:

Junio:

Julio:

Se aumenta la dotación a los batallones Atacama N°1, N°2, Coquimbo N°1, Valdivia, Caupolican, Chillán, Melipilla, Aconcagua N°1, N°2, Colchagua, Talca, Rengo, Curicó, Concepción, Cazadores del Desierto y Chacabuco (21 de Julio).
El batallón Cívico "Chillán", es

Agosto:

Septiembre:

Octubre:

Noviembre:

Diciembre:

ROBERTO SOUPER

2009-05-12T15:21:00.002+08:00

ROBERTO SOUPER
1818-1881
Ingles por nacimiento, chileno por el amor
Murió como héroe al defender el honor de Chile

Colonel Robert Souper Howard (September 9, 1818 - January 13, 1881) was an English soldier who served in the Chilean Army during most of the War of the Pacific.

Born in Harwich, England, son of Colonel William Souper and Emily Howard. His father, concerned about the education of his sons and looking for a better future for the family, decided to leave England and seek better fortune in France. They established themselves in Calais.

During the War of the Pacific, he joined the Chilean Army a few days before the official declaration of war, on April 3, 1879 as a Captain. He was then selected by Minister Rafael Sotomayor, and was present in the Naval Battle of Angamos.

He became a member of the Army General Staff, and participated in the Battle of Pisagua (November 2, 1879) and the Battle of Dolores (November 19, 1879); helping capture the Peruvian province of Tarapaca, which was effectively separated from the rest of the country.

During the Chilean offensive against Tarapaca, he served under General Manuel Baquedano as his Aide de Camp. Under his command, he fought on the Battle of Los Angeles, the Battle of Alto de la Alianza and the assault of Arica

He was killed during the aftermath of the Battle of San Juan.

Battle of San Francisco

2009-05-12T15:10:00.003+08:00

Battle of San Francisco

Part of War of the Pacific

Date	November 19, 1879
Location	South America
Result	Chilean victory

Belligerents

Chile

Peru
Bolivia

Commanders

Col. Emilio Sotomayor

Gen. Juan Buendia

Strength

6,500 soldiers:
3 regiments
4 battalions
2 artillery batteries

7,400 soldiers:
17 battalions
1 artillery battery
2 cavalry squadrons

Casualties and losses

60 killed
148 wounded

220 killed
76 wounded
3,200 missing
18 smoothbore

The Battle of San Francisco, also known as Battle of Dolores, fought on November 19, 1879, was the third battle of the Tarapaca Campaign in the War of the Pacific, after Pisagua and Germania. A Chilean army commanded by Colonel Emilio Sotomayor successfully held off and dispersed the bulk of the Peruvian army led by General Juan Buendía at San Francisco hill, near the town of Dolores. The Allies lost a huge amount of war material such as cannons, ammunition and weapons. The catastrophe for the Allies was the result of poor logistics, inefficient leadership and the unexpected desertion of the Bolivian Army under the half-hearted command of President Hilarion Daza, known as the Camarones betrayal.

Prelude

The Chilean forces had disembarked at the port of Pisagua after launching an amphibious operation on November 2nd, separating and isolating the Allied strongholds of Arica and Iquique; encountering merely mild resistance. On the 6th, Chilean cavalry led by Lt. Col. Jose Francisco Vergara almost annihilated the Peruvian Husares de Junin Cavalry Regiment at Pampa Germania [1] . The Chilean Army had taken extreme care in securing water sources - very rare in the dry Atacama Desert - and in adopting high and easily defendable positions. Meanwhile, the Peruvian army under the command of the old yet incompetent General Juan Buendia marched in an attempt to intercept the Chilean forces. It was Buendia's hope that his Bolivian allies commanded by President Hilarion Daza would link up with his forces in order to numerically overwhelm the fortified Chileans on the San Francisco hill top. However, the route from the Bolivian highlands to San Francisco was long and perilous; furthermore, the Bolivians stubbornly marched in full daylight, thus having to endure the scorching heat of the desert sun. Naturally, when the Bolivians reached the creek of Camarones near San Francisco, they were in no condition to fight a battle. Buendia was forced to face the Chileans on his own.

Preliminary situation

Chilean preliminary situation

On November 7, the "Buin" 1st Line and the 4th Line regiments with the Atacama and Coquimbo battalions, plus an artillery battery marched from Hospicio to Dolores. The next day took the same route the 3rd Line Regiment, the Navales and Valparaíso battalions and another artillery battery. These two columns reunited at Dolores on November 10th. The Chilean forces, under the command of Colonel Emilio Sotomayor, had a strength of 6,500 men [1] .

Peruvian preliminary situation

On November 5th, the Allies marched to Pozo Almonte, increasing its numbers with stray soldiers. On the 13th, Buendia left Pozo Almonte and moved towards Agua Santa, reaching his destination four days later. During the march, the soldiers were haunted by the lack of food and water. The troops marched to Negritos, and thence to Dolores. On the night of the 18th, Gen. Buendia decide to advance to Dolores and engage the Chilean troops posted there [2]

Armies layout

Chilean battle plan and disposition

When a scout group of the Cazadores a Caballo Cavalry Regiment encountered the marching Allied forces, Colonel Sotomayor - after a bitter discussion with Lt. Col. José Fco. Vergara - decided to fortify the position on the top of the San Francisco hill, where the larger number of the Allies represented no advantage whatsoever. Also, the artillery was divided in groups guarded with infantry [3]

The Chilean forces were divided into three groups and deployed as it follows:

On the northern elevation or Dolores hill, were the "Buin" 1st Line Regiment and the Valparaíso and Navales battalions; a six cannon battery directed by Cptn. Roberto Wood and another six mountain cannons led by Cptn. Eulogio Villareal [4] .

On the southern edge of the San Francisco hill was set the 4th Line Regiment with the Atacama and Coquimbo battalions; an eight cannon battery commanded by Sgt. Major Jose Maria de la Cruz Salvo, another six piece battery and 2 Gatling machine guns of Sgt. Major Benjamin Montoya, this last one set on the south-eastern part of this hill [4] .

On the hills San Bartolo and Tres Clavos was deployed the 3rd Line Regiment, along with a detachment of 50 soldiers from different units, besides some riders of the Cazadores a Caballo Cavalry Regiment; and two batteries of four cannons each [4] .

Peruvian battle plan and disposition

General Buendia divided his 7,400 troops in three columns. In this plan, Buendia counted on Hilarion Daza's Bolivian troops, but the latter decided to return to Arica after a long and extenuating march.

The three columns were placed under the command of Belisario Suarez, Andres Caceres and Buendia himself. The Suarez' column was formed by the Villamil, Bolognesi and Velarde divisions. This units were composed by the Cazadores de Cuzco Nº5, Cazadores de la Guardia Nº7, Ayacucho, Guardia de Arequipa, Aroma, Vengadores, Victoria and Colquechaca battalions.

Buendia had under his command the Villegas, Bustamante and Davila divisions, formed by the Ayacucho Nº3, Provisional de Lima Nº3, Cerro de Pasco, Puno Nº6, Lima Nº8, Illimani, Olañeta, Paucarpata, Dalance battalions, besides two cavalry squadrons and a six cannon battery.

Finally, the third column of Caceres was placed on the rear as reserve [5] .

The battle

A few Bolivian soldiers went to the San Francisco dwell looking for water, accidentally firing a gunshot, situation answered with one cannon shot by the Chilean artillery, thinking an imminent attack. These actions began the battle. Despite the Allied officers efforts to contain their men, the Peruvian and Bolivian forces attacked the Chilean positions in disorder.

Bolivian Gen. Carlos Villegas, with two companies of Puno and Ayacucho battalions, alongside with another two companies of the Illimani and Olañeta battalions started to fire at the Chilean positions causing no damage at all because of the long distance separating them and their enemies. Col. Lavadenz himself with the first company of the Dalance Battalion shortened the distance between them and the Chilean batteries of Amunategui's group, getting close to forty paces away from its objective. Gen Villegas then ordered another Dalance Battalion company to enter into the battle, along with the Lima Nº 8 and Puno battalions [5] .

Whilst these actions occurred on the Chilean left flank, Gen. Buendia's column headed to Dolores hill, describing a semicircle trying to take the Chilean position at Tres Clavos. Meanwhile this manoeuvre was being executed, the Chilean batteries of Frias and Carvallo caught Buendia in a heavy cross fire, breaking the Allies formation for a moment. Nevertheless, the Peruvian troops reorganized and continued advancing towards its objective, despite the severe loss of men. When the Allied troops got closer, the Chilean infantry posted here - six companies of the 3rd Line Regiment - stopped the attacking forces and obliged them to retreat out of Chilean batteries range [5] .

Villegas, having a part of his troops engaged in battle with Amunategui, advanced with the rest of his soldiers reinforcing Lavadenz and Espinar, and charged against Salvo's battery, defended only by its 56 cannon servants. Salvo spread his troops defending their positions with their rifles, as his soldiers spiked their cannons in an attempt to keep them from falling into Allied hands, waiting for reinforcements.

Two companies of the Atacama Battalion came in Salvo's aid, forcing the enemy to retreat. The Allies were rebuilt at hill bottom by another company of the Dalance Bn. and charged again. But this time, another Chilean company of the Coquimbo Battalion reached this position and with the remaining troops counterattacked this second effort on the hill slope. One last attack took place, but it was rejected once again with a bayonet charge [3] . This time the Allies withdrew definitively.

The Chilean troops didn't chase the Allies in their retreat, staying in their positions at the top of the hill, thinking the Allies would regroup and attack again the next day.

Aftermath

The Chileans lost 208 men between dead and wounded. The Allies had 296 casualties, plus over 3.000 missing troops. This defeat was a very rough blow for the Peruvian Army Southern Command. The remaining troops marched to Tarapacá.

6. Notes

1. Mellafe, Rafael; Pelayo, Mauricio (2004). La Guerra del Pacífico en imágenes, relatos, testimonios. Centro de Estudios Bicentenario.
2. Basadre, Jorge. "La verdadera epopeya". http://www.unjbg.edu.pe. Retrieved on 2008.
3. Ojeda Frex, Jorge. "Batalla de Dolores". http://www.geocities.com/blautz_9000/articulos/Dolores.htm. Retrieved on 2008.
4. Reyno Gutiérrez, Manuel; Gómez Ehrmann, Sergio; Guerrero Yoacham, Cristián (1985). Historia del Ejército de Chile, tomo V. Estado Mayor General del Ejército de Chile.
5. Machuca, Francisco (1926). Las cuatro campañas de la Guerra del Pacífico, Vol. I. Imprenta Victoria, Valparaíso.

7. References

* Machuca, Francisco (1926). Las cuatro campañas de la Guerra del Pacífico. Imprenta Victoria, Valparaíso.

* Reyno Gutiérrez, M

Andrés Avelino Caceres

2009-05-12T15:06:00.002+08:00

CACERES, Andrés Avelino, Peruvian soldier, born in Huanta, 12 April, 1831. He was a law student at the University of Lima in 1852, when Castilla headed a revolt to abolish slavery in Perú, and joined the revolutionary troops as a second lieutenant. He distinguished himself in the attack upon Arequipa, a place very well fortified, and defended by Vivanco, and General Castilla promoted him to the rank of captain and appointed him military attaché to the Peruvian legation at Paris, where he remained from 1857 till 1860.

On his return to Perú in the latter year he defended the government of Perú in several revolutions, and accompanied Prado at Callao during the attack against that place by the Spanish fleet in 1866. Then Cáceres won the rank of colonel, and was given command of the Zepita regiment, at the head of which he fought against Pierola from 1876 till 1878. During the war with Chile he was prominent, especially at the battle of Dolores, 2 November, 1879, when he successfully resisted the Chilean troops and captured some of their guns.

At the battle of Tacna, won by the Chileans, 26 May, 1880, he commanded a brigade and fought well, after which he offered his services to the dictator Pierola, who gave him command of a division camped near Lima, which was attacked and defeated by the Chileans, 14 January, 1881.

When the Chilean army occupied Lima, Cáceres and Pierola retreated with the rest of their forces to Arequipa, the former being appointed brigadier-general, and authorized by congress to continue the hostilities against the Chileans as well as against the Peruvian General Iglesias, who had established a government of his own at Cajamarca.

He made several unsuccessful attacks upon the Chilean troops, and, after much suffering in a three months' march through the Sierras, could not carry out the orders of congress to destroy Iglesias' government, for he was defeated by a Chilean division under Gorostiaga near Huamacucho, 14 November, 1881. Cáceres then went to the interior, raised a revolution against Iglesias, put himself at the head of a considerable force, and was again defeated near Lima.

But he persistently worked to depose Iglesias, collected more troops, routed those of the government, and finally entered the capital in March, 1885, and at once directed the election of a special board to govern until a new congress and president were chosen. He was elected president on 3 December, 1885, and his inauguration took place on 28 July, 1886.

Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884

2009-05-06T09:36:00.002+08:00

Review
"A well-researched and serious study that both scholars and casual readers will learn from."-Thomas L. Whigham, Hispanic American Historical Review (Thomas L. Whigham Hispanic American Historical Review 20081001)

"A fine example of the new vision of battle history as the author discusses arms, strategies, and tactics, as well as descriptions of encounters and the conduct of soldiers. . . . This is a well-written, well-researched work on a crucial event in the history of the west coast of South America and highly recommended to those interested in this region as well as to military history buffs."-Jerry W. Cooney, The Americas (Jerry W. Cooney The Americas )

Product Description
The year 1879 marked the beginning of one of the longest, bloodiest conflicts of nineteenth-century Latin America. The War of the Pacific pitted Peru and Bolivia against Chile in a struggle initiated over a festering border dispute. The conflict saw Chile’s and Peru’s armored warships vying for control of sea lanes and included one of the first examples of the use of naval torpedoes. On land, large armies using the most modern weapons—breech-loading rifles, Gatling guns, and steel-barreled artillery—clashed in battles that left thousands of men dead on the battlefields. Eventually, the warring parties revamped their respective military establishments, creating much needed, civilian-supported supply, transportation, and medical units. Chile ultimately prevailed. Bolivia lost its seacoast along with valuable nitrate and copper deposits to Chile, and Peru was forced to cede mineral rich Tarapaca and the province of Arica to the victor.

Employing the primary and secondary sources of the countries involved, William F. Sater offers the definitive analysis of the conflict's naval and military campaigns. Andean Tragedy not only places the war in a crucial international context, but also explains why this devastating conflict resulted in a Chilean victory.

#

There is no question that Professor Sater is the foremost authority on the War of the Pacific in the English language and probably in any language. For many years now, he has meticulously and profoundly researched into archives, published works, memoirs, folkloric sources, songs and poetry without leaving a stone unturned. This is his third book and presumably the final work on the subject: the culmination of decades work and study of his favorite subject. His facts are unquestionable even though some of his description of the battles may, at times, conflict with eyewitness narratives or popular sources. His description of the shortcomings in logistics and sanitary services go deeper than any other description of the war. Neither does the author shy away from the horrors of war which many Chilean and Peruvian historians tend to minimize.

Having recognized his effort in the investigations and his fine ability to put the facts together in good and easily understood order, there are plenty of opportunities to disagree with some of his conclusions. Many Chilean historians will find fault with his harsh judgment of Admiral Williams and Captain Simpson, and it must be admitted that he carries them a bit too far. Taking sides with Chilean Historian Francisco Encina, the author treats General Baquedano with equal ferocity. He believes that the General caused unnecessary loss of life at Tacna and later at Chorillos. He accepts the fact that battles of the XIX Century were unusually bloody. Frontal attacks, even if done in echelons, were brutal such as Picket's charge at Gettysburg and Pancho Villa's Army at Zelaya. In reference to Gettysburg there is a striking similarity with movements at Tacna, of course in a much more limited scale, but Baquedano's wise use of his reserves, unlike Lee, gave the attackers the victory. The alternative plan at Chorrillos or San Juan was too complicated, it extended the lines of march, it deprived the army from naval fire support and it did not pursue the ultimate goal of an army: to destroy the opposing force.

In summary, an excellent book: well researched and well organized that constitutes the best one volume account of this tragic war.

Carlos U. Lopez

WARS OF THE PERUVIAN-BOLIVIAN CONFEDERATION AND OF THE PACIFIC

2009-04-24T12:28:00.001+08:00

The Pacific littoral was the other site of protracted military struggle. Given their very close economic and administrative links during the colonial era, the early separation of Bolivia and Peru was in many ways a political fiction. In part because of their historic and economic connection and in part because of the rising strength of the Chilean state, the Bolivian president General Andre´s Santa Cruz sought to establish closer connections between two halves of the old Viceroyalty of Lima. In alliance with a number of Peruvian caudillos, he invaded Peru in 1835, and in October 1836 he proclaimed the existence of the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation. This union did have some popular support, but the division of Peru into two provinces and the selection of Lima as the capital alienated elites in both countries. More important, the union threatened the geopolitical position of Chile and Argentina. Both countries viewed a strong Peru as a challenge to their predominance. The first declared war in December 1836, the latter in May 1837. Despite some early failures, the Chilean army, in alliance with Peruvian forces opposed to the union, were able to defeat Santa Cruz in the battle of Yungay in January 1839, leading to the dissolution of the confederation.

Chile’s victory over Peru and Bolivia in the 1830s established its reputation as the regional ‘‘Prussia’’ and further solidified the political institutionalization begun under Diego Portales (who was assassinated at the very beginning of the war). If any war ‘‘made’’ Chilean exceptionalism, it was this one, as it provided a rare legitimacy while also establishing a stable civil military relationship. For Peru and Bolivia, defeat appears to have accelerated the process of economic and political fragmentation begun with independence.

Beginning in 1840, various international companies began the exploration of the Bolivian coast in order to make use of the guano and nitrate deposits there. The exploitation of silver beginning in 1870 led to an economic boom. During this decade Chile and Bolivia appeared to resolve a series of quarrels by increasing the influence of the former in the disputed region. But disagreements over taxes and the nationalization of Chilean mines in the Peruvian desert in 1875 fueled the tension. Following diplomatic efforts to resolve a new set of crises, Chile declared war in April 1879. Given a Peruvian-Bolivian alliance, this involved Chile in a war with both northern neighbors. The war quickly became a contest for plunder.

None of the countries was prepared for war, although Chile had a significant advantage in naval forces. More important, the Chilean state retained its institutional solidity, whereas both Peru and Bolivia suffered from internal divisions. Chile occupied the Bolivian littoral, then Tarapaca in 1879, and Tacna and Arica and most of the northern coast in 1880. By this stage the Chilean army had increased significantly with an invasion force of twelve thousand men. International pressure from both the U.S. and European powers forced the two sides into negotiation, but the Chileans sought a complete victory. In 1881, with an army now numbering twenty-six thousand, the Chileans entered Lima. They did not leave until 1884, extracting the province of Tarapaca permanently and the provinces of Tacna and Arica, which they retained until 1929. Chile also took the entire Bolivian coast (Atacama).

The victory helped determine the future institutionalization of both the Chilean and Peruvian militaries, as well as partially defining the development options of the three countries. Chile enjoyed an economic boom as well as unprecedented patriotic euphoria, both of which helped dispel the gloom of the 1870s. Despite the relative shortness of the war, Peru suffered severe casualties and the destruction of much of its coastal infrastructure. The war may also be seen as the best example of a military impetus for a new national identity, as the Peruvian and Bolivian memory of their defeat continues to play a large role in their respective nationalisms. The Bolivian defeat deprived that country of a great part of its wealth and left it contained within the Altiplano, in which Chile had no interest. The war did help decrease the political influence of the military and helped consolidate the rule of a civilian oligarchy dominated by mining interests.

The War of the Pacific may best demonstrate the consequences of the external orientation of these states and the lack of domestic domination. It was ‘‘at heart a bald struggle over exports among jealous Chile, Bolivia, and Peru.’’ ‘‘All three countries were hard up, and run by oligarchies which disliked paying taxes and looked to revenue from these fertilizers [nitrate] as a substitute.’’ Each country was competing with the others for those resources that would allow it to maintain its ‘‘rentier’’ status and not challenge the domestic status quo. War came because the states were too weak to fight their respective elites. For example, because the elites of the Altiplano were too powerful to tax, the Bolivian state saw the littoral and the nascent nitrate industry as the best source of fiscal support. This brought it into conflict with Chile. But, precisely because it did not have adequate support from its home base, Bolivia could not hope to win.

Comparing the Navies

2009-04-23T20:52:00.003+08:00

The famous Huascar

Evaluating the relative strengths of the belligerents’ fleets just prior to the outbreak of the War of the Pacific is a vexing task. Chilean and Peruvian historians, for example, traditionally pronounced their nations’ ships as barely seaworthy and belittled their crews’ professional skills, while exaggerating their opponents’ prowess. This rite of self-effacement had a clear purpose: by depreciating their prewar flotillas, and those who served in them, the writers could rationalize their nations’ defeats while elevating their victories to the level of the miraculous. Real problems did exist. But although budgetary problems forced the Chilean government to reduce naval expenditures, it was the questionable judgment and misguided priorities of Juan Williams Rebolledo, the Chilean navy’s commander, not material deficiencies, that limited his flotilla’s performance. Conversely, the skill and dedication of Adm. Miguel Grau, the commander of the Peruvian fleet, allowed his nation’s fleet to compensate for the loss of some its equipment and hold back the Chilean armada for the first six months of the war.

Learning the Lessons of Sea Power

Chile’s navy first took to the seas in 1818, when an embryonic fleet, under the command of the Scotsman Lord Thomas Cochrane, sailed north from Valparaíso to liberate Peru and Bolivia from Spanish rule. Some of the British naval officers who served in Cochrane’s armada remained in Chile’s fleet, thus explaining the presence of so many sailors with English surnames: John Williams, Santiago Bynon, Roberto Forster, Roberto Henson, Guillermo Wilkinson, Robert Simpson, Jorge O’Brien, Raimundo Morris (a few Americans, such as Charles Wooster, also served in Chile’s navy). Some, like Robert Simpson and Juan Williams Wilson, even sired a second generation of Chilean naval officers, including three who rose to the rank of admiral. Recognizing the vulnerability of the nation’s economy and its coastal population to a seaborne attack, Chile’s leaders early realized the need for a strong fleet. The government used this navy to vanquish the Peruvian- Bolivian Confederation in 1836. Domestically, the fleet helped suppress the abortive 1851 and 1859 revolutions. But after 1860, perhaps lulled by the lack of foreign and local enemies, Chile neglected its navy. The error of this policy became painfully apparent in the mid-1860s, when Chile and Spain went to war and a Spanish naval squadron subjected Valparaíso to a three-hour bombardment that inflicted fourteen million pesos in damage to the port. This Spanish incursion taught the Moneda that it needed a strong navy, especially since Peru’s fleet, reinforced by some recently purchased ironclads, now dwarfed that of Chile. In furtherance of this policy, Santiago bought two British-built corvettes, the Chacabuco and the O’Higgins, in 1866 and 1867. Two years after Peru responded by acquiring the Oneota and the Catawba, surplus U.S. riverine monitors, the Chilean government ordered two oceangoing ironclads from British shipyards. It also obtained two additional wooden corvettes, the Magallanes and the Abtao, as well as a transport. Anxious to achieve naval parity with Chile, the Peruvians wanted to buy more armored ships. Its legislature even allocated approximately four million soles for their purchase. The onset of a worldwide economic recession in the mid-1870s forced Lima to abandon its naval expansion program. Infected by the same economic malaise, Chilean officials became so desperate that they even considered selling the fleet’s ironclads for four million British pounds. Fortunately for the Chileans, their government could find no takers. Consequently, until onset of the War of the Pacific, the composition of the Peruvian and Chilean navies remained relatively stable.

CHILE’S ARMY

2009-04-15T17:33:00.002+08:00

Chile’s military differed from its enemies in a variety of ways. On the most superficial level, Santiago’s troops dressed rather drably, at least when compared to Bolivia’s colorfully clad hosts. A few of Chile’s militia units did design some regalia that rivaled in hue those of La Paz, but the Ministry of War, doubtless anxious to ensure uniformity—always a cardinal military virtue—quickly stifled such originality. Instead, Santiago’s troops, aping the French army’s fashions as well as its tactics, marched into battle wearing blue or red kepis and jackets, red trousers, and sometimes brown puttees or leggings.

Another, and certainly a more significant distinction, was that Chile’s prewar army was composed of volunteers: those who served as private soldiers or noncommissioned officers had enlisted, generally in return for a bonus. The enlisted men did not constitute the elite of the Chilean nation. Indeed, one foreign writer described them as “the very lowest scum of society.” Thus, we should not be surprised if these sunshine soldiers often deserted, taking their bonus and their new uniforms with them.

Unlike the Allies, the Chileans had standardized the regular army’s weapons. The infantry carried Comblain II rifles, and artillerymen used Winchester carbines, while the cavalry’s Regimiento de Cazadores a Caballo dangled Spencer carbines from their saddles. Increasing the size of the army, however, forced some units to use less modern small arms. The newly created Atacama and Concepción battalions used Beaumont rifles, some of which exploded each time the troops used them for target practice; the Regimiento de Granaderos a Caballo employed both types of carbines plus some percussion rifles. Santiago began the war with four Gatling guns as well as forty-four field pieces and mountain guns, including sixteen six- and eight-centimeter cannons purchased from the House of Krupp. Unfortunately, Chilean gunners had little experience deploying these weapons: in two years they had fired their field pieces only once. It does not appear that the infantry had much more experience using their small arms.

While the active army had adequate weaponry, the same could not be said for the national guard. The seven-thousand-man militia—which tumbled from eighteen thousand in 1877—had to make do with 3,868 ancient minié guns and “old French flintlock rifle[s], converted into percussion weapons, which through use and long time in service, are now found in bad state.” Unsurprisingly, the guard’s artillery, or cavalry guard units, also had to make do with outdated equipment.

A few factors distinguished Pinto’s army from that of the Allies. Thanks to Diego Portales, who had purged the army officer corps, the nation had managed to avert some of the more grievous sequela of unbridled militarism. Chile, however, was not immune to internal unrest: in 1851 and 1859 the army had to subdue rebellions. The Moneda sometimes called upon the military—but more so the national guard—to guarantee the “correct,” not necessarily honest, outcome of an election. Officers who demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm for this task or who vocally espoused a different political ideology than the government’s favorites sometimes had to resign their commissions.

In short, although flawed, the Chilean system nonetheless differed from that of Bolivia, where the chain of command was supplanted by cronyism, where “the intimate friends of the commander take turns sharing the command with him.” These facts do not mean that some Chilean officers did not call upon their santos en la corte to influence promotions, to arrange a coveted assignment, or to obtain protection from official retribution. Indeed, precisely because some officers served as government bureaucrats or sat in the legislature as elected representatives their acquaintance with politicians gave them some clout. But Chilean army officers also realized that the congress not only authorized the military’s budget but also set limits on its size, that if the minister of war was a professional officer he served at the pleasure of a civilian president and legislature, and that a promotion law required that officers spend a certain number of years in grade in order to ascend in the army’s hierarchy. Compare this requirement to Daza, who in thirteen years rose from the rank of private to lieutenant colonel.

Additionally, Chile’s officer corps, unlike that of the Allies, was professionally educated. True, a few of the army’s most senior officers, such as Gens. Justo Arteaga and Manuel Baquedano, received their commissions directly, but they were in a minority. Most of Chile’s officers entered the army only after completing a course of study in the Escuela Militar. Founded by Chile’s first national leader, Bernardo O’Higgins, the school at times seemed more like a refuge for juvenile delinquents than an institute for aspiring officers. A cadet riot, for example, forced the authorities to close the school in 1876, but it reopened in late 1878 with the expectation that it would graduate its fi rst class in five years.

Even attending the Escuela Militar or unit-level postgraduate seminars did not prepare Chile’s officers for modern war. The lessons of the later years of the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian conflict—that rapid-fire rifles and breech-loading artillery devastated massed troop formations—did not seem to influence Chile’s infantry, which continued to use the tactics outlined in a translated edition of a 1862 French military text. Unfortunately, as Jay Luvaas noted, “The infantry regulations of 1862, which had been described as a ‘faithful reproduction of the regulations of 1831’ [varied] little in spirit from the Ordinance of 1791.” Thus Chile would go to war in 1879 using the tactics of the Napoleonic era. As Emilio Sotomayor observed, “A soldier, especially the Chilean, because of his nature has to be watched and overseen constantly by his officers. Otherwise—as practical experience has shown us on many occasions—the soldier obeys the tendency to disperse and to fight alone.” This habit might have developed as a consequence of a situation unique to Chile: for decades the Araucanian Indians were Santiago’s major enemy. Whatever their deficiencies, Chile’s army acquired more military skills fighting the Indians than the Bolivian army did from “promoting or suffocating revolutions or mutinies.” Ironically, the foot soldiers seemed no more backward than Chile’s cavalry, which still followed some early-nineteenth-century Spanish regulations. The infantry employed tactics modeled on those of the Spanish for muzzle-loading weapons, not techniques adapted to the use of modern fi rearms. The artillery perforce demanded a higher level of education: in 1874 Gen. Luis Arteaga wrote a manual to teach the army’s gunners how to master their newly acquired Krupp artillery and Gatling guns.

Only two commanders, Ricardo Santa Cruz of the Zapadores and Domingo Toro Herrera of the Chacabuco, absorbed the lessons, which they later demonstrated during maneuvers. Their efforts, while not converting other commanders, convinced a few to adopt the maneuver of having their companies advance in skirmish lines; regrettably, the rest of the army, an American naval officer observed, did not embrace the new tactics, devoting its efforts to “mechanical precision and too little to skirmishing. Open-order fighting did not seem to form part of the system of tactics.”

In addition to the gaps in their education, Chile’s officers often lacked practical experience. The army’s more senior commanders did not know how to maneuver large units. Col. Marco Arriagada complained that most officers did not possess the knowledge to train the infantry and cavalry how to use their new rifles. Even when they acquired new Krupp field pieces, Chile’s gunners did not understand their value because they had fired them but once in past two years.

In sum, Chile’s army seemed ready to fight the war against Peru and Bolivia in 1879 using the same tactics it had employed when it had battled against the armies of the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation in 1836. Happily for the Moneda, its enemies’ military proved equally rooted in the past: just as the Bolivians still resorted to Napoleonic squares to repel cavalry charges, the Peruvians continued to follow Spain’s only slightly more modern 1821 military regulations, which, many officers sadly acknowledged, seemed appropriate only for a “distant epoch.”

THE BOLIVIAN ARMY

2009-04-11T11:34:00.001+08:00

Peru was not the only nation whose army contained too many officers commanding too few men. Bolivia created its first military academy in 1823. Like its Peruvian counterpart, the school functioned only intermittently. Indeed, in 1847 the military institute for the third time closed its doors. Not until 1872 did these reopen when President Tomás Frías entrusted the Colegio Militar and its cadets to the care of a French general and a veteran of the Franco-Prussian War. (The defeat sustained by the French in the Franco-Prussian War should have given the Bolivians pause.) Regrettably, this school did not meet its founders’ expectations, and even if it had, it never trained enough officers to change dramatically the tone, or level of skills, of Bolivia’s officer corps. Just before the War of the Pacific ended, the Bolivian government called for the creation of both another academy and a school to train noncommissioned officers. In short, Bolivia’s officers lacked the education or training to fight a conventional war.

The military, additionally, lacked the institutions of a modern army: when it existed the general staff, rather than consisting of the army’s intellectual elite, had become a dumping ground for officers considered too untrustworthy to command troops in the field; it had even lost most of its copies of its own Código Militar. Although General Daza apparently revived and reorganized the general staff in the early months of the War of the Pacific, it did not actually function until 1880.

The Bolivian army of 1877 included not only a smaller number of men but fewer units as well: three battalions of infantry, the Daza Granaderos 1 de la Guardia, the Sucre Granaderos de la Guardia, and the Illimani Cazadores de la Guardia; one cavalry detachment, the Bolívar 1 de Húsares; and a mobile squadron of four Gatling machine guns. The Regimiento Santa Cruz de Artillería also contained four cannons, purchased in 1872, as well as ten to fifteen older weapons. In 1880 Bolivia organized the Bolívar 2 de Artillería, which consisted of sixteen artillery field and mountain guns.

The small arms that these troops carried—ranging from Martini-Henrys to flintlocks—proved as varied as their uniforms. Worse, not one unit carried the same weapons into battle. La Paz’s minister of war attributed this problem to the countless cuartelazos that had consumed so many weapons that there was no uniformity of small arms within each of the army’s units. This lack of standardization not only led to supply problems but, according to the 1877 Memoria, “caused many, grave troubles in practical training as well as in their use.” Of the three combat arms, only the infantry seemed marginally acceptable. Certainly the artillery appeared blighted: it possessed two heavy and two light machine guns, and three three-inch artillery pieces. But the unit lacked the horses to transport them to the field and the technical skills needed to fire them accurately. Thanks to a lack of decent mounts, the product of the constant civil unrest, one minister called the cavalry the least efficient branch.

In fairness, Bolivia tried to remedy these problems. Unfortunately, its attempt to improve the troops’ living conditions, increase junior officers’ salaries, purchase draft animals, and acquire small arms plus four Krupp cannons foundered due to a lack of funds.45 In 1878, with war in the offing, Bolivia had requested and received permission from Peru to import, duty free, fifteen hundred Remington rifles plus some other military items. And in mid-1879 it received another two thousand Remingtons to add to the approximately three thousand rifles of the same make. By 1881, thanks to shipments from Panama, Bolivia acquired six modern Krupp artillery and enough rifles that it could to lend some to Peru, though it still continued to carp about the lack of ammunition. La Paz, however, had yet to standardize its arsenals’ contents.

By 1881 La Paz had improved the lot of its troops by providing food and clothing, as well as a general education. It also created various militia units such as the Guardia Republicana and hoped to train another ten thousand militiamen.

The Bolivian soldier’s stolid endurance, his stoicism, and his ability to endure privation did not make a skilled soldier. As Campero observed, training an illiterate Indian, “who does not know how to hold a rifle, [and who] has a very little idea of the motherland or of its elevated ends,” proved extremely difficult. Before the army could make these men into soldiers, it had teach them to be citizens, “to impart notions of civilization” or culture for the soldier “to know and to practice his duties to the motherland.

THE PERUVIAN MILITARY

2009-04-10T14:39:00.001+08:00

The declaration of a state of belligerence caught the Peruvian and Chilean armies in various stages of military unpreparedness. In Peru’s case, this condition partially resulted from bad luck: in 1875 the Lima government embarked on a project to reorganize the army using its noncommissioned officers recently graduated from the newly created Escuela de Clases as the core of the new formations. Economic as well as domestic political considerations, however, delayed the proposal’s completion. Thus, once the conflict erupted, Mariano Prado’s government had to abandon its efforts at restructuring and revert to the army’s old table of organization—seven infantry battalions, three cavalry squadrons, and two artillery regiments—to fight the war.

As part of its abortive reform proposal, between 1869 and 1878 Lima sent two missions abroad to acquire small arms. The first purchased two thousand Belgian Comblain II rifles. When Peru sought to buy more of these weapons three years later, it learned that the factory could not fill its order. (Deliveries to Brazil and Chile absorbed most of the plant’s capacity.) The second mission compromised, acquiring five thousand of the less effective French Chassepots, which it modified to accept the same cartridge as the Comblain. This weapon became known as El Peruano, or as the Castañón, in honor of Col. Emilio Castañón, who led the delegation.

The arrival of these new rifles, however, still could not satisfy completely the needs of Peru’s newly expanded army. Consequently, the government had to equip its troops with the obsolescent weapons, generally of different calibers and national origin, that clogged Lima’s arsenals. The Pichincha, Zepita, and Ayacucho battalions carried American-made Sniders, while the Dos de Mayo and Cazadores de Cuzco battalions toted Chassepots. The administration later claimed that by September 1879 it had standardized its weapon systems to the point that at least each division used the same firearms. Yet, on the eve of the Battle of Tacna in May 1880, a provincial prefect informed President Nicolás Piérola that the army was equipped with 5,873 rifles and carbines produced by twelve different manufacturers. As Segundo Leiva of the Second Army of the South noted, relying on such a heterogeneous mélange of rifles caused enormous logistical problems. It proved so difficult to provide ammunition that in some units troops had weapons but no bullets.2 Predictably, the government fobbed off its most out-of-date equipment, the Austrian or Prussian minié guns, on the various guardia nacional units; others carried the old Peabody.

Peru’s artillery park consisted of four eight-centimeter Krupp M/67 guns, twelve six-centimeter Krupp M/73 mountain guns, four Gatling guns, as well as some very heavy and very obsolete bronze cannons. During the war Peru purchased additional small arms, ammunition, as well as forty to fifty Gatling guns plus artillery. Local foundries, moreover, manufactured over 650,000 cartridges for the Chassepots, Castañóns, and 688,000 minié balls. These same factories also produced sixty artillery pieces constructed of fused railroad tracks that they encased in bronze and reinforced with iron rings. Called the Grieve cannon to honor its designer, it fired the same shells made for the Krupp mountain gun and had a range of five thousand yards.

Of all its combat arms, Peru’s cavalry seemed the most ill equipped. Although all mounted units were supposed to use Winchester carbines, they did not. Col. Manuel Zamudio reported, for example, that one of the Lanceros de Torata’s two squadrons, clad in body armor, carried lances as well as sabers; the other received Henry carbines that often malfunctioned because it proved difficult to extract spent cartridges.4 Another curious fact distinguished Lima’s mounted units: while Quechua- and Aymara- speaking Indians constituted the bulk of the infantry, and indeed the country’s population, the authorities prohibited them from serving in the cavalry in the belief that Indians did not know how to ride horses. This honor fell only to blacks and mestizos, who apparently had a genetic predisposition to serve in the cavalry as well as the artillery.

The quality of many of Peru’s officers remained doubtful. Although Lima opened its first military academy in 1823, the school, as well as its successors, operated only sporadically. The most recent reincarnation, the Colegio Militar, had only begun to function in 1875, and it did not graduate its first class until 1877. Consequently, most of those who received their commission directly did so by choosing the winning side of one of Peru’s numerous revolutions. Not surprisingly, the results of this system dismayed the nation. The officers’ performance during the war, particularly those at the company grade level, was so wretched that it had been, according to one British officer, the cause of the army’s defeat. Indeed, the Peruvian intellectual Ricardo Palma said of the officer corps that “for every ten punctilious and worthy officers, you have ninety rogues, for whom duty and motherland are empty words. To form an army you will have to shoot at least half the military.” Curiously, scores of officers from Uruguay and Argentina volunteered to serve under Peruvian colors. One of these was future Argentine president Roque Saenz Pena, who managed to survive the Battle of Arica and return to Buenos Aires to fight in the only marginally less bloody battles of Argentine politics.

NITRATES AS CAUSE OF THE WAR

2009-04-06T17:50:00.000+08:00

Chilean nitrates were the chief source of nitrogen for explosives, fertilizer, and chemical industries from the 1830s to the 1930s, and were the only significant source of iodine from the 1870s (replacing seaweed) until the mid-20th century (when iodine began to be extracted from oilfield brines).

In 1830, a shipment of 700 tonnes of nitrate left Tarapacá, southernmost Peru. The industry mushroomed, and annual exports were 16,000 tonnes by 1843. The peak was not reached until the rather unusual conditions of World War I, when production reached nearly 3 million tonnes. The all-time record was set in 1928, at 3.1 million tonnes.

The nitrates occur in what are now Chile's two northern provinces, Tarapacá and Antofagasta, along a band 30 km wide and 700 km long. They seem to have formed in shallow playa lakes, where the saline water contained bacteria that fixed nitrogen into nitrate.

In 1868 there was a boom in nitrate mining in the Atacama Desert, and major nitrate ports were developed from Iquique in the north through Pisagua and across the Atacama desert to Taltal. The nitrate mining was dominated by British and Chilean enterprises, even though the Atacama Desert was formally part of Bolivia. Chile had recognized Bolivia's title in an 1874 treaty, but was allocated economic rights there, including a guarantee that taxes on Chilean mining enterprises would not be raised.

For Peru, nitrate was rather unimportant as long as the guano trade was flourishing: in fact, most of the early nitrate mining on Peruvian and Bolivian territory was done by Chilean and British entrepreneurs. However, in 1875 a particularly impoverished Peruvian government declared nitrate deposits to be the property of the state, copying the declaration covering guano decades before. By this time the governments of Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, had all focussed their attention on control of the nitrate region.

In another of its economic crises, the Bolivian government announced a tax increase of 10 centavos per hundredweight on nitrates in 1879. At that time the largest nitrate mining company was the Antofagasta Nitrate and Railroad Company, a Chilean firm controlled by British capital, including the merchant house of Gibbs. It's not clear what part was played by Gibbs in the politics of this incident, but the Chileans mobilized with the intention of seizing the desert. The Peruvians expressed the intention of mediating the dispute between Bolivia and Chile, but when it turned out that there was a secret treaty between Peru and Bolivia, the Chileans declared war on them both.

The War of the Pacific may have been started as much by national rivalry and runaway emotion as by the economic prize of the nitrate deposits themselves. However, the nitrate prize was enough to give the victor the income of an entire nation, and the combatants were acutely aware of that. Peru's income had been largely based on guano and nitrate for decades; Bolivia's economy was ramshackle at best, but its foreign income was based on metal mining in the Altiplano; and Chile had already had a taste of the riches to be gained from the Atacama mines it was already operating.

Early in the War, W. R. Grace allied itself with the Peruvian government, and became a clandestine arms shipper to Peru. It bought and shipped millions of dollars' worth of armaments, including guns from Krupp and a new naval weapon, a torpedo boat. However the Chileans quickly beat both their opponents and went on to occupy Lima.

Chile's victory in the War of the Pacific gave it full control of a large northern strip of coast. Iquique was the terminus of the Nitrate Railways and the most important outlet. At first Tarapacá province was dominant, with 48 out of Chile's 53 nitrate works in 1892. But twenty years later the southern fields of Antofagasta, linked by a new railroad, the Longitudinal Railway, overtook the northern field in production.

Nitrate played an increasing role in Chile's economy after the War of the Pacific, as copper production declined. By the late 1880s an export tax on nitrate was earning 43% of Chilean government income, and in 1894 it was 68%, and the wealth was used to improve the country's infrastructure. The nitrate industry, however, was largely foreign owned. European capital had bought out Chilean entrepreneurs in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia, even before the War of the Pacific. The major reason was the large amount of capital needed to set up the nitrate works, the infrastructure in the difficult desert regions that contained the nitrate deposits, and the railroad and port facilities that were needed, and the continuing requirement for importing supplies. Capital on this scale was simply not available in South America, nor were the basic supplies to support the industry. For example, foreign coal constituted 20% of Iquique's imports in 1909. In fact, a convenient two-way trade of coal for nitrate favored British shipping firms, who loaded 60% of the nitrates even though most of the nitrate went to European countries.

Synthetic production of nitrates surpassed Chilean mining production in the 1930s. By 1950 the Chilean production was only about 15% of world supply, and by 1980 it was only 0.14%. Today the Chilean reserves total only about a year's worth of world consumption, not because they are close to exhaustion, but because world demand has increased so much.

Uniformes de la Guerra del Pacifico 1879-1884

2009-04-01T23:23:00.001+08:00

An astounding large format, full-colour uniform book!

Spanish text, but with rough English translation soon available on PDF.

Amazing uniforms - think ACW meets British Colonial meets Franco-Prussian War - but with extra colour and llamas!

£59.50 GBP

An incredibly sumptuous book that surpasses even Partizan's usual committment to quality colour uniforms.

This book covers one of the longest and bloodiest conflicts in Latin America during the 19th. Century. In 1879 the war started as a simple border dispute which drew three nations armies into armed conflict, Chile, Peru and Bolivia.

Chile with its small army of 2,440 men stood to be overwhelmed by the combine allied forces of Peru and Bolivia which numbered 10,452 men, although this war is not considered large by European standards, it was equally as bloody and left thousands of men dead and the Chilean Army the victor.

In this book you will find the military dress and uniforms worn by all the opposing forces. One is struck by the colourful uniforms worn by the regiments on all sides in this war. The fashion ranges from American Civil War, Franco-Prussian War and you even find some traces of Spanish uniform.

The plates show all ranks from senior officers down to ordinary infantrymen and troopers, even the indegenous Indians are included. Credit must go to Greve and Fernández in producing such beautiful and detailed plates and bringing this subject to life.

You will also find a wonderful collection of contemporary black and white photographs taken during this conflict which with the help of Electronic Retouching have brought them into the 21st. Century. This has been done in the most careful way by the authors following to the letter the dress regulations of the time. This technique was used by them in their first book in Spanish on this subject for the Chilean Army.

This book shows an entirely new and very colourful subject for the student of military dress and campaign history. With 80 superb colour plates, many contemporary photograps and drawings, all showing the uniforms as they were actually worn by the soldiers of the day, with a combination of regulation and improvised dress.

Others show the variety of arms which were used and came from North America and Europe, also the equipment that the soldiers carried on their long campaigns, plus flags, insignia, medals and even buttons are shown in this work.

This excellent book continues to open up the vast subject of South American military uniform and history which has been woefully neglected in the past.

Wargame - War of the Pacific - 1878 to 1883

2009-04-01T23:13:00.001+08:00

War of the Pacific - 1878 to 1883

WitP is a complex wargame that take the players through the conflict involving Chile, Bolivia, and Peru, which resulted in Chilean annexation of valuable disputed territory along the Pacific coast. It grew out of a dispute between Chile and Bolivia over control of a part of the Atacama Desert that lies between the 23rd and 26th parallels on the Pacific coast of South America. The territory contained valuable mineral resources, particularly sodium nitrate. In this wargame the Tri-Tab system allows for the complexities of the terrain and exigencies of combat operations during that time period.

Currently the definitive uniform guide for the three warring armies (UNIFORMES DE LA GUERRA DEL PACIFICO 1879 – 1884). The land and sea battles that were fought were all quite small, and could easily be re-created using the TABLE TOP BATTLES rules. Although there are no figure ranges available for the Bolivians, Chileans, and Peruvians, the uniforms are very similar to the French, German, and US uniforms of the period, and could be reproduced with a reasonable degree of accuracy using paint ‘conversions’.

Bolivia's international relations - Chile & Peru

2009-03-30T18:14:00.000+08:00

Chile

Bolivia's relations with Chile are strained, as they have been for much of the last 130 years, by Bolivia's loss of its maritime provinces as a result of its defeat in the War of the Pacific (1879-83). Bolivia's territorial dispute with Chile has also long been a source of nationalist fervour, not least within the armed forces, who continue to see recovery of the lost coastal territories as a patriotic duty. Full diplomatic relations between the two countries have been severed since 1978.

There have been various attempts to enter into negotiations to give Bolivia a sea corridor, 'salida al mar', in return for Bolivian concessions towards Chile. These efforts have however tended not to find favour in either Bolivia or Peru. (As the disputed northernmost areas of Chile actually belonged to Peru prior to 1879, a 1929 treaty gives Peru an effective right of veto over any further territorial changes). Attempts by Bolivia to court international support for its claims have been rejected by Chile, which argues that the issue is entirely bilateral.

The election of the Morales government in Bolivia, as well as the Bachelet government in Chile from 2006, has led to an improvement in relations. Ricardo Lagos, the outgoing Chilean president, attended Morales' inauguration in January 2006 , becoming the first Chilean president in over 50 years to visit La Paz. A few weeks later, Morales returned the compliment by attending Michelle Bachelet's inauguration. He was met with a warm reception from Chilean leftist and trades union groups, who chanted slogans and unfurled banners in support of Bolivia's ambitions for coastal access. Bolivia's gas wealth and Chile's chronic energy shortage provides an incentive for both sides to work out a lasting solution. Using gas as a weapon to force Chile to give up territory is however poorly received in Chile, while selling gas to Chile without some sort of territorial incentive is a sensitive issue in Bolivia. A good deal of mutual distrust remains, and a certain rapprochement between Chile and Peru after the election of Alan García to the Peruvian presidency in February 2006 meant Bolivia risked being left out in the cold.

Peru

Peru and Bolivia have historically been drawn together in hostility towards Chile, since both came out losers in the three-way War of the Pacific. Peru's unwillingness to concede Pacific coast access to Bolivia along Peru's southern frontier with Chile has nonetheless been an obstacle. In 2002, Peru offered to provide an alternative route for the export of Bolivian gas, allowing Bolivia to bypass the problematic Chilean territories, but the project - involving the building of a pipeline to link the Bolivian department of Tarija with Peru's Pacific coast - has been shelved.

Bolivia and Peru are moreover potential rivals so far as gas sales are concerned: plans by Peru to use gas from the Camisea reserves in the Peruvian department of Cuzco to supply Chile and Argentina were seen in La Paz as an unfriendly move. Were Peru to try to build a pipeline directly to Chile across Bolivia's potential salida al mar , this would also further complicate territorial claims. The open sympathy expressed by Morales for losing candidate Ollanta Humala in the 2006 Peruvian presidential elections did little to improve relations with eventual winner Alan García. During his first months in office, García made clear that he attached great importance to improving relations between Peru and Chile. Any such rapprochement could lead to Bolivia's further isolation.

Bolivia’s President Says Quest for Coast Threatened by Peru-Chile Dispute

2009-03-30T18:08:00.002+08:00

LA PAZ – President Evo Morales confirmed on Monday that Bolivia’s drive to regain at least a portion of the Pacific coastline it lost in a 19th-century war could be harmed by Peru’s litigation with Chile over those nations’ maritime boundary.

The Peruvian claim “would only prejudice one of the alternatives” for Bolivia to obtain a sovereign outlet to the ocean, Morales said during his country’s annual Day of the Sea observance.

“I wouldn’t want to think that this lawsuit that’s being presented before the International Court in The Hague about the maritime boundary between Peru and Chile would be to affect and set back one of the possible solutions to our historic request which is sovereign access to the sea,” he added.

Bolivia on Monday commemorated the 130 anniversary of the death of Eduardo Abaroa, one of the heroes of the country’s defense when it was invaded by Chilean troops in 1879 during the War of the Pacific.

The war cost Bolivia 120,000 square kilometers (a little over 46,000 square miles) of territory and the 400 kilometers (250 miles) of coastline it had on the Pacific before the war, in which Peru was La Paz’s ally and also suffered territorial losses to the victorious Chileans.

Morales insisted, alluding to the Peruvians, that “only they know what this lawsuit is due to.”

He added that, above and beyond the “internal and external agents” who want to harm Bolivia’s maritime aspirations, there are also “international powers” who are trying to create conflicts in the region, but he did not specify to which countries he was referring.

Morales emphasized that he and his Chilean counterpart, Michelle Bachelet, had included the discussion about Bolivian ocean access on the 13-point agenda that is the basis for bilateral talks that began in 2006.

“Sooner or later we will return to the Pacific Ocean,” said Morales, noting that in those discussions there had already been progress made on solving the controversy over water in the Silala region of the southern Bolivian highland province of Potosi.

The waters there, considered by Bolivia to be a source to which it has the rights, benefit northern Chile, which – in contrast – considers it to be an international river.

According to the Bolivian government, Santiago accepted an agreement to economically compensate Bolivia for half the consumption of that water.

La Paz and Santiago have not had diplomatic relations since 1978, after the failure of negotiations that would have allowed the landlocked Andean nation to regain access to the Pacific Ocean, a goal that has become an insistent demand in international forums.

But the administrations of Morales and Bachelet have agreed to an agenda which includes dialogue on Bolivia’s demand for access to the sea, and despite the lack of movement on that issue, the two presidents maintain cordial ties.

The topic of Bolivia’s getting back a stretch, even a short one, of coastline is a sore one in Chile, where virtually all politicians and the great majority of citizens consider the matter long closed.

Bolivia’s repeated attempts to persuade Chile to return the coastal territory caused the countries to break off diplomatic ties in 1962, with a brief resumption between 1975 and 1978, when both nations were ruled by military regimes. EFE

Photographic History Of The War Of The Pacific Rescued In Book Form‎

2009-03-30T16:54:00.001+08:00

David Blanco Bonilla / EFE

A photographic history of the War of the Pacific, a conflict between Chile and the joint ‎forces of Peru and Bolivia in the late 19th century, has been rescued by Peruvian Renzo ‎Babilonia in a book documenting the dramatic conflict.‎

One hundred and twenty images have been compiled in “La Guerra de Nuestra Memoria: ‎Crónica Ilustrada de la Guerra del Pacífico (1879 – 1884),” a book published in Lima, by ‎the Editorial Fund of the University of Sciences and Humanities (UCH).‎

Babilonia, a university professor and member of the Ibero-American Society of History ‎of Photography, told Efe that his book is intended to describe this historical period from a ‎photographic and journalistic point of view.‎

A finalist at the 9th International Photographic Art Exhibition in Beijing in 2001, the ‎researcher has compiled scenes of the war’s progression, the battlegrounds, the ‎occupation of Lima, and portraits of different characters of the time.‎

To obtain these documents he researched archives in Peru and Chile, with support from ‎other countries including Argentina and England.‎

His work has enabled him to describe how the Chilean army was accompanied by ‎photographers during the military campaign in Peru and Bolivia, a country that ‎participated in the first part of the war.‎

‎“The best known among them was the American Edward Spencer, who accompanied and ‎documented the War of the Pacific from the standpoint of the Chilean army,” he said.‎

Peru did not have photographers to officially document the war, “but several ‎photographic studies were able to document it privately,” he said.‎

Babilonia recalled that in the late 19th century the works of the Englishman Roger Fenton ‎in the Crimean War and American photographers in the American Civil War were ‎known.‎

In Peru, the Frenchman Eugène Courret had also documented the defenses of the May 2, ‎‎1866 battle, which in Callao faced Lima’s defenders against the Spanish fleet.‎

Although Chile “has no official documentation that says that these photographers ‎accompanied the army during the campaign,” they had many advantages, he said.‎

‎“In these images the photographer is on the scene before and after the battle, not during ‎the event itself; however, it is obvious that there is official support, because among the ‎Chilean celebrations for the conquering of Lima it is known that there is a photo exhibit ‎celebrating Chile’s triumph,” he explained.‎

According to the researcher, at that time “the photographer had as much power as a ‎filmmaker or a general,” since he could gather hundreds of men to pose for photographs, ‎which were also published in the newspapers and magazines of that time.‎

Several of these prints were published by the Spanish newspaper “La Ilustración ‎Española y Americana,” since in Spain there was much interest in the situation of its ‎immigrants, in addition to the economic “and emotional” ties to Peru.‎

‎“Spain’s participation in the War of the Pacific is so important, there is a photograph and ‎an engraving of the Spanish Company of the Urban Guard, which was formed by ‎members of the Spanish colony in Lima; while the army defended the city against the ‎invasion, the foreign colony formed detachments to protect the internal order of the city,” ‎he said.‎

Babilonia revealed that his grandfather, a lieutenant general in the Peruvian Army, ‎influenced his interest in that historical period, and that in his work he counted on the ‎valuable support of Chilean researchers and the Ibero-American Society for the History ‎of Photography, which is based in Argentina.‎

It was in this country that he found a collection of photographic work on the War of the ‎Triple Alliance, in which the joint forces of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay fought ‎against Paraguay, in the 19th century.‎

That book, he admitted, was “fascinating” and gave him the foundation for his work on ‎the War of the Pacific, which besides the snapshots also collects one hundred pages of ‎researches, with anecdotes about the uses of photography in this period among both ‎Peruvians and Chileans.‎

While working on a second edition, he stated that his book is “a contribution” to his ‎country and explained that “in no way” contains “criticism or disrespect to Chile.”‎

The book of Babilonia will be presented in Lima on March 4, at the Inca Garcilaso de la ‎Vega Cultural Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru.

Major Bolivian Territorial Losses

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The War of the Pacific resulted from a dispute between Bolivia and Chile over sovereignty of the mineral-rich coastal area of the Atacama Desert. In the mid-1860s, the two nations had come to the brink of war because of disagreement over their boundaries. In 1874 Chile agreed to fix the border at 24° south latitude in return for Bolivia's promise not to increase taxes on Chilean nitrate enterprises for twenty-five years. But in 1878, Daza imposed a slight increase on export taxes. Chile immediately objected, and when Daza refused to revoke the tax hike, Chile landed troops on February 14, 1879. Bolivia, in alliance with Peru, declared war on Chile on March 1, but Bolivia's troops in the coastal territory were easily defeated, in part because of Daza's military incompetence. Driven from office by a popular revolt, Daza fled to Europe with a sizable portion of Bolivia's treasury. The attempt of General Narciso Campero Leyes (1880-84) to come to the aid of Peru, Bolivia's ally in the war, was unsuccessful, and t he combined armies were defeated by Chile in 1880. Having lost its entire coastal territory, Bolivia withdrew from the war. It ceded the territory officially to Chile twentyfour years later, in 1904, under the Treaty of Peace and Friendship.

The War of the Pacific was a turning point in Bolivian history. Bolivian politicians were able to rally Bolivians by blaming the war on Chilean aggression. Bolivian writers were convinced that Chile's victory would help Bolivia to overcome its backwardness because the defeat strengthened the "national soul." Even today, Bolivia has not relinquished the hope of regaining an outlet to the Pacific Ocean.

After the war, a vigorous debate among civilian elites spawned the development of new political parties. Mining entrepreneurs, who had become the most important economic group in the country because of increasing production, created the Conservative Party (Partido Conservador). Conservatives favored reaching a quick peace settlement with Chile that would include indemnification for lost territories and enable Bolivia to construct a railroad for mining exports. The Liberal Party (Partido Liberal) denounced the pacifism of the Conservatives. It also resented the economic dependence of the mining sector on Chilean and British capital and hoped to attract United States investment. Despite these differences, both parties were primarily interested in political and economic modernization, and their ideological outlooks were similar. Civilian politicians reorganized, reequipped, and professionalized the discredited armed forces and tried to subject them to civilian control. Still, both Conservatives and Liberals init ially supported military candidates for the presidency. The governments in power from 1880 to 1920--elected by a small, literate, and Spanish-speaking electorate--brought Bolivia its first relative political stability and prosperity

Bolivia Reaches for a Slice of the Coast That Got Away

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September 24, 2006

By SIMON ROMERO
LA PAZ, Bolivia, Sept. 23 — From his penthouse office in a tightly guarded nine-story building here, where architects designed the watchtowers to look like small lighthouses, Vice Adm. José Alba Arnez oversees a military force with more than 5,000 sailors, cadets and officers.
His waiting room has oil paintings depicting men-of-war in choppy waters, an old wooden ship’s wheel made by John Hastie & Company of Scotland and waiters clad in bow ties who serve coca tea on fine china.
All that is lacking for Admiral Alba, the commander general of the Bolivian Navy, is a sea.
“We’ve been in this unfortunate condition since the late 19th century,” he said in an interview, gesturing toward a map on the wall from 1859 showing Bolivia with almost twice its current territory and a swath of Pacific coastline.
Today’s maps show that coast as part of Chile, thanks to the 1879 conflict known as the War of the Pacific, or the Saltpeter War, which helped cement Chile as a regional power and, some here say, put Bolivia on the path to becoming South America’s poorest nation.
In a diplomatic push combining nostalgia and shrewd nationalist politics, President Evo Morales has begun lobbying to regain a small part of that coastline for Bolivia. The navy, which patrols Bolivia’s rivers and the waters of Lake Titicaca, finds itself in the middle of this quest.
Mr. Morales took the spotlight at the summit meeting of the Nonaligned Movement of countries this month in Havana, where he led a parallel meeting of a 31-member organization called the Group of Landlocked Developing Countries. Members include countries like Bhutan, Burkina Faso and Moldova.
“We hope in the near future to be able to leave this group,” Mr. Morales told delegates in Havana.
Notwithstanding Chile’s historic intransigence to cede even one inch of its territory to Bolivia, such comments play well in Bolivia, where textbooks portray that 1879 war as a Chilean land grab, and where each May the nation commemorates a Day of the Sea.
Naval officers, meanwhile, pine for a corridor to the Pacific.
“We don’t want it all back,” said Admiral Alba, clad in dress uniform. “All we want is a 10-kilometer strip to call our own.”
The current navy, though ensconced in society, is a relatively recent creation. In a fit of nationalism in 1963, President Víctor Paz Estenssoro decreed it back into existence.
Military officials were sent on educational exchanges to naval schools in Argentina, Brazil and the United States, institutionalizing Bolivia’s wish for a coastline.
Now the navy patrols Amazonian rivers, assists in efforts to limit contraband and distributes medicine to remote communities. An elite unit formed to combat drug trafficking, the Blue Devils, operates near the border with Brazil.
The navy’s proudest outpost is found on the southern banks of Lake Titicaca, more than two miles above sea level.
A monument near the entrance to the Titicaca Naval Base depicts a Bolivian soldier thrusting his bayonet into the throat of a Chilean soldier beside the words, “What once was ours, will be ours once more.”
The base’s commander, Capt. Carlos Vallejo Crespo, said in an interview that the naval base’s purpose was to “exercise sovereignty.”
Carefully choosing his words, Captain Vallejo said Bolivia was not “mediterráneo,” Spanish for something that is surrounded by land, but was instead “enclaustrado,” or forcibly cloistered.
On touring the base, which was filled with blue naval uniforms and white hats, he pointed to a fleet that included two rusting patrol boats donated by China and a hospital boat to take government pediatricians, gynecologists and dentists to far-flung villages on the lake.
Watching recruits, mainly Aymara-speaking Indians, emerge shivering after a swim in the lake’s 46-degree water as part of a punishing high-altitude diving course, he explained, “We now guarantee that almost all of our sailors learn how to swim.” Though they swear off any involvement in politics, naval officers closely follow every ripple in Bolivia’s effort to regain access to the Pacific, a prickly issue that has grown more serious in recent years.
In 2003, President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, already unpopular for yielding to pressure from the United States to eradicate coca, pushed for plans to export Bolivian natural gas to North America through Chile. Protests forced him to flee the country.
Mr. Morales, who was elected late last year on a platform of protecting coca farming for nondrug use, has reaffirmed his support for a “gas for sea” policy. That conditions the possible supply of Bolivian gas to Chile or its export through Chilean ports to winning access to the sea.
But Bolivia and Chile have not had full diplomatic relations since 1978. Mr. Morales has appealed to the Organization of American States to help broker a solution, but received a tepid response even though his ally, President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, has stated that he longed to swim on a Bolivian beach.
Some Chilean legislators and Jorge Arancibia, the former commander in chief of the Chilean Navy, have backed finding a resolution with Bolivia, but polls show that most Chileans oppose a settlement.
Still, Mr. Morales recently told people attending the commemoration of the 43rd anniversary of the reformation of the navy that they should be prepared “to return at any moment to the Pacific Ocean.”
Though Mr. Morales remains popular here, strikes and road blockades by groups dissatisfied with the pace of his government’s changes have grown more common.
Such unrest, though, does not seem to have affected sentiment at the Museum of the Coast, a collection here of old maps, war correspondence and books by marólogos, or sea specialists, on the consequences of the War of the Pacific, which was fought over control of nitrate deposits in the form of guano and saltpeter.
“This is about part of us,” said Mauricia Yapura, an attendant at the museum for 10 years, “a part that Chile took away.”

United States Involvement

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US attempted to intercede in the War of the Pacific between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia - the Chilean admiral threatened to send the American ships to the bottom of the ocean, and with two new British-built battleships in his fleet, he was well able to deliver on the threat.

The War of the Pacific broke out on February 14th, 1879, when Chilean troops landed in the Bolivian harbor of Antofagasta. It is clear from the evidence presented in previous chapters that Chile entertained annexation ambitions towards this Bolivian territory since 1842. The Chilean government had already decided on military occupation of the territory by the end of 1878. In January 1879 the Chilean newspapers were inciting an already belligerent public opinion by proclaiming the need to use armed force in order to solve Chile's dispute with Bolivia.

Studies on the War of the Pacific divide this event into four main stages. The first one comprises the occupation of the Bolivian littoral. The second corresponds to the naval war between the Peruvian and Chilean fleets. The third includes the occupation of the southernmost Peruvian provinces. And the fourth is the invasion of the Peruvian heartland, including the port of Callao and the city of Lima.

There is a large number of books written about this war, and in addition, several American researchers have studied the role played by the United States during this conflict. (1) However, some little known aspects of this conflict are studied in this chapter which are particularly important for Bolivia. Nonetheless, one should not overlook the fact that because of this war Bolivia lost an entire province, which covered approximately 62,000 square miles; almost equivalent in size to Pennsylvania. lt. also lost part of its population that radicated there, whose descendants later became Chilean citizens. In addition, Bolivia was deprived of important fiscal revenue as well as valuable natural resources. Worst of 'al], Bolivia became landlocked since Chile took over its littoral, which included 187 miles of shore, four main ports and seven coves.

Information sent to Washington on the Chilean Invasion

The American minister in Lima, Mr. Gibbs, sent information to the State Department on February 10, 1879, about the imminent Chilean invasion of Bolivia and stated that Peru would probably be involved in the conflict. In a later message, Mr. Gibbs confirmed the invasion of Antofagasta and analyzed the legal and historical status of the territories claimed both by Chile and ]3olivia. In his message he added that the foreign minister of Bolivia, Mr. Serapio Reyes Ortiz, had arrived in Lima in order to ask for compliance of the Alliance Treaty of 1873. Mr. Gibbs noted his belief that Chile was a country with larger financial resources, able to defend with case the occupied seashore area, and probably to have it annexed in case of Peruvian nonintervention. Furthermore, he considered that Bolivia did not have much to lose because the commercial saltpeter beds in that area were quite far from the country's urban centers, and in addition, were isolated by the Andean range where mountain passes were narrow and dangerous. He added that President Prado closest circles feared that dispatching Peruvian troops from Lima to the south would probably make that capital an easy prey of Mr. Pierola, a Peruvian politician accused of subversion. (2)

The American envoy accredited to the Chilean government, Mr. Thomas Osborn, informed his government in a note dated 20 February 20, 1879, that Chile was again involved in a border dispute, this time against Bolivia for the Pacific shoreline area lying between 23 degrees and 25 degrees latitude. In his note Mr. Osborn describes the Treaty of 1866 and the changes to that treaty introduced In 1874. He said that the discovery of vast saltpeter beds in the area of Mejillones had awakened the interest of several commercial enterprises on their exploitation. The American representative pointed out that this business was becoming a monopoly under a corporation know as "Compañia de Salitres y Ferrocarril de Antofagasta" (Antofagasta's Saltpeter Refiner and Railroad Company) and added that wealthy Chilean citizens had a majority interest in this corporation. (3)

Subsequently, the American envoy sent information about the break of diplomatic relations between Chile and Peru and of the war declaration of April l5th; he further verified that Chile had established a blockade of Iquique’s harbor and was preparing to land troops in the Peruvian province of Tarapaca, just north of the Bolivian border. He mentioned that Tarapaca had inexhaustible deposits of guano and saltpeter. Therefore, in case of military success Chile would certainly retain that province, as a prominent citizen of that country had informed him because of Chilean interest in such deposits valued more than $400'@illion. (4)

Mr. Gibbs sent independent dispatches from Lima containing official Bolivian documents about the Battle of Calama and reporting Chile's declaration of war to Peru. (5) At the same time, Mr. Osborn was sending information from Santiago about the occupation of the ports of Cobija and Tocopilla by Chilean naval. forces and on the occupation of Calama by other Chilean units after stubborn Bolivian stand and numerous casualties. He said that e surviving Bolivian soldiers from Calama were taken prisoners d added that Chile's major concern was Peru. (6)

Chile’s Expansionist Policies and Minister Pettis’ Mediation

The new American minister, Mr. Newton Pettis, arrived in Bolivia early in June 1879 without clear instructions from his government but with a sincere interest in contributing to the restoration of peace n South America. The minister of foreign affairs of Bolivia, Mr. Pedro J. de Guerra, asked Mr. Pettis for American peace mediation directed to get back the occupied Bolivian territory. Mr. Pettis ceded to the Bolivian request and opened talks with his colleagues in Lima and Santiago to explore the feasibility of a US mediation before the governments of Peru and Chile. Minister Pettis traveled later on to Arica and Pisagua for an interview with the presidents of Peru and Bolivia, and continued then on his way to Santiago to have talks with the president and the minister of foreign affairs of Chile. After his return from the Chilean capital, Minister Pettis met the presidents of the allied countries again and gave them an aide-memoire containing a description of his efforts. Pettis informed that Chile would only accept the US arbitration with a guarantee for the possession of Antofagasta. On their part Chile would then pay a sum in compensation to Bolivia for their territory. On the other hand, who accepted arbitration only concerning the question of Bolivia, stressing that the situation with Peru was a different matter that prevented Chile from accepting any mediation on this respect in the near future. (7)

Even though Mr. Pettis failed in his mission, it was obvious that the government of Chile, in spite of accepting arbitration, did not feel secure on its right over the Bolivian coastal territories, and thus demanded as a precondition that in case of losing the arbitration proceedings, the relevant tribunal should have set an amount for reparations that Chile would then pay Bolivia in order to obtain ratification of its possession of the disputed territory. In other words. Chile considered irreversible the annexation of the coastal territories. Its future interest in Tarapaca was unquestionable as well, and their only problem, therefore was to find a way of granting Bolivia access to the sea while validating the Chilean occupation of the territories usurped to Bolivia and Peru.

American Mediation: Peace Talks on the Lackawanna

After Chile's military victories in Tacna and Arica and at a time when Chilean troops were preparing to march on Lima, Minister Osborn took the initiative to offer the good offices of the American government to reach a negotiated solution to the conflict of the Pacific' Chile accepted such initiative and so did the allied countries some time later. Their representatives met with the three American ministers in October 1880 on board of the ship Lackawanna, then anchored in Arica's harbor.

There were three meetings on October 22, 25 and 27, 1980. During the first meeting, once the greetings and the introductory proceedings were over, the delegation of Chile introduced seven basic conditions for peace. They were: first, the transfer to Chile of the territories of Antofagasta and Tarapaca second, the payment of 20 million gold pesos compensation to Chile, of which 4 million would be in cash; third, the restoration of Chilean properties nationalized in Peru and Bolivia; fourth, the return to Chile of the transport vessel Rimac; fifth, the abrogation of the Secret Alliance Treaty between Peru and Bolivia; sixth, the retention by Chile of the territories of Moquegua, Tacna and Arica until all previous conditions were satisfied; and seventh, the formal commitment on the part of Peru not to mount artillery batteries In Arica's harbor once returned by Chile and to limit that port to commercial use only.

At the second meeting, Mr. Antonio Arenas of Peru rejected the Chilean demands because his country did not recognize the right of anyone to rule through military occupation; otherwise that would amount to set a very dangerous precedent for the Americas. The representative of Chile, Mr. Eulogio Altamirano, answered with a statement on how painful it had been for his country to go to war, but stressing that they did so without regard for the amount of sacrifice involved and eager to achieve a solid peace that would enable the reparation of such sacrifices. He added that modern history was fraught with cases of border rectification, and in the case of the so-called Chilean conquest, the only territories involved were those made productive by Chilean toil and capital which by itself made the shift of the border line unavoidable.

The representative of Bolivia, Mr. Mariano Baptista, maintained that the statement of Mr. Altamirano precluded any peaceful solution. He expressed his country's absolute solidarity with the Peruvian position and firmly rejected the principle of territorial annexation by the force of arms, no matter whether it was called a shift forward, a transfer, an acquisition or a conquest. He finally suggested a search, with the help of American representatives, for a framework of the debate that would give way to other conciliatory moves.

The other Peruvian representative, Mr. Aurelio Garcia, submitted among other things the need that arbitration be undertaken by the United States, in view of the good will expressed by the American envoys and on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine.

The representatives of Chile, Mr. Lillo and Mr. Vergara, refused to accept the arbitration proposal, arguing that such a move would have been acceptable before the war but not after. Mr. Lillo added that Chile accepted the ideals of Pan American brotherhood advanced by Mr. Baptista, and accordingly, Chile did not accept the right of conquest either. Nevertheless, he wanted it to be understood that this country required a just compensation for the effort spent in the tragic conflict started for the protection of the Chilean population that brought progress to the disputed regions. Juan Carrillo of Bolivia refuted these arguments and recalled that international arbitration was legitimate. , He joined Baptista in accepting on behalf of Bolivia that Chile may keep its troops of occupation in place until the arbitration tribunal found a solution to all related problems.

Minister Osborn took up from there and made clear that the US government did not seek to become an arbiter in the controversy but that the American government would undoubtedly assume this responsibility in answer to a petition duly endorsed by the three countries. The Chilean envoy then affirmed that he regretted to decline arbitration, particularly in view of the US government's willingness to accept it.

In the course of the third session, the representative of Chile expounded that they were unable to make changes to the peace proposals introduced in the first session. The Peruvian representatives stated as well that they had no new proposals, and once they had advanced the possibility of arbitration, the Chilean rejection had taken the burden of responsibility for the war from the shoulders of Peru, who was just looking for peace with decorum. The representatives of Bolivia reiterated how clear this question was for them -- the allied countries did not accept Chilean conditions and Chile rejected the arbitration proposal advanced by the allies. Furthermore, the proposal of Bolivia for accepting a provisional Chilean administration of the occupied territories that would allow Chile to recover its war expenses was also denied. They deplored thus the lack of agreement resulting from the American mediation. Mr. Osborn lamented on behalf of the three American diplomats their failure to achieve conciliation and peace during that session and stated that he anticipated a very negative reaction from the government and the people of the United States as a consequence of such a failure. (8)

The collapse of the Lackawanna talks had negative repercussions in the three countries and also in public opinion throughout the continent. Ambassador Osborn was admonished by the secretary of state for his failure to promote arbitration as a solution for peace. The ministers of foreign affairs of Chile, Peru and Bolivia issued circulars explaining the position adopted by their respective chanceries in view of the collapse of negotiations on the Lackawanna. It is interesting to note that the Chilean circular attempted to explain the seven conditions set in their original proposal. With regard to the seventh condition, Chile pointed out that the Port of Arica was the natural commercial outlet for Bolivian products and that Chile demanded Peruvian demilitarization of Arica in the interest of defending free Bolivian trade in the area.

Parallel to the Lackawanna talks, Chile tried once again to reach a separate agreement with Bolivia. The Chilean representative, Mr. Eusebio Lillo, proposed an agreement to Mariano Baptista that would have entailed, on the one hand, the final transfer of Antofagasta to Chile: and on the other, the concession of a port further north to Bolivia probably in Moquegua. In that way, Chile would retain Tacna and Arica In payment for war costs. Bolivia declined the alternative to betray its ally and did not accede to separate negotiations. In this regard, the American minister in La Paz sent the following report to Washington:

"The main endeavors of the Chileans in private conferences with the Bolivians, communicated to me confidentially by the latter, were made to break up the alliance between Peru and Bolivia, and engage the latter republic in an alliance with themselves as the unavoidable result of such action. Great inducements were held out, a share in the conquests already and still to be made, but I am pleased to be able to say that such perfidy and disregard of national honor was not consummated; and if, on being consulted on that subject, I took a decided stand in declaring that such proceeding, no matter how beneficial it might be to Bolivia, would be considered by my government, and no doubt by the world, as one of the most infamous transactions in history." (9)

Chile asks for American Intervention in the Matter of the

Exchange of Prisoners

The more outstanding. events of the War of the Pacific have been duly chronicled by many; however, the persistent Bolivian resistance in denying the Chilean army the possibility to conquer more territories in the Altiplano (Andean High Plateau) has been regarded less relevant and is a field of research as yet unexplored.

In this respect it is worthy to note that the government of Chile asked for Minister Osborn's assistance in order that the American government would promote an exchange of prisoners of war arranged by the American envoys in La Paz and Santiago. The Chilean chancellor, Mr. Miguel Luis Amunategui, made reference to several encounters "of little relevance", where Bolivia was able to capture Chilean soldiers. He pointed out that Chile had Bolivian prisoners too, and they would all be exchanged with the cooperation of the United States.

Minister Osborn informed the State Department about the quest and asked for the required official authorization allowing him to intervene in the exchange of prisoners. The Secretary of State, Mr. Evarts, sent instructions to the American envoy in La Paz, Charles Adams, asking him to provide his cooperation to Mr. Osborn in the American humanitarian effort aimed to obtain the exchange of prisoners of war. (10)

American efforts for the exchange of prisoners failed after six months of mediation, but in spite of that, the exchange took place subsequently by direct arrangement between the two antagonists.

Bolivian Proposal for Economic Compensation to Chile

American Companies

A few months after the collapse of the Lackawanna talks, the Chilean army succeeded in occupying El Callao, and Lima fell some later. Several peace initiatives were put forward during 1881 d 1882, One of those was undertaken by the first Bolivian minister in Washington, Mr. Ladislao Cabrera, a well known public official who had organized the defense of Calama when the Chilean attacked the place.

In February 1881 Mr. Cabrera introduced his project before the American government for a plan to put an end to the conflict and to the foundation for a peace with honor that could satisfy the expectations of all belligerent nations involved. The Cabrera Plan assumed that territorial conquest was outlawed in South America and that the principle of territorial integrity of nations must be preserved in terms similar to those upheld at the time of independence. This plan foresaw war reparations to Chile by the allied nations, as well as cancellation of other outstanding obligations such as Peru's external debt. On this account, the plan contemplated the formation of a company with American capital's participation that would exploit the saltpeter beds in Tarapaca's Province and in the Bolivian littoral. The American government would be the guarantor for the company's operation, to be managed under the joint authority of the governments of Chile Peru and Bolivia. The company's profit from prospecting operations would serve to pay war reparations to Chile and other expenses aforementioned. This plan did not have a time limit but it did estimate allied war reparations to Chile in Lbs.4,500,000. Minister Cabrera estimated in that amount the annual income from the sale of guano and saltpeter obtained in the occupied territories, and thus the proposed company might pay the Peruvian debt and the cost of the War - after commissions and operating expenses -within a three-year period. The secretary of state, Mr. William M. Evarts, acknowledged receipt of Cabrera's proposal but warned him that no official decision would be forthcoming because of the proximity of a change of government in the US.(11)

Minister Cabrera then insisted on his proposal in May 1881 before the new secretary of state, Mr. James G. Blaine, and made clear to him the Bolivian interest in having the United States play an important role to achieve honorable peace in the conflict being waged in the Pacific, thus side-stepping a possible intervention of such powers as France, England, Italy and Holland, which were at the time expressing their interest in mediation with the belligerent countries.

Secretary Blaine did not pay much attention to this proposal as presented by Mr. Cabrera, but decided as a matter of the highest priority to attain peace in the region, hoping to get a leading role for the United States in peace negotiations and in the future of the occupied territories. (12)

Preserving American Hegemony:

The Secretary of State, Mr. James G. Blaine

The new American government presided by James Garfield took office in March 1881 and appointed Mr. James G. Blaine as secretary of state. This government official had a bright future on the American political stage and had a Panamericanistic scope that gave him an understanding of the need for promoting common goals among all nations in this hemisphere, on the basis of respect for their rights and of solidarity among all of them. In addition, he was interested in preserving American hegemony over the region by denying European powers to exert their influence there. He further believed that on account of prestige and brotherhood, the United States should play an important role in the restoration of harmony among the belligerents in the South Pacific.

Mr. Blaine deeply resented the fact that England could benefit from a situation that legitimately belonged to the United States, since he believed that England was backing Chile in order to absorb, through the latter, the whole Peruvian guano and nitrate business. Secretary Blaine emphasized to American journalists the fact that the iron-clads furnished by England allowed Chile to destroy the Peruvian navy. He also predicted that business in the occupied territories by Chile would be furnished by money from English cargoes. Blaine's forecast proved to be a reality scarcely eight years later, when British interests swept away the gains of guano and saltpeter mining, while Chile kept merely the territories for itself. (13)

Mr. Blaine was concerned that in such ongoing controversies as those between Mexico and Guatemala or between Chile, Peru and Bolivia, territorial conquest by the force of arms might become an established principle. Nevertheless, James Blaine was pragmatic enough to understand that the Chilean occupation and power in the South Pacific was afact accompli. The United States of America therefore had no other choice but to accept that Chile had acquired certain privileges stemming from military victory, such as the payment of compensation, which might include territorial annexation as part of the cost. In other words, Mr. Blaine was prepared to establish a qualitative distinction in the annexation of Antofagasta and Tarapaca to Chile taking it as payment for debts pending but not as spoils of war and conquest.

Mr. Blaine deeply resented the constant arrogance of Chilean officials in explaining their participation in the war and in expressing their demands for peace. Secretary Blaine asserted many times that he would not have allowed failure in the Lackawanna negotiations. In order to achieve peace he sent new envoys to the belligerent countries followed by a special mission composed of Mr. William Trescot and his own son, Mr. Walker Blaine, who was at the time third secretary of the State Department.

President Garfield was mortally wounded in an assassination attempt a few months after he took office and was replaced by the vice-president, Chester A. Arthur. Mr. Blaine was involved in deep political controversies and was accused, by political rivals and Chilean diplomats accredited in Washington of following a policy in defense of Peru and Bolivia not in the best interests of the United States, but instead in connivance with bond-holders of the Peruvian external debt conspiring for their own benefit. Such a political climate prompted President Arthur to designate a new secretary of state and to yield to a detailed House investigation of these allegations. After careful investigation, the House of Representatives declared unfounded the allegations against Mr. Blaine. This politician would later on take again the functions of secretary of state and promote a new the ideal of a Pan-American union.

Secretary of State Blaine sent new ministers to the capitals of the belligerent nations to try to give new impulse to peace negotiations. Mr. Stephen Hurlbut, in Lima, and Mr. Judson Kilpatrick, in Santiago, attempted respectively but in vain to reach an agreement in which Chile would respect the territorial integrity of Peru and the right of conquest would be rejected. Mr. Blaine's instructions did not specify any provisions referring to the situation of Bolivia and in the territorial dispute, but in La Paz as well as in Lima, Blaine's defense of Peruvian territorial integrity was equated by extension to encompass the Bolivian seashore.

Secretary Blaine was determined to give further momentum to the peace effort in the South Pacific and set up on November 30, 1881, a special mission under William Trescot and Walker Blaine entrusted with the restoration of peace and harmonious coexistence among the three belligerent countries. Mr. Blaine gave the Trescot mission instructions including the following three basic ideas for a renewed American mediation:

"l. To concert such measures as will enable Peru to establish a regular government, and initiate negotiations.

2. To include Chile's consent to such negotiation without cession of territory as a condition precedent.

3. To impress upon Chile that in such negotiation she ought to allow Peru a fair opportunity to provide for reasonable indemnity."

Blaine was also telling Trescot that the American government admitted indeed the right of Chile to expect adequate compensation in payment for war costs. (14) Trescot had instructions to ratify American recognition of Garcia Calderon's government, who was at the time detained in Chile while Lisandro Montero had taken charge provisionally in Arequipa.

On their way south Mr. Trescot and the young Mr. Blaine met in Peru with Charles Adams and left him with instructions to exert his influence upon Bolivian authorities in order to have them stop any possible separate negotiations that they might be conducting with Chile.

Consequently, Minister Adams sent a note to the government of Bolivia in January 1882 on the following terms:

"As the outcome of a meeting I held with Mr. Trescot in El Callao last December 23rd ... I have committed myself to ask Bolivia for a continuation of the present statu quo until the opinion and intentions of Chile could be clearly understood. I have thus the honor to request his excellency's government to avoid the adoption of any conclusive steps before I learn the outcome of negotiations being conducted by Mr. Trescot in Santiago." (15)

The government of Bolivia had sent Mr. Mariano Baptista to take part in the Pan-American Conference convened by Blaine in November 1881 at Panama. The cancellation of that conference played in the hands of Mariano Baptista to open informal talks on his way through Tacna with the Chilean prefect, Mr. Eusebio Lillo, whom he already knew from the Lackawanna talks. Lillo offered a truce to Baptista that would allow Chile to continue its occupation of the Littoral Province, would restore his country's trade with Bolivia and would determine the belligerent's commitment not to renew hostilities without a one-year advance warning.

The Bolivian government took the advice of the American minister in La Paz and reaffirmed that the talks held by Baptista would not be considered seriously because the government of Bolivia maintained absolute loyalty towards the Peruvian government of President Montero. (16)

Trescot's instructions were to support the Peruvian position and to ratify American recognition of the government of Garcia Calderon, then detained in Chile. Coincidental with Trescot's arrival to Santiago, President Arthur appointed a new secretary of state, and such action weakened Blaine's original diplomatic strategy and contributed to promote Chilean intransigence towards Mr. Trescot. In his talk with Trescot, Chile's chancellor, Mr. Balmaceda, reaffirmed Chile's conditions for peace with Peru. One of them consisted of the unconditional cession of Tarapaca, and the other was the continuing occupation of Tacna and Arica as a guarantee for the war reparations demanded.

The newly appointed American secretary of state, Mr. Frederick Frelinghuysen, sent Mr. Trescot new instructions that prompted on February 11, 1882, the signing of the Protocol of Viña del Mar.

This protocol consisted of the following points:

"l. Cession to Chile of the territory of Peru situated to the south of the Quebrada de Camarones.

2. Occupation of the region of Tacna and Arica for ten years. Peru being obliged to pay twenty million pesos at the expiration of that time.

3. Chile shall occupy the islands of Lobos so long as there shall be guano upon them, and both the net product of the guano taken from them shall be equally divided between Chile and the creditors of Peru."(17)

The Chancellor of Bolivia, Mr. Pedro Jose Zilveti, requested information from Minister Charles Adams about the protocol signed in Viña del Mar between Chile and the United States, but Mr. Adams claimed ignorance of the text. The Bolivian chancellor subsequently submitted a protest about the absolute disregard shown in the Protocol of Viña del Mar for the situation with respect to Bolivia, ignoring the concession of his country made to the United States on its mediation by canceling all separate diplomatic initiative with Chile. Thereupon Mr. Trescot sent Walker Blaine to La Paz with an explanation of the talks held with Balmaceda.

Mr. Walker Blaine arrived in La Paz and met immediately with Vice-president Belisario Salinas, Foreign Minister Zilveti and other Bolivian officials, and gave them general information on the Protocol of Viña del Mar. He was not more specific on account of his instructions to uncover neither details of the talks maintained between Trescot and Balmaceda nor the full scope of the instructions sent by the secretary of state tending for the moment to support Peru on Bolivia's detriment.

Commissioner Walker Blaine sent a long message to Trescot with a report on his negotiations in Bolivia, as well as those held in Peru with the Bolivian envoys, in which he summarized his mission as follows:

"A great deal of importance was apparently attached by the Bolivian government to the protocol signed on the 11th of February last by yourself and Señor Balmaceda .... should it prove impossible to save her present littoral, and I do not see how this can he done . . . . Bolivia is to be altogether shut out from the Pacific, then the years of Bolivia's existence as an independent nation are few in number."

In another part of his message, Commissioner Blaine considered that:

"the geographic situation of Bolivia required in any case an access to the Pacific," Afterwards he added that it was advisable to consider the need to form an effective confederation between Bolivia and Peru so that Bolivia had access to the sea through Peruvian southern ports, such as "Mollendo and Arica, in order to be able to maintain its national identity…"

In concluding his note, Blaine confided to Trescot his shame on not being able to convey to Zilveti and Carrillo the American government's views, considering above all that Bolivia had great interests at stake. Mr. Blaine suggested that by virtue of American prestige and sense of justice, Bolivia should not be kept waiting and the Americans must determine their position in this respect. (18)

It must be pointed out that on his way through Arequipa to Bolivia, The American envoy, Mr. Walker Blaine, had already advanced to the Bolivia Ambassador Juan Carrillo information about the fact that the Protocol of Viña del Mar did not mention Bolivia. He rationalized that since the United States was unable to press forward a peace agreement with Peru based on conditions demanded by Chile, there was hardly any need to consider the question of Bolivia, but in case that Peru accepted the Chilean offer, the question of Bolivia would then naturally follow immediately after in the discussions. (19)

Some controversial aspects present in the steps taken by Mr. Hurlbut in Peru and Mr. Kilpatrick in Santiago further weakened the negotiating stance of Trescot's mission. The sudden deaths of Ministers Hurlbut and Kilpatrick further complicated things, and Secretary of State Frelinghuysen then took advantage of those events to declare that former negotiations started by his predecessor were closed. In turn he took a new initiative more favorable to Chile than ever, where he accepted territorial conquest achieved by that country and focused on giving Peru the chance to consolidate a stable government that would be able to negotiate the Chilean peace proposal. Such a scheme did not have a clear position regarding the situation of Bolivia.

The US State Department consents to the Maneuvers of Chile

The War of the Pacific, no matter how far from the United States, became an apple of discord in the US Congress, where many groups started active lobbying in favor of Peruvian bond-holders, Chilean diplomats, and other groups involved. President Arthur appointed new envoys to the three belligerent countries following the advise of Secretary of State Frelinghuysen, and gave them instructions to exert their influence in order to have peace as soon as possible. He sent Mr. Cornelius Logan to Chile, Mr. James Partridge to Peru, and Mr. George Maney to Bolivia. (20)

The secretary of state resumed his instructions in this manner:

"It is understood that Chile is in possession of the littoral province of Bolivia and the Peruvian littoral provinces of Tarapaca, Tacna and Arica. It is not supposed that any contingency can happen which will bring about the permanent occupation and annexation by Chile of any larger part of Peru than this. Your efforts, therefore, must be directed towards securing for Peru as large a part of these provinces in the peace treaty as possible, and as large a money indemnity as possible for whatever territory may be retained by Chile." (21)

On the instructions sent to his minister in Bolivia, George Maney indicated:

"If negotiations offered any opportunity to do so, you could help make provisions procuring that Bolivia take part in them but avoiding to commit ourselves without previous knowledge of the president of the United States." (22)

Minister Logan, who had been previously assigned to Chile and held that country in high esteem, became the most dynamic figure among the three American diplomats and followed the steps of his predecessor, Mr. Osborn, in support of Chile's position, in spite of the relative congeniality felt by the American administration towards Peru.

Mr. Logan did not lose time in meeting President Garcia Calderon in prison and in telling him openly that Peru should not place any hopes in the US mediation and that it would be advisable to give up Tarapaca in favor of Chile. And furthermore, that he should consider the possibility of transferring Tacna and Arica to Bolivia. On the other hand, he spoke with Chilean Chancellor Aldunate and expressed to him the reservations of the American government that prevented it from recommending to the Peruvian government acceptance of the provisions contained in the Protocol of Viña del Mar.

Mr. Logan summed up the achievements of his initial actions in search for peace in a note sent to the Chilean chancellor that read as follows:

"1. In order to remove the difficulty regarding the sale of Tacna and Arica, I proposed a treaty on the basis of ceding Tarapaca, with a separate article presenting the question of Tacna and Arica, to the Peruvian congress for its own decision, without any recommendation from Señor Calderon.

2. I proposed to make: the river Azufre the boundary line, giving Arica to Chile and Tacna to Peru. This proposal was not accepted by either party.

3. This suggestion came from your excellency's government, and was made into a formal proposal by myself. Chile was to have military occupation of Tacna and Arica for five years, at the end of which time a vote to be taken by the people of the territory to determine whether they would attach it to Chile or Peru. If the vote took the territory to Chile, the latter was to pay Peru $10,000,000 in compensation. Señor Calderon, however, refused the proposal.

4. I proposed to Señor Calderon that Chile should have military occupation of Tacna and Arica for ten years, and then evacuate it. He declined this, and it was not presented to your excellency.

5. I proposed to submit the following question to the president of the United States, in the capacity of a friendly arbitrator:

Shall the Chilean government as a measure growing out of the necessities and manner of settlement of the war have the right to purchase the Peruvian territory lying between the river Camarones and the river Sama, for the sum of $9,000,000, with the stipulation that Bolivia shall be given the perpetual right to the free and innocent passage over said territory, with perpetual freedom from export and import duties, upon the conclusion of a satisfactory treaty between the latter republic and the Republic of Chile?

Señor Calderón accepted this proposal, but your excellency declined it." (23)

A few weeks later, Mr. Logan personally visited the acting Peruvian president, L. Montero, and advised him to enter into negotiations with Chile. He presented an outline of his actions and reminded the acting president that he should be aware the Bolivian congress approved a resolution in favor of a truce, which would certainly be followed by a peace treaty. Mr. Logan also explained to Mr. Montero that since a separate peace was achieved between Bolivia and Chile, Peru would find itself at a disadvantage for any further negotiations, and therefore he would suggest that Peru accept to sell Tacna and Arica for 10 million dollars, otherwise, Peru might be forced to give them up at a later time without due compensation. (24)

By the end of 1882, President Chester Arthur inserted in His message to Congress the following ideas concerning the American position on the War of the Pacific:

"The war between Peru and Bolivia on the one side and Chile on the other began more than three years ago. On the occupation by Chile in 1880 of all the littoral territory of Bolivia, negotiations for peace were conducted under the direction of the United States. The allies refused to concede any territory, but Chile has since become master of the whole coast of both countries, and of the capital of Peru. A year since, as you have already been advised by correspondence transmitted to you in January last, this government sent a special mission to the belligerent powers to express the hope that Chile would be disposed to accept a money indemnity for the expenses of the war, and to relinquish her demand for a portion of the territory of her antagonist.

This recommendation, which Chile declined to follow, this government did not assume to enforce, nor can it be enforced without resort of measures which would be in keeping neither with the temper of our people nor the spirit of our institutions.

The power of Peru no longer extends over its whole territory, and in the event of our interference to dictate peace would need to be supplemented by the armies and navies of the United States. Such interference would almost inevitable lead to the establishment of a protectorate, a result utterly at odds with our past policy, injurious to our present interest, and full of embarrassments for the future."

President Arthur wrote this part of the presidential message in order to dispel any doubts about a possible American military intervention, so that Peru would understand that the country was standing alone and should accept defeat. Secretary of State Frederick Frelinghuysen sent instructions to Mr. Logan asking him to divulge the substance of President Arthur's message and reminded him that, in evaluating the message, Bolivia should consider itself more fortunate than Peru, since it had merely lost access to the sea in its war with Chile. (25)

For this part, the American envoy in Lima, Mr. James Partridge, approached the Chilean negotiator Novoa and introduced to him the following basic points for peace: First, cession of Tarapaca; second, cession, sale or transfer of Arica and Tacna to Bolivia, but if that proposal were unacceptable, the territories mentioned should remain neutral; third, demilitarization of Arica's port. Partridge's proposal forced Mr. Logan to send a strong note of complaint to Washington; Mr. Frelinghuysen supported him, disavowed the proposals and dismissed Partridge from his post. (26) In addition, reiterated his instructions to Minister Maney in La Paz, asking not to take any initiative and leave all further actions in Logan's hands. (27)

The president prisoner, Mr. Garcia Calderon, complained to Logan about his pro-Chilean leaning and about the way he had incited Bolivia to break the alliance with Peru. Mr. Logan answered that he had not incited Bolivia but reminded Montero that there was a real possibility instead for such an event to happen. Later on President Garcia Calderon pointed out to Mr. Logan that the summary made in his note of October 18, 1882, about the negotiations, contained a false statement where he said that Garcia Calderon would have rejected to cede Arica and Tacna to Bolivia, when in fact, Logan never mentioned this point. Mr. Garcia Calderon, together with other Peruvian personalities, maintained that it was appropriate for Peru to cede Tacna and Arica to Bolivia and that such territorial cession had already been approved by the Peruvian congress itself. Mr. Garcia Calderon made public in that way, and in those days, the position maintained by Peru until today; in other words, that Bolivia's access to the sea through Arica must be a decision adopted by Peru and in no way by Chile. (28)

With Mr. Logan's support, the Chilean negotiators began a peace offensive and promoted with money and weapons the establishment of a Peruvian government under the leadership of Mr. Iglesias. They expected him to accept the peace proposals presented by Chile, or otherwise wanted to use him in a way that would prompt Mr. Montero to enter negotiations and sign the peace proposals as presented. Mr. Novoa succeeded in signing with Mr. Lavalle, a representative of Mr. Iglesias, a first protocol that acknowledged those basic proposals for a peace negotiation, and Mr. Iglesias himself signed it later. Mr. Logan indicated that his own initial proposals to Mr. Garcia Calderon were based on this particular agreement. There was a difference, however because Mr. Logan had suggested that Tacna and Arica would remain under Chilean administration for five years and Mr. Garcia Calderon's stubbornness had only hardened Chile's position, while Mr. Iglesias had accepted that Tacna d Arica remained in Chilean hands for ten years a period which Logan considered long enough for the Chileanization of the territories and their ultimate loss by Peru. (29)

Subsequently, Logan informed about his belief of the existence of an agreement for a separate peace between Chile and Bolivia and concluded that Montero's days as head of his Government were numbered. In addition, Chile canceled its recognition of Mr. Garcia Calderon's government and recommended that the United States give recognition instead to Mr. Iglesias' administration in order to facilitate the peace process, in view of the fact that, after their agreement with Mr. Iglesias, Chilean troops were withdrawing from Northern Peru and their military units were marching towards Arequipa. (30)

The American envoy, Mr. Logan, reported to Mr. Frelinghuysen in June 1883 that the Peruvian Congress, in a meeting convened in Arequipa, had confirmed Mr. Garcia Calderon as president and Mr. Montero as first vice-president. He added that the congress of Peru ratified the protocol signed by Montero with President Campero, in which Peru transferred sovereignty to Bolivia over the provinces of Tacna and Arica, under the provision that Bolivia would maintain its alliance with Peru until the end of the war. Minister Logan viewed this action as a sort of "checkmate" by Montero to Chile, thus preventing Bolivia from signing a separate peace treaty with Chile. (31)

The American minister in Santiago sent to Washington in July 1883 a copy of the peace protocol signed by the government of General Iglesias with the Chilean delegate, Mr. Jovino Novoa, and informed him in the accompanying note that the signing of the protocol caused a great impact on Bolivia, where some public sectors were asking for a separate peace with Chile and for severance of the alliance with Montero. (32)

Meanwhile, the secretary of state in Washington accredited Mr. Seth Phelps as the new American minister in Lima and gave him an outline of the position of the United States in the conflict, as follows:

"The representatives of this government, as you have seen from these instructions, were directed harmoniously to join in a courteous and friendly effort to aid the belligerent powers in reaching an agreement for peace, which, while securing to Chile the legitimate results of success should at the same time not be unduly severe upon Peru and Bolivia.

While greater stress has been given in the instructions of this department to the relations of Peru and Chile, it must not be assumed that the rights and wishes of Bolivia, a sovereign power and a party to the contest, with rights equal to the other contestants, are to be neglected. It is not supposed that any agreement be reached, which shall not receive the assent of that power in all that concerns its interests. As this government has recognized the equal sovereignty of the three republics, and will not depart from that position, of course any agreement, so far as it affects the rights of Bolivia, must receive the consent of that power.

Until Chile and Peru had reached a point where a fair prospect of agreement was seen, it seemed unnecessary to negotiate at La Paz, particularly as Señor Calderon, it was properly assumed, would not act against the interests of his ally. For these reasons the tentative discussions were carried out at Santiago."

On his arrival in Lima, Phelps observed that General Iglesias did not enjoy a favorable political atmosphere in spite of the determined financial and military support from Chile, and recommended accordingly to let some more time pass before granting American recognition to Iglesias' government. He also asserted that Mr. Montero did not count with enough forces and that Peruvian towns in the heartland were particularly exhausted. (33)

Under such prevailing conditions, the Chilean government maintained the situation under control and it even had the option to choose among the alternatives for peace.

Therefore, General Montero accepted from the Chilean negotiator, Mr. Novoa, the following peace proposals:

"a) Cession of Peruvian Tarapaca to Chile.

b) Cession of Peruvian Tacna and Arica to Bolivia.

c) Payment of war reparations to Chile in the sum of 60 million pesos, half this amount to be paid by Bolivia.

d) Peruvian recognition of its obligation to pay the external debt."

Chilean authorities rejected the plan forwarded by Montero because it would mean that Peru could count on Bolivian loyalty in exchange for Tacna and Arica, two regions that some elements within the Chilean government considered should be reserved for Chile. Those same elements were fully convinced of the need to obtain a final break between Bolivia and Peru.

Consequently, Mr. Novoa received instructions to sign the Peace treaty with Iglesias, based on the protocol formerly signed with Lavalle. Iglesias concerted this way with Chile the Treaty of Ancon on October 20, 1883, in which not only territorial conquest was considered legal but, in addition, a bilateral agreement between Chile and Peru to sanction the permanent confinement of Bolivia was legalized for the first time. On the next day Mr. Phelps sent information about Chile's recognition of Iglesias' government as well as on the signing of Ancon's Treaty. (34)

Minister Logan asked the US secretary of state once more for American recognition of the Peruvian government under Iglesias, this time, with a view to consolidate the Peace Treaty of Ancon. (35)

The secretary of state then sent instructions to Mr. Phelps asking him to foster relations with whoever exerted some form of authority, but maintaining a position of friendship and goodwill towards the Peruvian people that would give time for public opinion to express itself about Iglesias' actions. Furthermore, he told Mr. Phelps that the United States would not take sides in connection with the substantive meaning of the Treaty of Ancon and its protocols before having time enough to examine and study them. (36)

By the end of that year, President Chester Arthur sent his third annual message to congress and referred to the war in South America in the following terms:

"The contest of Bolivia, Chile and Peru has passed from the stage of strategic hostilities to that of negotiation, in which the counsels of this government have been exercised. The demands of Chile for absolute cession of territory have been maintained and accepted by the party of General Iglesias to the extent o Peru's concluding a treaty of peace with the government of Chile."

It should be noted that President Arthur did not make any reference to the situation of Bolivia. (37)

While Iglesia's government was confronting Caceres, Chile occupied Arequipa and the south of Peru in order to put pressure upon Bolivia and force that country to sign an agreement for the cessation of hostilities.

It was essential for American diplomacy to get Chile and Peru to sign a treaty while the situation of Bolivia did not have the relevance to demand a more active intervention of the State Department. In this regard, Mr. Frelinghuysen stated that the War of the Pacific ended with the Treaty of Ancon - the same treaty that contained provisions somewhat different to those formerly considered advisable by the United States. (38)

The Truce of 1884 as a Decoy to divide Bolivia and Peru

Minister Logan informed Secretary of State Frelinghuysen about the request sent by the Bolivian government to the Chilean government through the Spanish ambassador -once Arequipa capitulated and General Montero fled - to allow two Bolivian envoys to visit Santiago in order to begin peace negotiations. With Chile's consent, the vice-president of Bolivia, Mr. Belisario Salinas, and his assistant, Mr. Belisario Boeto, traveled to Santiago in November 1883 with instructions to sign a peace agreement that would include a transfer of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia. Mr. Logan noted the complexity of the situation because he was aware since his arrival in Santiago that Chile repeatedly had tried to proceed to such a transfer in reciprocity for the acquisition of the Atacama seashore.

Logan observed as well that in the meantime, Chile had not succeeded in convincing Bolivia to sign a separate peace treaty; on the contrary, the Bolivian government constantly advocated to maintain its alliance with the Peruvian faction of President Montero. The American minister considered that as a result of the factor Chile had ignored Bolivia deliberately - once they had their peace with the Peruvian faction of General Iglesias - and was determined, on the other hand, to consolidate absolutely and unconditionally its possession of Tacna and Arica.

Subsequently, Logan asserted that considering the treaty's provision to allow the 10 year occupation of Tacna and Arica, it was impossible at the moment to adopt any decision over those territories. He also had information that Iglesias' government was against the introduction of any changes to those provisions. Therefore, Logan warned that talks between Bolivia and Chile would be very difficult, but noted that, the mobilization of Chilean troops in Tacna - where five thousand men awaited orders to invade Bolivian territory - would certainly force the issue towards reaching some sort of agreement. He also emphasized that having all its ports under occupation, Bolivia found itself in an indefensible position. Consequently, Logan believed that Chile would force peace through a treaty of its own liking, which would undoubtedly isolate Bolivia from all its maritime ports. He added that some members of the Chilean government nevertheless maintained a magnanimous stance towards Bolivia, which would in any case depend upon the posture adopted by the newly arrived Bolivian commissioners.

Logan made reference in the same note to the fact that Montero had rejected the note of November l3t, 1882, intended to promote the partial transference of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia, as well as to Campero's obstinacy to continue his unconditional alliance with Montero. Therefore, Logan considered that the Bolivian president had lost "the maximum desideratum of Bolivia's access to the sea" on which the national being of the country was dependent and which made evident Campero's incompetence and his lack of a distinct understanding of the true national interests of Bolivia.

After all these considerations, Minister Logan concluded his report noting the total blindness of the national leaders of both countries, Montero and Campero, which precluded them from understanding their failure and from listening to impartial advice. In Logan's view, they would be responsible should an unfortunate situation turn into a real calamity for the allied countries. (39)

Some time later, the American minister sent a confidential note to the secretary of state informing him of progress in peace negotiations being held between Bolivia and Chile. Logan reported on his conversation with Chancellor Aldunate, who told him about the peace proposal presented by the Bolivian commissioners on the basis of the cession of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia. Such a concession was out of the question for the Chilean chancellor because the treaty signed with President Iglesias of Peru prevented it. However, Chile was ready to offer a limitless truce that would allow the resumption of trade and the construction of a railroad from a port of the Bolivian littoral to a given point on the tentative new borders. Chancellor Aldunate mentioned to the American envoy that this offer had been presented in the form of an ultimatum and resulted in its acceptance by Commissioners Salinas and Boeto, but only in principle, because their powers included the signature of a peace treaty and not the signature of a truce; accordingly, they had requested new powers from the Bolivian government.

Minister Logan said that the Chilean counterproposal included payment of reparations to Chile by Bolivia, and this prompted Mr. Aldunate to invite Mr. Logan to be an arbiter on the question of the sum that Bolivia should pay if the success of those talks resulted in a truce agreement. On this account, Logan asked the State Department for instructions, and added that Bolivia would elect a new president and that the question of peace was a very important issue for such election.

In analyzing the situation, Logan indicated that President Campero and his chancellor Quijarro had lost the opportunity to obtain perpetual possession of Tacna and Arica provinces on account of their personal hostility to Chile and of their decision to stake their fate on their loyalty to President Montero of Peru. He added that the Chileans, annoyed by Campero's intransigence, had no other choice but to deal directly with General Iglesias, and thus to close for not less than ten years Bolivian chances of negotiating for the acquisition of Tacna and Arica. Another important point in Logan's commentaries was the sensitivity of Bolivian public opinion against the concept of a railroad that would connect Bolivia to the coast, because of the general belief that such action would open the doors to Chilean immigration and to domination by Chilean capitals.

Such trends could ultimately produce the country's total assimilation by Chile. Further down in his message, Minister Logan expounded the prevailing belief In Bolivian intellectual circles that the nation's existence would be seriously jeopardized if Bolivia could not get a permanent and sovereign access to the sea through Tacna and Arica. He already forecasted, however, that Chile would maintain absolute control over those territories and that Chile would consolidate its entitlement over them once the ten-year time limit, sanctioned by the Treaty of Ancon was over. He further believed that Peru's hands were tied for at least 25 more years.(40)

Early in April 1884, the American envoy, Mr. Phelps, was reporting on his part from Lima to the secretary of state, that he had information leading him to believe that truce negotiations between Chile and Bolivia had failed and that he had learned of large Chilean troop movements in southern Peru for an intent on resuming hostilities against Bolivia. He vouched for Chilean superiority on account of their control of the Mollendo-Puno railroad which allowed them to transport torpedo boats to Puno and use them against Bolivia in the attack that would be launched through Lake Titicaca. Mr. Phelps added that Chile also captured the steamships used for the crossing of the lake and that the situation was secured until Chile could achieve peace with Bolivia. (41)

The US secretary of state sent instructions to the new American minister, Mr. Gibbs, accredited before both the governments of Lima and La Paz, after he weighed Mr. Phelps report. In his instructions, he pointed out US recognition of General lglesia's government and remarked that Mr. Gibbs should do all he could to have Bolivia participate in the peace negotiations that would result from such diplomatic recognition. Mr. Gibbs did not have a chance to carry on those instructions because, in the meantime, negotiations were concluded in Valparaiso. (42)

Facing the threat of renewed hostilities posed by the Chilean troops concentrating in Puno, Tacna, Mollendo and Calama, Bolivia was forced to sign in Valparaiso the Truce Pact of April 4, 1884, accepting the proposals as originally requested by Chile. The provisions of this pact were kept confidential until their approval by the parliaments of both countries, and they were not given to the public until late in 1884.

This chapter is thus intended to show how American diplomatic efforts played contradictory roles that fluctuated with the respective changes taking place in US domestic policy. In general, it could be said that the United States' position favored Peru openly, but that it did not necessarily mean to favor Bolivia, whose interests were normally ignored or forgotten when the major decisions were taken. The fact that their best ministers were subsequently sent to Santiago transformed the initial pro-Peruvian American stance into a subjective pro-Chilean posture that affected mediation results and indeed served to consolidate all claims made by Chile.

Diplomatic correspondence shows that the truce pact was imposed upon Bolivia and that its terms had already been decided by Chile earlier. Although the US played a prevailing role during the negotiations of the Ancon Treaty, it did not take part in the talks leading to the truce between Chile and Bolivia. The latter became totally isolated while maintaining its loyalty to President Montero's

Peru. Moreover, Iglesias' Peru ignored Bolivian loyalty, and in fact buried the alliance. For Minister Logan, the position of Chile was clear and the confinement of Bolivia was already decided in the treaty of 1883. The truce pact was no more than a decoy to divide Bolivia and Peru, thus saving time to consolidate the Chileanization of Arica. That pact already contained all of the main provisions that would find their corollary in the 1904 Treaty and their coda in the 1929 treaty and protocols.

The War of the Pacific had three main outcomes. First it allowed Chile's conquest of the Bolivian seacoast and the Peruvian Tarapaca. The exploitation of the nitrate and other mineral riches of these provinces would allow Chile to play a semiperipheral role in the region. Second, it left the provinces of Arica and Tacna under Chile's occupation with a final decision over them to he made at a later date. At the same time this gave the US a formal role to play in any settlement. Third, the new status of Bolivia as a land-locked country created a conflictive situation, which would endure and shape regional relations as well as it would influence somehow the US performance as the hegemonic power in the Americas.

The US role in this conflict was controversial and gave room for resentment in Chile, Peru and Bolivia. Although that role did not interfere with the rising of the US as a hegemonic power, it was mostly Great Britain, a declining power, that profited most. While British diplomacy did not accrue any gains with this war, British private interest cleverly monopolized all nitrate riches from the Bolivian Littoral and Tarapaca.

Notes

1. Herbert Millington, American Diplomacy and the War of the Pacific. New York, Octagon Books; 1975. Richard S. Phillips Junior, "Bolivia and the War of the Pacific. 1879-1884," Ph.D. Diss., University of Virginia. 1973. Mason, T.B.M., War on the Pacific Coast of South America Washington D. C. 1883. Burr, Robert N., By Reason or Force. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press. Ireland, Gordon, Boundaries, Possessions and Conflicts in South America., Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1938. Talbott, Robert Dean, A History of the Chilean Borders.

2. Dispatches, Peru, Note 304 and 31 1, Pichard Gibbs to William Evarts, Lima, February 10, 19, 1879.

3. Dispatches, Chile, Note 83, Thomas Osborn to William M. Evarts, Santiago, February 20, 1879.

4. Dispatches, Chile, Notes 88 and 89, Thomas Osborn to William Evarts, April 4-10, 1879.

5. Dispatches, Peru, Notes 314, 316, 317, 323 and 326. Richard Gibbs to William Evarts. Lima, February 26;,March 5, 12 and 26; and April 2, 1879.

6. Dispatches, Chile, Note 86, Thomas Osborn to William Evarts, Santiago, April 3. 1879.

7. Dispatches, Bolivia. Note 22, Newton Pettis to William Evarts, August 23, 1879.

8. Dispatches, Peru, Note 200, A. Christiancy to William Evarts, Lima November 2, 1880. Dispatches, Bolivia. Note 46, Charles Adams to William Evarts, La Paz, November 17, 1880.

9. Dispatches, Bolivia, Note 39, Charles Adams to Williams Evarts, La Paz, November 17, 1880.

10. Dispatches, Chile, Notes 132 to 165. Thomas Osborn to William Evarts. Santiago, February 27, September 13, 1880. Instructions, Note 3, William Evarts to Charles Adams, Washington, DC., April 19, 1880.

11. Diplomatic correspondence, Washington D.C., Ladislao Cabrera to William Evarts, February 18, 1881, and William Evarts to Ladislao Cabrera, Washington, D.C., May 5, 1880.

12. Diplomatic correspondence. Ladislao Cabrera to James Blaine. Washington, D.C., May 9, 1881.

13. Blaine's interviews by the New York Herald, April 27 and June 30, 1882. Cited by Enrique Amayo, British Policy in the War of the Pacific, Chile vs. Peru and Bolivia, 1879-1884., Ph.D. Diss. University of Pittsburgh, 1985.

14. Instructions, James Blaine to William Trescot, Washington, D.C., December 1, 1881.

15. Dispatches, Bolivia, Charles Adams to J.P. Zilveti. La Paz, January 10, 1882.

16. Dispatches, Bolivia, J.P. Zilveti to Charles Adams, La Paz, February 2, 1882.

17. Dispatches, Chile, Note 13, William Trescot to F. Frelinghuysen, Viña del Mar, May 4, 1882.

18. Dispatches, Peru, Note 4, Walker Blaine to W. Trescot. Lima, May 8, 1882.

19. Dispatches, Peru, Note 1, Walker Blaine to W. Trescot. Arequipa, March 28, 1882. Instructions, Note 12, F. Frelinghuysen to C. Logan,, Washington, D.C., June 26, 1882.

20. The House of Representatives made an inquiry on the Peruvian bonds and the behavior of American congressmen regarding this matter. See Congress report on Chile and Peru, Washington, D.C., August 1, 1882. Report 1790, 47th Congress. Session l.

21. Instructions, Note 3, F. Frelinghuysen to G. Maney, Washington, D.C., June 2, 1882.

22. Instructions, Note 3, F. Frelinghuysen to G. Maney, Washington, D.C., June 26, 1882.

23. Dispatches, Chile, Note 15, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen. Santiago, October 18, 1882.

24. Dispatches, Chile, C. Logan to Lizardo Montero, Santiago, November 13, 1882.

25. Instructions, Note 41, F. Frelinghuysen to C. Logan, Washington, D.C., March 23, 1883.

26. Instructions, Note 47. F. Frelinghuysen to G. Maney, Washington, D.C., February 10, 1883.

28. Francisco Garcia Calderon, Mediacion de los Estados Unidos de Norte America en la Guerra del Pacifico, el señor doctor don Cornelius A. Logan y el Dr. Don Francisco Garcia Calderon Buenos Aires, 1884. Letters, Garcia Calderon to Logan, January 11 and December 21, 1883.

29. Dispatches, Chile, Note 92, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, May 9, 1883.

30. Dispatches, Chile, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Note 93 of May 9 and telegram dated May 2, 1883.

31. Dispatches, Chile, Note 104, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, June 18, 1883.

32. Dispatches, Chile. Note 113, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen. Santiago, July 2nd, 1883.

34. Dispatches, Peru, Telegram and Note 18, S. Phelps to F. Frelinghuysen. Lima, October 21 and 23, 1883.

35. Dispatches, Chile, Note 146, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, November 1, 1883. Also, Dispatches, Peru. Note 32,S. Phelps to F. Frelighuysen, Lima, November 15, 1883.

36. Instructions, Note 18, F. Frelinghuysen to S. Phelps, Washington, D.C., November 15, 1883.

37. Quoted by Herbert Millington, op. cit. p. 139.

38. Op. cit. p. 140.

39. Dispatches, Chile, Note 158, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, November 30, 1883.

40. Dispatches, Chile, Note 160, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, December 19, 1883.

41. Dispatches, Peru, Notes 83 and 86, S. Phelps to F. Frelinghuysen, April 8 and 11, 1884.

42. Instructions, Note 1, F. Frelinghuysen to R. Gibbs, Washington, May 19, 1884.

Chile:War of the Pacific, 1879-83

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Prominent military commanders

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Bolivia

Mr. Eduardo Abaroa †, an engineer, was killed leading a group of civilian defenders at the Battle of Topater
Dr. Ladislao Cabrera, organizing the defense of Calama
General Narciso Campero, military President of Bolivia (1880-1884)
General Hilarión Daza, military President of Bolivia (1876-1879)

Chile

General Manuel Baquedano González, commander in chief of the Chilean Army
Captain Ignacio Carrera Pinto †, killed with the entire garrison at the Battle of La Concepción, Peru
Colonel Pedro Lagos Marchant, captured the Morro de Arica (Arica Cape)
Rear Admiral Patricio Lynch y Solo de Zaldívar, military Governor of occupied Peru
Captain Arturo Prat Chacón †, was killed on the Huáscar at the Naval Battle of Iquique. He jumped from "La Esmeralda" and landed in the "Huascar". He died with a bullet wound in his head.

Peru

Colonel Francisco Bolognesi †, was killed while leading the defense of the Arica garrison
General Andrés Cáceres, led the guerilla war during the occupation of Peru, was elected President of Peru after the war
Rear Admiral Miguel Grau †, commander of Huáscar and widely known as the gentleman of the seas, was killed at the Naval Battle of Angamos
Colonel Leoncio Prado †, the son of former President Mariano Ignacio Prado, chose duty as a soldier over an oath not to fight, was captured and executed by a Chilean firing squad after the Battle of Huamachuco
Colonel Alfonso Ugarte †, Bolognesi's top lieutenant, a rich saltpeter entrepreneur and former mayor of Iquique, was killed during the Battle of Arica, believed to have jumped off a cliff on his horse to save the flag from capture.

Other nationalities

Rear Admiral Abel Bergasse Dupetit-Thouars, French commander, after the Battle of Miraflores, he prevented the destruction and looting of Lima by threatening to engage and destroy the Chilean Navy with a French naval force under his command.
Colonel Robert Souper Howard †, a British soldier who served in the Chilean Army in nearly every battlefield of the war, was killed at the Battle of San Juan.
Lt. Colonel Roque Saenz Peña, an Argentine lawyer who served as an officer in the Peruvian Army during the battles of Tarapaca and Arica, was later elected President of Argentina.

The Ten Cents War By Bruce W. Farca

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The Atacama Desert, a coastal area where the borders of Chile, Peru, and Bolivia meet, was a region of little interest in the late nineteenth century until European research on the use of nitrates in fertilizers and explosives rendered the droppings of millions of sea birds a valuable commodity. In a move that echoed the California Gold Rush, the three neighboring countries soon battled for control of the region. In 1879, a comparatively modern and powerful Chile seized Bolivia's coastal province, and a secret alliance between Peru and Bolivia soon led to a full-scale war, one which saw the employment of much new military technology. Using such new weapons as the breech-loading rifle, rapid-fire cannon, ironclad warships, torpedoes, and electronic mines, Chile quickly crushed the allied armies, but a guerrilla war would drag on for years. While the three armies fought over some of the most inhospitable terrain imaginable, from burning, waterless deserts to snow-clogged mountain passes at 15,000 feet, their governments bumbled and wrangled. In the end, the lure of easy wealth undermined the economies of all three nations and served no good purpose when the market for nitrates soon evaporated, leaving all three much poorer for the experience.

More details

The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884

By Bruce W. Farcau

Edition: illustrated

Published by Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000

ISBN 0275969258, 9780275969257

214 page

Reviews:

[i]n the works discussed herein. As a corpus these works are significant because they raise questions for future students of military-civilian relations...Such contrasts and comparisons make this body of work historiographically noteworthy as well...Each is a refreshing corrective to national versions that extolled the virtues of things matial, made nationalistic claims, and doted on the technicalities of military history, all the while ignoring the ugly side of war and its aftermath...Smallman'sFear and Memory confirms this on a case-study level. Centeno's and Smallman's works complement each other neatly, as do Vale's, Whigham's, and Farcau's; and Brahm's, Rauch's, Arancibia's, and Sater's and Herwig's. _
—Latin American Review Winter/Spring 2002
...a valuable addition to the study of nineteenth century Latin American history.
—South Eastern Latin Americanist Autumn 2001
...a very welcome work for anyone interested in the military history of the nineteenth century, as well as relations among Latine American states, on which the confict continues to have an impact....does a very good job of examining strategic planning, campaigns, and a number of individual actions.
—The NYMAS Newsletter
...interesting and well-written...the book provides a good introduction to the War of the Pacific, covering the political and economic aspects quite well...a good starting poing for those interested in the war and Chile's nineteenth-century domination of the west coast of South America.
—The Journal of Military History

Description:The Atacama Desert, a coastal area where the borders of Chile, Peru, and Bolivia meet, was a region of little interest in the late nineteenth century until European research on the use of nitrates in fertilizers and explosives rendered the droppings of millions of sea birds a valuable commodity. In a move that echoed the California Gold Rush, the three neighboring countries soon battled for control of the region. In 1879, a comparatively modern and powerful Chile seized Bolivia's coastal province, and a secret alliance between Peru and Bolivia soon led to a full-scale war, one which saw the employment of much new military technology.Using such new weapons as the breech-loading rifle, rapid-fire cannon, ironclad warships, torpedoes, and electronic mines, Chile quickly crushed the allied armies, but a guerrilla war would drag on for years. While the three armies fought over some of the most inhospitable terrain imaginable, from burning, waterless deserts to snow-clogged mountain passes at 15,000 feet, their governments bumbled and wrangled. In the end, the lure of easy wealth undermined the economies of all three nations and served no good purpose when the market for nitrates soon evaporated, leaving all three much poorer for the experience.

Table of Contents:

Introduction
The Stage
The Contenders
The Issue
Opening Moves
Decision at Sea
Coming to Grips
The Presidents Depart
Tacna and Arica: The End in the South
A Diplomatic Interlude
On to Lima
The Broken-backed War
Loose Ends
Selected Bibliography
Index

LC Card Number: 00-036709

LCC Class: F3097

Dewey Class: 983

LAST NAVAL ACTIONS OF THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC

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Monitor Atahualpa

After Angamos, Peru’s Navy was left only with the two old Canonicus monitors, the wooden corvettes Union and Pilcomayo, the gunboat Arno and some torpedo boats. None of those ships however could match the strong Chilean battleships, although they gave invaluable support in delivering necessary equipment to the Peruvian garrisons in the South by breaking the dangerous blockades imposed by the Chileans.

For all effects the war at sea had almost concluded. In November 1879, the small corvette Pilcomayo was captured in combat by the battleship Blanco Encalada. On December 22 the torpedo boat Alay suffered the same fate. On June 7, 1880, after the battle of Arica, the monitor Manco Capac was scuttle by her crew. Although there would be no longer naval actions of importance, some particular engagements demonstrated the determination of the Peruvian naval officers to continue the struggle in spite of their disadvantage.

Past midnight, May 25, 1880, the modern Chilean Spar torpedo boats Guacolda and Janaqueo, armed each with two torpedo tubes, one small gun and one machinegun, discovered three Peruvian gunboats on their way to Callao and tried to stop them. The fast Janaqueo, under Lieutenant Manuel Señoret, approached the Independencia, under Lieutenant Jose Galvez -who was the son of the hero of the 1866 “2 de Mayo” combat- and fired a torpedo that almost destroyed the Peruvian boat and killed eight of her crew of thirteen. Nevertheless, Galvez injured as he was, charged with his crippled ship against the opponent and by hand and under heavy fire, with the help of another brave officer, Manuel Ugarte y Moscoso, he threw a 50-kilogram torpedo inside the Janaqueo. The explosion killed two enemy sailors and destroyed their boat. The Chileans were so impressed by Galvez courage, that few hours after he was taken prisoner to the battleship Blanco Encalada, he was returned to the Peruvian authorities in Callao. Ugarte y Moscoso died in the action.

Later, on December 6 of that year, a second torpedo-boat combat took place. The Peruvian gunboat Arno, armed with two guns, and the torpedo boats Capitania, Resguardo, Urcos and Republica, fought against the Chilean torpedo boats Fresia, Guacolda, Colo Colo and Tucapel, armed each with two torpedoes and one Hotchkiss machinegun. As a result of the combat, the gunboat Arno sunk the 25-ton torpedo boat Fresia, under command of Lieutenant Alvaro Bianchi.

The Peruvians also sink the 1,657-ton steamer Loa, one of the ships that participated in the final hunt of the Huascar. The ship was destroyed off Callao on July 3, 1880, by an explosive charge hidden by the Peruvians inside a boat, which Loa’s Commander, Juan Peña, imprudently order to pick up at sea. The commander and 119 crewmen died during the terrible explosion.

On September 13th, 1880, off the coasts of Chancay, North of Lima, the old schooner Virgen de Covadonga, which also fought against Huascar in Angamos, suffered identical fate that the Loa. Her commander, Pablo Ferrari, imprudently decided to hoist up what was supposed to be a harmless small vessel. The boat was loaded with explosives. The terrible explosion sent the schooner to the bottom of the sea in a matter of minutes. From her crew of 109 men, 32, including the Captain, died during the explosion, while 29 escaped in boats and 48 become prisoners of war of the Peruvian army

On January 3, 1881, however, the Chilean corvette O´Higgins would sink the torpedo boat Republica after she tried to execute a night raid against the Chilean ironclads off Callao.

Few days later, after the battle for Lima, to avoid the fleet falling into enemy hands, the Government ordered to destroy the remaining ships of the armada: The corvette Union, the monitor Atahualpa, the gunboat Arno, the torpedo boats, the submarine and all the transports.

With those actions, the Peruvian Navy would cease to exist temporarily, until her rebirth took place at the end of the decade, with the arrival of the gunboat Lima.