The Ten Centavos War

The War of the Pacific was popularly dubbed the “Ten Centavos (cents) War.” In 1877, after a devastating tidal wave destroyed much of the port of Antofagasta, the municipal council there passed a reconstruction tax. In 1878, President Hilarión Daza and the Bolivian Congress approved the modest 10¢ tax on every 100 pounds of nitrates exported from Bolivian territory. This law directly violated the 1874 treaty, and the Chileans and foreign investors were outraged. The British and Chilean–owned Nitrates and Railroad Company of Antofagasta refused to pay the tax, and tensions mounted.

At first, cooler heads prevailed. President Daza temporarily suspended the tax, and the company agreed to an annual voluntary contribution. But then Daza ended the moratorium and demanded that the tax be paid retroactively. Once again, the foreign company refused to comply. The Chileans responded with gunboat diplomacy, and anchored an ironclad in Antofagasta harbor and mobilized their entire fleet.

This time, President Daza refused to back down. With Bolivian sovereignty seemingly besmirched, Daza canceled the mining contract of the British-Chilean consortium. On February 14, 1879, Chile occupied Antofagasta—home to 5,000 Chileans and fewer than 600 Bolivians— and issued an ultimatum: Bolivia had 48 hours to accede to international arbitration of the dispute. President Daza ignored the deadline and insisted that the port first be liberated. He also withheld news of the Chilean landing for a week until after the conclusion of the popular carnival festivities then under way.

In no mood for more wrangling, Chile occupied Bolivia’s Antofagasta province and the entire Pacific coast south of the 23rd parallel in March. On March 14, Bolivia announced a formal declaration of war, but war still might have been averted if Peru’s last-minute conciliatory diplomacy had succeeded, or if Peru had not honored its defensive alliance with Bolivia. By this time, however, word of the Bolivian declaration of war had reached Santiago, and therefore, on April 5, Chile formally declared war against Bolivia and Peru.

Defeat and Loss of the Seacoast

Bolivia was totally unprepared for war, especially one so distant from its population centers and resource base, and suffered from grossly irresponsible leadership. Despite his patriotic bluster, President Daza was inept in the military campaign. On the battlefield, he proved cowardly, self-motivated, and (according to some accounts) often drunk. Daza withdrew his crack Bolivian regiments from the field and left the allied forces to be defeated by the Chileans in the Battle of San Francisco. Although the remaining allied forces were victorious days later in the indecisive Battle of Tarapacá, President Daza’s desertion became a great national embarrassment to Bolivia.

Historians have argued that Daza wanted to protect his prized regiments as a hedge against coup attempts, but on December 27, 1879, in a clever and meticulously timed plot, officers at the front and Colonel Eliodoro Camacho, the chief of staff, overthrew Daza, and the expresident fled into exile in Europe.

In January 1880, General Narciso Campero, a distinguished career officer and division commander, was appointed Bolivia’s provisional president and assumed command of the allied forces in the field as by then both the Bolivian and the Peruvian presidents had effectively deserted command of their armies. Campero’s Bolivian-Peruvian force was decisively defeated by the Chileans in May, and Campero and his exhausted troops retreated toward La Paz. At the head of one column of survivors, Campero was met with the news that the National Assembly had formally elected him president on May 31. As the marauding horde of desperate soldiers approached the Bolivian border, a cavalry force from La Paz intercepted and forcibly disarmed them. The government feared violence when the wounded and exhausted returnees learned that they would not receive the back pay owed them. For Bolivia, the shooting war was over, although hostilities between Peru and Chile continued for three more years while Bolivia watched from the sidelines, hoping for a favorable resolution.

On April 5, 1884, Bolivia signed the Truce of Valparaiso, which gave Chile control, but not permanent transfer, of Bolivia’s coastal territory. A peace treaty was finally signed in 1904, whereby Chile formally annexed Bolivia’s Atacama province (called Antofagasta today). Bolivia was guaranteed the right to import and export its goods through the ports of Arica and Antofagasta and to set up customs stations. Duties on imports were to be divided, providing Bolivia 75 percent and Chile 25 percent.

Thus, with the stroke of a pen, Bolivia lost a fourth of its territory and became the landlocked nation that it is today. The War of the Pacific was officially over, but not Bolivia’s relentless quest to regain a seacoast.

Bolivia - On the Eve of the Great Pacific War

No war breaks out over guano, of which little remains. It is saltpeter that throws the Chilean army into the conquest of the deserts, against the allied forces of Peru and Bolivia. Eduardo Galeano (1987, 218)

 The War of the Pacific was a war over resources, although territorial rivalry was its most immediate cause. The conflict also involved geopolitics, economic rivalry, greed, corruption, and personal ambitions. Indeed, the basic ingredient of the war—rivalry for power and economic dominance—first came into play with Bolivian independence. Because of this endemic regional rivalry, some historians have argued that the War of the Pacific was inevitable.

In the 1870s, the conflict of national interests and increasing disparities in economic and political power among the three neighboring South American countries of Bolivia, Chile, and Peru reached a critical climax. The new power distribution greatly favored Chile, and Chilean statesmen seized this opportunity to consolidate and further expand their nation’s influence and control along the Pacific coast.

Since its founding as a sovereign nation, Bolivia’s survival had been tentative. At first, Lima and Buenos Aires considered Bolivia’s very existence suspect. Bolivia, after all, had been capriciously carved out of the colonial audiencias that they had jealously controlled. Once established, Bolivia was troublesome and unstable. The new country seemed unable to rule itself, much less populate and effectively administer its vast and dispersed territory. Bolivia’s rich natural resources were the constant envy of its more powerful and aggressive neighbors in the Southern Cone. Debilitated by corruption and instability, Bolivia dismally failed to preserve its territory and resources when challenged by Chile.

In great part Bolivia’s geopolitics and unique national conditions facilitated this disastrous war and the loss of its Pacific seacoast. As late as the 1880s, the altiplano region remained the geopolitical center of the shaky new republic. The majority of the country’s territory, however, was neglected and isolated from the highland by formidable natural barriers—impassable and hostile mountain ranges, rivers, deserts, and jungles. Bolivians in these frontier regions were forced to fend for themselves. Moreover, Bolivia’s population was largely indigenous with only a thin upper crust of Spaniards and other Europeans. Neither social group had the necessary mobility or motivation to migrate to the less hospitable parts of the country.

These factors had a devastating impact on settlement of Bolivia’s Atacama province. Even after the discovery of guano and nitrate deposits in the Atacama Desert, which stretched from Peru in the north to Chile in the south, the Bolivian government was unable to incorporate and fortify this distant, sparsely populated coastal province. The unexpected bonanza in natural fertilizers brought a sudden influx of new settlers, prospectors, and entrepreneurs to the region; however, this population increase only compounded Bolivia’s problems since Bolivian citizens were now outnumbered 10 to one by Chileans and other immigrants, including thousands of Chinese coolies brought here by Peru and Chile as cheap, captive laborers.

With other nations and foreign firms competing for the profits from the bird droppings and saltpeter, Bolivia’s share of the bonanza steadily shrank. The remainder was squandered by the corrupt caudillos on profligate living and ill-advised foreign concessions and loans. Bolivian entrepreneurs’ resources were depleted or invested elsewhere, primarily in the highland silver mines. As a last resort, with the economy stagnant and the country heavily indebted, Bolivian governments permitted and encouraged British and Chilean capital to exploit the desert windfall on their behalf. In short, Bolivia’s inherent political and economic weaknesses directly contributed to the outbreak of the war.

Chile, on the other hand, stood in a position of relative strength. Unlike Peru or Bolivia, Chile’s exceptional political stability and economic growth since 1830 had helped make it the dominant power in the region. Chileans held regular elections for civilian governments and enticed foreign investors by the credibility of their sound political and financial systems. Chile’s cities were modern, and its people were mostly European immigrants, rather than Indians. Its economy was more diversified, and its territory was more integrated and cohesive. Chile had what both Peru and Bolivia lacked. Indeed, one Chilean president boasted in 1858 that the country had “the honor to have proved to the world that the Spanish American people can govern themselves by their own unaided efforts and can continue to prosper” (Bader 1967, 25).

This is not to say that all was well in Chile at the time. The country had its share of shortcomings and crises, and it was precisely a national crisis—the depression of 1878—that pushed Chile closer to war. By the mid-1870s, Chilean progress had come to a halt. Chilean exports had declined and the foreign debt had skyrocketed at the same time that droughts and diseases ravaged the country. Upward of 50,000 Chileans—mostly rotos, or landless peasant farmers of European descent—were forced to emigrate. Many would slave in the grueling guano and nitrate operations in Bolivia’s Atacama Desert.

Chile’s economic decline was an incentive to resolve the territorial dispute with Bolivia aggressively. Chile saw in the great riches of the coastal desert an immediate solution to the 1878 financial crisis and reliable long-term financing for the national debt and future commercial and territorial expansion. Decades later, Chile’s foreign minister, Abraham Köning, dissected Chilean motivations succinctly: “The area is rich and worth many millions” (Siles Guevara 1960, 68). Indeed, in the 20 years from 1880 to the end of the century, the gross value of the nitrate exports from the conquered regions reached nearly 3 billion pesos. On the eve of the war, corruption in Peru and Bolivia and the economic crisis in Chile had diminished the military preparedness of all three future belligerents. Chile, nevertheless, was relatively more prepared. For several decades Chile had been locked in a fierce military and commercial rivalry with Peru and had competed fiercely over control of the western seacoast. Now, Peru, like Bolivia, was virtually bankrupt, in political chaos on the eve of the war, and outclassed militarily by Chile. War decided this rivalry and assured Chilean hegemony on the Pacific coast.

The Uncouth General Daza

Bolivian historians have bestowed on Hilarión Daza the epithet “el soldado mandón” (the imperious soldier). According to historian Humberto Vázquez Machicado, Daza was born in the constitutional capital of Sucre around 1840 the illegitimate son of an itinerant Italian snake-oil salesman named Grossolín. As a child, Daza had difficulty pronouncing his father’s surname, and from these attempts he received the ludicrous nickname of “Chocholín.” Not pleased, he started to use the surname of his mother.

Daza received his limited education on the tough streets of Sucre as a small-time crook and con artist and in the rough barracks of the army. He showed a talent for being in the right place at the right time and rapidly rose in the military ranks with Mariano Melgarejo, whom in the end he betrayed for 10,000 pesos. Daza was overthrown in 1879, while at the battlefront in Tacna, and headed for Europe. There, he lived the good life until the enormous fortune that he had pilfered became depleted. He returned to Bolivia intent on heading another military coup but was killed in 1894.

Bolivia: The Last 19th-Century Caudillo

The presidency of Hilarión Daza was landmark in Bolivian history. During his administration, the legislature approved the historic Liberal Constitution of 1879 (the county’s ninth since independence), which remained, with slight modifications in 1880, Bolivia’s fundamental governing charter until the 1930s. It protected private property rights and the economic concerns of Bolivia’s Big Silver industrialists and their Chilean interests.

General Daza’s rule, however, figures most tragically in the nation’s collective memory because it marked the loss of Bolivia’s access to the Pacific Ocean. His government and Congress of 1878 passed the infamous 10¢ tax on the nitrates exported by the British-Chilean Nitrates and Railroad Company of Antofagasta. This tax, which the bankrupt Bolivian treasury desperately needed, provided Chile with the perfect pretext to occupy Bolivia’s seacoast and launch a war with its neighbors.

President Daza cannot be blamed entirely for the war and the loss of the seacoast. Years before his government, Chilean, British, and U.S. capital had extended financial tentacles into virtually every profit-generating enterprise available to Bolivia: guano, nitrates, borax, even silver. The economic concessions of the Bolivian Litoral province produced an estimated 28 million pesos annually, according to historian José Fellman Velarde. By his calculations, this bonanza exceeded 14 times the Bolivian budget and eight times that of Chile at the time. This appropriation and Bolivia’s semicolonization by domestic and foreign capital caused the War of the Pacific as much as the incompetence and venality of Daza and earlier Bolivian regimes did. Already, on the eve of Daza’s military coup of May 1876, Chile in effect controlled the bulk of Bolivia’s coastal assets demographically and financially. By the time General Daza was overthrown in December 1879, the Chilean forces had also militarily occupied the entire Bolivian Litoral.

WARS OF THE PERUVIAN-BOLIVIAN CONFEDERATION AND OF THE PACIFIC

The Pacific littoral was the other site of protracted military struggle. Given their very close economic and administrative links during the colonial era, the early separation of Bolivia and Peru was in many ways a political fiction. In part because of their historic and economic connection and in part because of the rising strength of the Chilean state, the Bolivian president General Andre´s Santa Cruz sought to establish closer connections between two halves of the old Viceroyalty of Lima. In alliance with a number of Peruvian caudillos, he invaded Peru in 1835, and in October 1836 he proclaimed the existence of the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation. This union did have some popular support, but the division of Peru into two provinces and the selection of Lima as the capital alienated elites in both countries. More important, the union threatened the geopolitical position of Chile and Argentina. Both countries viewed a strong Peru as a challenge to their predominance. The first declared war in December 1836, the latter in May 1837. Despite some early failures, the Chilean army, in alliance with Peruvian forces opposed to the union, were able to defeat Santa Cruz in the battle of Yungay in January 1839, leading to the dissolution of the confederation.

Chile’s victory over Peru and Bolivia in the 1830s established its reputation as the regional ‘‘Prussia’’ and further solidified the political institutionalization begun under Diego Portales (who was assassinated at the very beginning of the war). If any war ‘‘made’’ Chilean exceptionalism, it was this one, as it provided a rare legitimacy while also establishing a stable civil military relationship. For Peru and Bolivia, defeat appears to have accelerated the process of economic and political fragmentation begun with independence.

Beginning in 1840, various international companies began the exploration of the Bolivian coast in order to make use of the guano and nitrate deposits there. The exploitation of silver beginning in 1870 led to an economic boom. During this decade Chile and Bolivia appeared to resolve a series of quarrels by increasing the influence of the former in the disputed region. But disagreements over taxes and the nationalization of Chilean mines in the Peruvian desert in 1875 fueled the tension. Following diplomatic efforts to resolve a new set of crises, Chile declared war in April 1879. Given a Peruvian-Bolivian alliance, this involved Chile in a war with both northern neighbors. The war quickly became a contest for plunder.

None of the countries was prepared for war, although Chile had a significant advantage in naval forces. More important, the Chilean state retained its institutional solidity, whereas both Peru and Bolivia suffered from internal divisions. Chile occupied the Bolivian littoral, then Tarapaca in 1879, and Tacna and Arica and most of the northern coast in 1880. By this stage the Chilean army had increased significantly with an invasion force of twelve thousand men. International pressure from both the U.S. and European powers forced the two sides into negotiation, but the Chileans sought a complete victory. In 1881, with an army now numbering twenty-six thousand, the Chileans entered Lima. They did not leave until 1884, extracting the province of Tarapaca permanently and the provinces of Tacna and Arica, which they retained until 1929. Chile also took the entire Bolivian coast (Atacama).

The victory helped determine the future institutionalization of both the Chilean and Peruvian militaries, as well as partially defining the development options of the three countries. Chile enjoyed an economic boom as well as unprecedented patriotic euphoria, both of which helped dispel the gloom of the 1870s. Despite the relative shortness of the war, Peru suffered severe casualties and the destruction of much of its coastal infrastructure. The war may also be seen as the best example of a military impetus for a new national identity, as the Peruvian and Bolivian memory of their defeat continues to play a large role in their respective nationalisms. The Bolivian defeat deprived that country of a great part of its wealth and left it contained within the Altiplano, in which Chile had no interest. The war did help decrease the political influence of the military and helped consolidate the rule of a civilian oligarchy dominated by mining interests.

The War of the Pacific may best demonstrate the consequences of the external orientation of these states and the lack of domestic domination. It was ‘‘at heart a bald struggle over exports among jealous Chile, Bolivia, and Peru.’’ ‘‘All three countries were hard up, and run by oligarchies which disliked paying taxes and looked to revenue from these fertilizers [nitrate] as a substitute.’’ Each country was competing with the others for those resources that would allow it to maintain its ‘‘rentier’’ status and not challenge the domestic status quo. War came because the states were too weak to fight their respective elites. For example, because the elites of the Altiplano were too powerful to tax, the Bolivian state saw the littoral and the nascent nitrate industry as the best source of fiscal support. This brought it into conflict with Chile. But, precisely because it did not have adequate support from its home base, Bolivia could not hope to win.

NITRATES AS CAUSE OF THE WAR

Chilean nitrates were the chief source of nitrogen for explosives, fertilizer, and chemical industries from the 1830s to the 1930s, and were the only significant source of iodine from the 1870s (replacing seaweed) until the mid-20th century (when iodine began to be extracted from oilfield brines).

In 1830, a shipment of 700 tonnes of nitrate left Tarapacá, southernmost Peru. The industry mushroomed, and annual exports were 16,000 tonnes by 1843. The peak was not reached until the rather unusual conditions of World War I, when production reached nearly 3 million tonnes. The all-time record was set in 1928, at 3.1 million tonnes.

The nitrates occur in what are now Chile's two northern provinces, Tarapacá and Antofagasta, along a band 30 km wide and 700 km long. They seem to have formed in shallow playa lakes, where the saline water contained bacteria that fixed nitrogen into nitrate.

In 1868 there was a boom in nitrate mining in the Atacama Desert, and major nitrate ports were developed from Iquique in the north through Pisagua and across the Atacama desert to Taltal. The nitrate mining was dominated by British and Chilean enterprises, even though the Atacama Desert was formally part of Bolivia. Chile had recognized Bolivia's title in an 1874 treaty, but was allocated economic rights there, including a guarantee that taxes on Chilean mining enterprises would not be raised.

For Peru, nitrate was rather unimportant as long as the guano trade was flourishing: in fact, most of the early nitrate mining on Peruvian and Bolivian territory was done by Chilean and British entrepreneurs. However, in 1875 a particularly impoverished Peruvian government declared nitrate deposits to be the property of the state, copying the declaration covering guano decades before. By this time the governments of Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, had all focussed their attention on control of the nitrate region.

In another of its economic crises, the Bolivian government announced a tax increase of 10 centavos per hundredweight on nitrates in 1879. At that time the largest nitrate mining company was the Antofagasta Nitrate and Railroad Company, a Chilean firm controlled by British capital, including the merchant house of Gibbs. It's not clear what part was played by Gibbs in the politics of this incident, but the Chileans mobilized with the intention of seizing the desert. The Peruvians expressed the intention of mediating the dispute between Bolivia and Chile, but when it turned out that there was a secret treaty between Peru and Bolivia, the Chileans declared war on them both.

The War of the Pacific may have been started as much by national rivalry and runaway emotion as by the economic prize of the nitrate deposits themselves. However, the nitrate prize was enough to give the victor the income of an entire nation, and the combatants were acutely aware of that. Peru's income had been largely based on guano and nitrate for decades; Bolivia's economy was ramshackle at best, but its foreign income was based on metal mining in the Altiplano; and Chile had already had a taste of the riches to be gained from the Atacama mines it was already operating.

Early in the War, W. R. Grace allied itself with the Peruvian government, and became a clandestine arms shipper to Peru. It bought and shipped millions of dollars' worth of armaments, including guns from Krupp and a new naval weapon, a torpedo boat. However the Chileans quickly beat both their opponents and went on to occupy Lima.

Chile's victory in the War of the Pacific gave it full control of a large northern strip of coast. Iquique was the terminus of the Nitrate Railways and the most important outlet. At first Tarapacá province was dominant, with 48 out of Chile's 53 nitrate works in 1892. But twenty years later the southern fields of Antofagasta, linked by a new railroad, the Longitudinal Railway, overtook the northern field in production.

Nitrate played an increasing role in Chile's economy after the War of the Pacific, as copper production declined. By the late 1880s an export tax on nitrate was earning 43% of Chilean government income, and in 1894 it was 68%, and the wealth was used to improve the country's infrastructure. The nitrate industry, however, was largely foreign owned. European capital had bought out Chilean entrepreneurs in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia, even before the War of the Pacific. The major reason was the large amount of capital needed to set up the nitrate works, the infrastructure in the difficult desert regions that contained the nitrate deposits, and the railroad and port facilities that were needed, and the continuing requirement for importing supplies. Capital on this scale was simply not available in South America, nor were the basic supplies to support the industry. For example, foreign coal constituted 20% of Iquique's imports in 1909. In fact, a convenient two-way trade of coal for nitrate favored British shipping firms, who loaded 60% of the nitrates even though most of the nitrate went to European countries.

Synthetic production of nitrates surpassed Chilean mining production in the 1930s. By 1950 the Chilean production was only about 15% of world supply, and by 1980 it was only 0.14%. Today the Chilean reserves total only about a year's worth of world consumption, not because they are close to exhaustion, but because world demand has increased so much.

Bolivia's international relations - Chile & Peru

Chile

Bolivia's relations with Chile are strained, as they have been for much of the last 130 years, by Bolivia's loss of its maritime provinces as a result of its defeat in the War of the Pacific (1879-83). Bolivia's territorial dispute with Chile has also long been a source of nationalist fervour, not least within the armed forces, who continue to see recovery of the lost coastal territories as a patriotic duty. Full diplomatic relations between the two countries have been severed since 1978.

There have been various attempts to enter into negotiations to give Bolivia a sea corridor, 'salida al mar', in return for Bolivian concessions towards Chile. These efforts have however tended not to find favour in either Bolivia or Peru. (As the disputed northernmost areas of Chile actually belonged to Peru prior to 1879, a 1929 treaty gives Peru an effective right of veto over any further territorial changes). Attempts by Bolivia to court international support for its claims have been rejected by Chile, which argues that the issue is entirely bilateral.

The election of the Morales government in Bolivia, as well as the Bachelet government in Chile from 2006, has led to an improvement in relations. Ricardo Lagos, the outgoing Chilean president, attended Morales' inauguration in January 2006 , becoming the first Chilean president in over 50 years to visit La Paz. A few weeks later, Morales returned the compliment by attending Michelle Bachelet's inauguration. He was met with a warm reception from Chilean leftist and trades union groups, who chanted slogans and unfurled banners in support of Bolivia's ambitions for coastal access. Bolivia's gas wealth and Chile's chronic energy shortage provides an incentive for both sides to work out a lasting solution. Using gas as a weapon to force Chile to give up territory is however poorly received in Chile, while selling gas to Chile without some sort of territorial incentive is a sensitive issue in Bolivia. A good deal of mutual distrust remains, and a certain rapprochement between Chile and Peru after the election of Alan García to the Peruvian presidency in February 2006 meant Bolivia risked being left out in the cold.

Peru

Peru and Bolivia have historically been drawn together in hostility towards Chile, since both came out losers in the three-way War of the Pacific. Peru's unwillingness to concede Pacific coast access to Bolivia along Peru's southern frontier with Chile has nonetheless been an obstacle. In 2002, Peru offered to provide an alternative route for the export of Bolivian gas, allowing Bolivia to bypass the problematic Chilean territories, but the project - involving the building of a pipeline to link the Bolivian department of Tarija with Peru's Pacific coast - has been shelved.

Bolivia and Peru are moreover potential rivals so far as gas sales are concerned: plans by Peru to use gas from the Camisea reserves in the Peruvian department of Cuzco to supply Chile and Argentina were seen in La Paz as an unfriendly move. Were Peru to try to build a pipeline directly to Chile across Bolivia's potential salida al mar , this would also further complicate territorial claims. The open sympathy expressed by Morales for losing candidate Ollanta Humala in the 2006 Peruvian presidential elections did little to improve relations with eventual winner Alan García. During his first months in office, García made clear that he attached great importance to improving relations between Peru and Chile. Any such rapprochement could lead to Bolivia's further isolation.

Bolivia’s President Says Quest for Coast Threatened by Peru-Chile Dispute

LA PAZ – President Evo Morales confirmed on Monday that Bolivia’s drive to regain at least a portion of the Pacific coastline it lost in a 19th-century war could be harmed by Peru’s litigation with Chile over those nations’ maritime boundary.

The Peruvian claim “would only prejudice one of the alternatives” for Bolivia to obtain a sovereign outlet to the ocean, Morales said during his country’s annual Day of the Sea observance.

“I wouldn’t want to think that this lawsuit that’s being presented before the International Court in The Hague about the maritime boundary between Peru and Chile would be to affect and set back one of the possible solutions to our historic request which is sovereign access to the sea,” he added.

Bolivia on Monday commemorated the 130 anniversary of the death of Eduardo Abaroa, one of the heroes of the country’s defense when it was invaded by Chilean troops in 1879 during the War of the Pacific.

The war cost Bolivia 120,000 square kilometers (a little over 46,000 square miles) of territory and the 400 kilometers (250 miles) of coastline it had on the Pacific before the war, in which Peru was La Paz’s ally and also suffered territorial losses to the victorious Chileans.

Morales insisted, alluding to the Peruvians, that “only they know what this lawsuit is due to.”

He added that, above and beyond the “internal and external agents” who want to harm Bolivia’s maritime aspirations, there are also “international powers” who are trying to create conflicts in the region, but he did not specify to which countries he was referring.

Morales emphasized that he and his Chilean counterpart, Michelle Bachelet, had included the discussion about Bolivian ocean access on the 13-point agenda that is the basis for bilateral talks that began in 2006.

“Sooner or later we will return to the Pacific Ocean,” said Morales, noting that in those discussions there had already been progress made on solving the controversy over water in the Silala region of the southern Bolivian highland province of Potosi.

The waters there, considered by Bolivia to be a source to which it has the rights, benefit northern Chile, which – in contrast – considers it to be an international river.

According to the Bolivian government, Santiago accepted an agreement to economically compensate Bolivia for half the consumption of that water.

La Paz and Santiago have not had diplomatic relations since 1978, after the failure of negotiations that would have allowed the landlocked Andean nation to regain access to the Pacific Ocean, a goal that has become an insistent demand in international forums.

But the administrations of Morales and Bachelet have agreed to an agenda which includes dialogue on Bolivia’s demand for access to the sea, and despite the lack of movement on that issue, the two presidents maintain cordial ties.

The topic of Bolivia’s getting back a stretch, even a short one, of coastline is a sore one in Chile, where virtually all politicians and the great majority of citizens consider the matter long closed.

Bolivia’s repeated attempts to persuade Chile to return the coastal territory caused the countries to break off diplomatic ties in 1962, with a brief resumption between 1975 and 1978, when both nations were ruled by military regimes. EFE

Major Bolivian Territorial Losses

The War of the Pacific resulted from a dispute between Bolivia and Chile over sovereignty of the mineral-rich coastal area of the Atacama Desert. In the mid-1860s, the two nations had come to the brink of war because of disagreement over their boundaries. In 1874 Chile agreed to fix the border at 24° south latitude in return for Bolivia's promise not to increase taxes on Chilean nitrate enterprises for twenty-five years. But in 1878, Daza imposed a slight increase on export taxes. Chile immediately objected, and when Daza refused to revoke the tax hike, Chile landed troops on February 14, 1879. Bolivia, in alliance with Peru, declared war on Chile on March 1, but Bolivia's troops in the coastal territory were easily defeated, in part because of Daza's military incompetence. Driven from office by a popular revolt, Daza fled to Europe with a sizable portion of Bolivia's treasury. The attempt of General Narciso Campero Leyes (1880-84) to come to the aid of Peru, Bolivia's ally in the war, was unsuccessful, and t he combined armies were defeated by Chile in 1880. Having lost its entire coastal territory, Bolivia withdrew from the war. It ceded the territory officially to Chile twenty-four years later, in 1904, under the Treaty of Peace and Friendship.

The War of the Pacific was a turning point in Bolivian history. Bolivian politicians were able to rally Bolivians by blaming the war on Chilean aggression. Bolivian writers were convinced that Chile's victory would help Bolivia to overcome its backwardness because the defeat strengthened the "national soul." Even today, Bolivia has not relinquished the hope of regaining an outlet to the Pacific Ocean.

After the war, a vigorous debate among civilian elites spawned the development of new political parties. Mining entrepreneurs, who had become the most important economic group in the country because of increasing production, created the Conservative Party (Partido Conservador). Conservatives favored reaching a quick peace settlement with Chile that would include indemnification for lost territories and enable Bolivia to construct a railroad for mining exports. The Liberal Party (Partido Liberal) denounced the pacifism of the Conservatives. It also resented the economic dependence of the mining sector on Chilean and British capital and hoped to attract United States investment. Despite these differences, both parties were primarily interested in political and economic modernization, and their ideological outlooks were similar. Civilian politicians reorganized, reequipped, and professionalized the discredited armed forces and tried to subject them to civilian control. Still, both Conservatives and Liberals initially supported military candidates for the presidency. The governments in power from 1880 to 1920--elected by a small, literate, and Spanish-speaking electorate--brought Bolivia its first relative political stability and prosperity

United States Involvement

US attempted to intercede in the War of the Pacific between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia - the Chilean admiral threatened to send the American ships to the bottom of the ocean, and with two new British-built battleships in his fleet, he was well able to deliver on the threat.

The War of the Pacific broke out on February 14th, 1879, when Chilean troops landed in the Bolivian harbor of Antofagasta. It is clear from the evidence presented in previous chapters that Chile entertained annexation ambitions towards this Bolivian territory since 1842. The Chilean government had already decided on military occupation of the territory by the end of 1878. In January 1879 the Chilean newspapers were inciting an already belligerent public opinion by proclaiming the need to use armed force in order to solve Chile's dispute with Bolivia.

Studies on the War of the Pacific divide this event into four main stages. The first one comprises the occupation of the Bolivian littoral. The second corresponds to the naval war between the Peruvian and Chilean fleets. The third includes the occupation of the southernmost Peruvian provinces. And the fourth is the invasion of the Peruvian heartland, including the port of Callao and the city of Lima.

There is a large number of books written about this war, and in addition, several American researchers have studied the role played by the United States during this conflict. (1) However, some little known aspects of this conflict are studied in this chapter which are particularly important for Bolivia. Nonetheless, one should not overlook the fact that because of this war Bolivia lost an entire province, which covered approximately 62,000 square miles; almost equivalent in size to Pennsylvania. lt. also lost part of its population that radicated there, whose descendants later became Chilean citizens. In addition, Bolivia was deprived of important fiscal revenue as well as valuable natural resources. Worst of 'al], Bolivia became landlocked since Chile took over its littoral, which included 187 miles of shore, four main ports and seven coves.

Information sent to Washington on the Chilean Invasion

The American minister in Lima, Mr. Gibbs, sent information to the State Department on February 10, 1879, about the imminent Chilean invasion of Bolivia and stated that Peru would probably be involved in the conflict. In a later message, Mr. Gibbs confirmed the invasion of Antofagasta and analyzed the legal and historical status of the territories claimed both by Chile and ]3olivia. In his message he added that the foreign minister of Bolivia, Mr. Serapio Reyes Ortiz, had arrived in Lima in order to ask for compliance of the Alliance Treaty of 1873. Mr. Gibbs noted his belief that Chile was a country with larger financial resources, able to defend with case the occupied seashore area, and probably to have it annexed in case of Peruvian nonintervention. Furthermore, he considered that Bolivia did not have much to lose because the commercial saltpeter beds in that area were quite far from the country's urban centers, and in addition, were isolated by the Andean range where mountain passes were narrow and dangerous. He added that President Prado closest circles feared that dispatching Peruvian troops from Lima to the south would probably make that capital an easy prey of Mr. Pierola, a Peruvian politician accused of subversion. (2)

The American envoy accredited to the Chilean government, Mr. Thomas Osborn, informed his government in a note dated 20 February 20, 1879, that Chile was again involved in a border dispute, this time against Bolivia for the Pacific shoreline area lying between 23 degrees and 25 degrees latitude. In his note Mr. Osborn describes the Treaty of 1866 and the changes to that treaty introduced In 1874. He said that the discovery of vast saltpeter beds in the area of Mejillones had awakened the interest of several commercial enterprises on their exploitation. The American representative pointed out that this business was becoming a monopoly under a corporation know as "Compañia de Salitres y Ferrocarril de Antofagasta" (Antofagasta's Saltpeter Refiner and Railroad Company) and added that wealthy Chilean citizens had a majority interest in this corporation. (3)

Subsequently, the American envoy sent information about the break of diplomatic relations between Chile and Peru and of the war declaration of April l5th; he further verified that Chile had established a blockade of Iquique’s harbor and was preparing to land troops in the Peruvian province of Tarapaca, just north of the Bolivian border. He mentioned that Tarapaca had inexhaustible deposits of guano and saltpeter. Therefore, in case of military success Chile would certainly retain that province, as a prominent citizen of that country had informed him because of Chilean interest in such deposits valued more than $400'@illion. (4)

Mr. Gibbs sent independent dispatches from Lima containing official Bolivian documents about the Battle of Calama and reporting Chile's declaration of war to Peru. (5) At the same time, Mr. Osborn was sending information from Santiago about the occupation of the ports of Cobija and Tocopilla by Chilean naval. forces and on the occupation of Calama by other Chilean units after stubborn Bolivian stand and numerous casualties. He said that e surviving Bolivian soldiers from Calama were taken prisoners d added that Chile's major concern was Peru. (6)

Chile’s Expansionist Policies and Minister Pettis’ Mediation

The new American minister, Mr. Newton Pettis, arrived in Bolivia early in June 1879 without clear instructions from his government but with a sincere interest in contributing to the restoration of peace n South America. The minister of foreign affairs of Bolivia, Mr. Pedro J. de Guerra, asked Mr. Pettis for American peace mediation directed to get back the occupied Bolivian territory. Mr. Pettis ceded to the Bolivian request and opened talks with his colleagues in Lima and Santiago to explore the feasibility of a US mediation before the governments of Peru and Chile. Minister Pettis traveled later on to Arica and Pisagua for an interview with the presidents of Peru and Bolivia, and continued then on his way to Santiago to have talks with the president and the minister of foreign affairs of Chile. After his return from the Chilean capital, Minister Pettis met the presidents of the allied countries again and gave them an aide-memoire containing a description of his efforts. Pettis informed that Chile would only accept the US arbitration with a guarantee for the possession of Antofagasta. On their part Chile would then pay a sum in compensation to Bolivia for their territory. On the other hand, who accepted arbitration only concerning the question of Bolivia, stressing that the situation with Peru was a different matter that prevented Chile from accepting any mediation on this respect in the near future. (7)

Even though Mr. Pettis failed in his mission, it was obvious that the government of Chile, in spite of accepting arbitration, did not feel secure on its right over the Bolivian coastal territories, and thus demanded as a precondition that in case of losing the arbitration proceedings, the relevant tribunal should have set an amount for reparations that Chile would then pay Bolivia in order to obtain ratification of its possession of the disputed territory. In other words. Chile considered irreversible the annexation of the coastal territories. Its future interest in Tarapaca was unquestionable as well, and their only problem, therefore was to find a way of granting Bolivia access to the sea while validating the Chilean occupation of the territories usurped to Bolivia and Peru.

American Mediation: Peace Talks on the Lackawanna

After Chile's military victories in Tacna and Arica and at a time when Chilean troops were preparing to march on Lima, Minister Osborn took the initiative to offer the good offices of the American government to reach a negotiated solution to the conflict of the Pacific' Chile accepted such initiative and so did the allied countries some time later. Their representatives met with the three American ministers in October 1880 on board of the ship Lackawanna, then anchored in Arica's harbor.

There were three meetings on October 22, 25 and 27, 1980. During the first meeting, once the greetings and the introductory proceedings were over, the delegation of Chile introduced seven basic conditions for peace. They were: first, the transfer to Chile of the territories of Antofagasta and Tarapaca second, the payment of 20 million gold pesos compensation to Chile, of which 4 million would be in cash; third, the restoration of Chilean properties nationalized in Peru and Bolivia; fourth, the return to Chile of the transport vessel Rimac; fifth, the abrogation of the Secret Alliance Treaty between Peru and Bolivia; sixth, the retention by Chile of the territories of Moquegua, Tacna and Arica until all previous conditions were satisfied; and seventh, the formal commitment on the part of Peru not to mount artillery batteries In Arica's harbor once returned by Chile and to limit that port to commercial use only.

At the second meeting, Mr. Antonio Arenas of Peru rejected the Chilean demands because his country did not recognize the right of anyone to rule through military occupation; otherwise that would amount to set a very dangerous precedent for the Americas. The representative of Chile, Mr. Eulogio Altamirano, answered with a statement on how painful it had been for his country to go to war, but stressing that they did so without regard for the amount of sacrifice involved and eager to achieve a solid peace that would enable the reparation of such sacrifices. He added that modern history was fraught with cases of border rectification, and in the case of the so-called Chilean conquest, the only territories involved were those made productive by Chilean toil and capital which by itself made the shift of the border line unavoidable.

The representative of Bolivia, Mr. Mariano Baptista, maintained that the statement of Mr. Altamirano precluded any peaceful solution. He expressed his country's absolute solidarity with the Peruvian position and firmly rejected the principle of territorial annexation by the force of arms, no matter whether it was called a shift forward, a transfer, an acquisition or a conquest. He finally suggested a search, with the help of American representatives, for a framework of the debate that would give way to other conciliatory moves.

The other Peruvian representative, Mr. Aurelio Garcia, submitted among other things the need that arbitration be undertaken by the United States, in view of the good will expressed by the American envoys and on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine.

The representatives of Chile, Mr. Lillo and Mr. Vergara, refused to accept the arbitration proposal, arguing that such a move would have been acceptable before the war but not after. Mr. Lillo added that Chile accepted the ideals of Pan American brotherhood advanced by Mr. Baptista, and accordingly, Chile did not accept the right of conquest either. Nevertheless, he wanted it to be understood that this country required a just compensation for the effort spent in the tragic conflict started for the protection of the Chilean population that brought progress to the disputed regions. Juan Carrillo of Bolivia refuted these arguments and recalled that international arbitration was legitimate. , He joined Baptista in accepting on behalf of Bolivia that Chile may keep its troops of occupation in place until the arbitration tribunal found a solution to all related problems.

Minister Osborn took up from there and made clear that the US government did not seek to become an arbiter in the controversy but that the American government would undoubtedly assume this responsibility in answer to a petition duly endorsed by the three countries. The Chilean envoy then affirmed that he regretted to decline arbitration, particularly in view of the US government's willingness to accept it.

In the course of the third session, the representative of Chile expounded that they were unable to make changes to the peace proposals introduced in the first session. The Peruvian representatives stated as well that they had no new proposals, and once they had advanced the possibility of arbitration, the Chilean rejection had taken the burden of responsibility for the war from the shoulders of Peru, who was just looking for peace with decorum. The representatives of Bolivia reiterated how clear this question was for them -- the allied countries did not accept Chilean conditions and Chile rejected the arbitration proposal advanced by the allies. Furthermore, the proposal of Bolivia for accepting a provisional Chilean administration of the occupied territories that would allow Chile to recover its war expenses was also denied. They deplored thus the lack of agreement resulting from the American mediation. Mr. Osborn lamented on behalf of the three American diplomats their failure to achieve conciliation and peace during that session and stated that he anticipated a very negative reaction from the government and the people of the United States as a consequence of such a failure. (8)

The collapse of the Lackawanna talks had negative repercussions in the three countries and also in public opinion throughout the continent. Ambassador Osborn was admonished by the secretary of state for his failure to promote arbitration as a solution for peace. The ministers of foreign affairs of Chile, Peru and Bolivia issued circulars explaining the position adopted by their respective chanceries in view of the collapse of negotiations on the Lackawanna. It is interesting to note that the Chilean circular attempted to explain the seven conditions set in their original proposal. With regard to the seventh condition, Chile pointed out that the Port of Arica was the natural commercial outlet for Bolivian products and that Chile demanded Peruvian demilitarization of Arica in the interest of defending free Bolivian trade in the area.

Parallel to the Lackawanna talks, Chile tried once again to reach a separate agreement with Bolivia. The Chilean representative, Mr. Eusebio Lillo, proposed an agreement to Mariano Baptista that would have entailed, on the one hand, the final transfer of Antofagasta to Chile: and on the other, the concession of a port further north to Bolivia probably in Moquegua. In that way, Chile would retain Tacna and Arica In payment for war costs. Bolivia declined the alternative to betray its ally and did not accede to separate negotiations. In this regard, the American minister in La Paz sent the following report to Washington:

"The main endeavors of the Chileans in private conferences with the Bolivians, communicated to me confidentially by the latter, were made to break up the alliance between Peru and Bolivia, and engage the latter republic in an alliance with themselves as the unavoidable result of such action. Great inducements were held out, a share in the conquests already and still to be made, but I am pleased to be able to say that such perfidy and disregard of national honor was not consummated; and if, on being consulted on that subject, I took a decided stand in declaring that such proceeding, no matter how beneficial it might be to Bolivia, would be considered by my government, and no doubt by the world, as one of the most infamous transactions in history." (9)

Chile asks for American Intervention in the Matter of the

Exchange of Prisoners

The more outstanding. events of the War of the Pacific have been duly chronicled by many; however, the persistent Bolivian resistance in denying the Chilean army the possibility to conquer more territories in the Altiplano (Andean High Plateau) has been regarded less relevant and is a field of research as yet unexplored.

In this respect it is worthy to note that the government of Chile asked for Minister Osborn's assistance in order that the American government would promote an exchange of prisoners of war arranged by the American envoys in La Paz and Santiago. The Chilean chancellor, Mr. Miguel Luis Amunategui, made reference to several encounters "of little relevance", where Bolivia was able to capture Chilean soldiers. He pointed out that Chile had Bolivian prisoners too, and they would all be exchanged with the cooperation of the United States.

Minister Osborn informed the State Department about the quest and asked for the required official authorization allowing him to intervene in the exchange of prisoners. The Secretary of State, Mr. Evarts, sent instructions to the American envoy in La Paz, Charles Adams, asking him to provide his cooperation to Mr. Osborn in the American humanitarian effort aimed to obtain the exchange of prisoners of war. (10)

American efforts for the exchange of prisoners failed after six months of mediation, but in spite of that, the exchange took place subsequently by direct arrangement between the two antagonists.

Bolivian Proposal for Economic Compensation to Chile

American Companies

A few months after the collapse of the Lackawanna talks, the Chilean army succeeded in occupying El Callao, and Lima fell some later. Several peace initiatives were put forward during 1881 d 1882, One of those was undertaken by the first Bolivian minister in Washington, Mr. Ladislao Cabrera, a well known public official who had organized the defense of Calama when the Chilean attacked the place.

In February 1881 Mr. Cabrera introduced his project before the American government for a plan to put an end to the conflict and to the foundation for a peace with honor that could satisfy the expectations of all belligerent nations involved. The Cabrera Plan assumed that territorial conquest was outlawed in South America and that the principle of territorial integrity of nations must be preserved in terms similar to those upheld at the time of independence. This plan foresaw war reparations to Chile by the allied nations, as well as cancellation of other outstanding obligations such as Peru's external debt. On this account, the plan contemplated the formation of a company with American capital's participation that would exploit the saltpeter beds in Tarapaca's Province and in the Bolivian littoral. The American government would be the guarantor for the company's operation, to be managed under the joint authority of the governments of Chile Peru and Bolivia. The company's profit from prospecting operations would serve to pay war reparations to Chile and other expenses aforementioned. This plan did not have a time limit but it did estimate allied war reparations to Chile in Lbs.4,500,000. Minister Cabrera estimated in that amount the annual income from the sale of guano and saltpeter obtained in the occupied territories, and thus the proposed company might pay the Peruvian debt and the cost of the War - after commissions and operating expenses -within a three-year period. The secretary of state, Mr. William M. Evarts, acknowledged receipt of Cabrera's proposal but warned him that no official decision would be forthcoming because of the proximity of a change of government in the US.(11)

Minister Cabrera then insisted on his proposal in May 1881 before the new secretary of state, Mr. James G. Blaine, and made clear to him the Bolivian interest in having the United States play an important role to achieve honorable peace in the conflict being waged in the Pacific, thus side-stepping a possible intervention of such powers as France, England, Italy and Holland, which were at the time expressing their interest in mediation with the belligerent countries.

Secretary Blaine did not pay much attention to this proposal as presented by Mr. Cabrera, but decided as a matter of the highest priority to attain peace in the region, hoping to get a leading role for the United States in peace negotiations and in the future of the occupied territories. (12)

Preserving American Hegemony:

The Secretary of State, Mr. James G. Blaine

The new American government presided by James Garfield took office in March 1881 and appointed Mr. James G. Blaine as secretary of state. This government official had a bright future on the American political stage and had a Panamericanistic scope that gave him an understanding of the need for promoting common goals among all nations in this hemisphere, on the basis of respect for their rights and of solidarity among all of them. In addition, he was interested in preserving American hegemony over the region by denying European powers to exert their influence there. He further believed that on account of prestige and brotherhood, the United States should play an important role in the restoration of harmony among the belligerents in the South Pacific.

Mr. Blaine deeply resented the fact that England could benefit from a situation that legitimately belonged to the United States, since he believed that England was backing Chile in order to absorb, through the latter, the whole Peruvian guano and nitrate business. Secretary Blaine emphasized to American journalists the fact that the iron-clads furnished by England allowed Chile to destroy the Peruvian navy. He also predicted that business in the occupied territories by Chile would be furnished by money from English cargoes. Blaine's forecast proved to be a reality scarcely eight years later, when British interests swept away the gains of guano and saltpeter mining, while Chile kept merely the territories for itself. (13)

Mr. Blaine was concerned that in such ongoing controversies as those between Mexico and Guatemala or between Chile, Peru and Bolivia, territorial conquest by the force of arms might become an established principle. Nevertheless, James Blaine was pragmatic enough to understand that the Chilean occupation and power in the South Pacific was afact accompli. The United States of America therefore had no other choice but to accept that Chile had acquired certain privileges stemming from military victory, such as the payment of compensation, which might include territorial annexation as part of the cost. In other words, Mr. Blaine was prepared to establish a qualitative distinction in the annexation of Antofagasta and Tarapaca to Chile taking it as payment for debts pending but not as spoils of war and conquest.

Mr. Blaine deeply resented the constant arrogance of Chilean officials in explaining their participation in the war and in expressing their demands for peace. Secretary Blaine asserted many times that he would not have allowed failure in the Lackawanna negotiations. In order to achieve peace he sent new envoys to the belligerent countries followed by a special mission composed of Mr. William Trescot and his own son, Mr. Walker Blaine, who was at the time third secretary of the State Department.

President Garfield was mortally wounded in an assassination attempt a few months after he took office and was replaced by the vice-president, Chester A. Arthur. Mr. Blaine was involved in deep political controversies and was accused, by political rivals and Chilean diplomats accredited in Washington of following a policy in defense of Peru and Bolivia not in the best interests of the United States, but instead in connivance with bond-holders of the Peruvian external debt conspiring for their own benefit. Such a political climate prompted President Arthur to designate a new secretary of state and to yield to a detailed House investigation of these allegations. After careful investigation, the House of Representatives declared unfounded the allegations against Mr. Blaine. This politician would later on take again the functions of secretary of state and promote a new the ideal of a Pan-American union.

Secretary of State Blaine sent new ministers to the capitals of the belligerent nations to try to give new impulse to peace negotiations. Mr. Stephen Hurlbut, in Lima, and Mr. Judson Kilpatrick, in Santiago, attempted respectively but in vain to reach an agreement in which Chile would respect the territorial integrity of Peru and the right of conquest would be rejected. Mr. Blaine's instructions did not specify any provisions referring to the situation of Bolivia and in the territorial dispute, but in La Paz as well as in Lima, Blaine's defense of Peruvian territorial integrity was equated by extension to encompass the Bolivian seashore.

Secretary Blaine was determined to give further momentum to the peace effort in the South Pacific and set up on November 30, 1881, a special mission under William Trescot and Walker Blaine entrusted with the restoration of peace and harmonious coexistence among the three belligerent countries. Mr. Blaine gave the Trescot mission instructions including the following three basic ideas for a renewed American mediation:

"l. To concert such measures as will enable Peru to establish a regular government, and initiate negotiations.

2. To include Chile's consent to such negotiation without cession of territory as a condition precedent.

3. To impress upon Chile that in such negotiation she ought to allow Peru a fair opportunity to provide for reasonable indemnity."

Blaine was also telling Trescot that the American government admitted indeed the right of Chile to expect adequate compensation in payment for war costs. (14) Trescot had instructions to ratify American recognition of Garcia Calderon's government, who was at the time detained in Chile while Lisandro Montero had taken charge provisionally in Arequipa.

On their way south Mr. Trescot and the young Mr. Blaine met in Peru with Charles Adams and left him with instructions to exert his influence upon Bolivian authorities in order to have them stop any possible separate negotiations that they might be conducting with Chile.

Consequently, Minister Adams sent a note to the government of Bolivia in January 1882 on the following terms:

"As the outcome of a meeting I held with Mr. Trescot in El Callao last December 23rd ... I have committed myself to ask Bolivia for a continuation of the present statu quo until the opinion and intentions of Chile could be clearly understood. I have thus the honor to request his excellency's government to avoid the adoption of any conclusive steps before I learn the outcome of negotiations being conducted by Mr. Trescot in Santiago." (15)

The government of Bolivia had sent Mr. Mariano Baptista to take part in the Pan-American Conference convened by Blaine in November 1881 at Panama. The cancellation of that conference played in the hands of Mariano Baptista to open informal talks on his way through Tacna with the Chilean prefect, Mr. Eusebio Lillo, whom he already knew from the Lackawanna talks. Lillo offered a truce to Baptista that would allow Chile to continue its occupation of the Littoral Province, would restore his country's trade with Bolivia and would determine the belligerent's commitment not to renew hostilities without a one-year advance warning.

The Bolivian government took the advice of the American minister in La Paz and reaffirmed that the talks held by Baptista would not be considered seriously because the government of Bolivia maintained absolute loyalty towards the Peruvian government of President Montero. (16)

Trescot's instructions were to support the Peruvian position and to ratify American recognition of the government of Garcia Calderon, then detained in Chile. Coincidental with Trescot's arrival to Santiago, President Arthur appointed a new secretary of state, and such action weakened Blaine's original diplomatic strategy and contributed to promote Chilean intransigence towards Mr. Trescot. In his talk with Trescot, Chile's chancellor, Mr. Balmaceda, reaffirmed Chile's conditions for peace with Peru. One of them consisted of the unconditional cession of Tarapaca, and the other was the continuing occupation of Tacna and Arica as a guarantee for the war reparations demanded.

The newly appointed American secretary of state, Mr. Frederick Frelinghuysen, sent Mr. Trescot new instructions that prompted on February 11, 1882, the signing of the Protocol of Viña del Mar.

This protocol consisted of the following points:

"l. Cession to Chile of the territory of Peru situated to the south of the Quebrada de Camarones.

2. Occupation of the region of Tacna and Arica for ten years. Peru being obliged to pay twenty million pesos at the expiration of that time.

3. Chile shall occupy the islands of Lobos so long as there shall be guano upon them, and both the net product of the guano taken from them shall be equally divided between Chile and the creditors of Peru."(17)

The Chancellor of Bolivia, Mr. Pedro Jose Zilveti, requested information from Minister Charles Adams about the protocol signed in Viña del Mar between Chile and the United States, but Mr. Adams claimed ignorance of the text. The Bolivian chancellor subsequently submitted a protest about the absolute disregard shown in the Protocol of Viña del Mar for the situation with respect to Bolivia, ignoring the concession of his country made to the United States on its mediation by canceling all separate diplomatic initiative with Chile. Thereupon Mr. Trescot sent Walker Blaine to La Paz with an explanation of the talks held with Balmaceda.

Mr. Walker Blaine arrived in La Paz and met immediately with Vice-president Belisario Salinas, Foreign Minister Zilveti and other Bolivian officials, and gave them general information on the Protocol of Viña del Mar. He was not more specific on account of his instructions to uncover neither details of the talks maintained between Trescot and Balmaceda nor the full scope of the instructions sent by the secretary of state tending for the moment to support Peru on Bolivia's detriment.

Commissioner Walker Blaine sent a long message to Trescot with a report on his negotiations in Bolivia, as well as those held in Peru with the Bolivian envoys, in which he summarized his mission as follows:

"A great deal of importance was apparently attached by the Bolivian government to the protocol signed on the 11th of February last by yourself and Señor Balmaceda .... should it prove impossible to save her present littoral, and I do not see how this can he done . . . . Bolivia is to be altogether shut out from the Pacific, then the years of Bolivia's existence as an independent nation are few in number."

In another part of his message, Commissioner Blaine considered that:

"the geographic situation of Bolivia required in any case an access to the Pacific," Afterwards he added that it was advisable to consider the need to form an effective confederation between Bolivia and Peru so that Bolivia had access to the sea through Peruvian southern ports, such as "Mollendo and Arica, in order to be able to maintain its national identity…"

In concluding his note, Blaine confided to Trescot his shame on not being able to convey to Zilveti and Carrillo the American government's views, considering above all that Bolivia had great interests at stake. Mr. Blaine suggested that by virtue of American prestige and sense of justice, Bolivia should not be kept waiting and the Americans must determine their position in this respect. (18)

It must be pointed out that on his way through Arequipa to Bolivia, The American envoy, Mr. Walker Blaine, had already advanced to the Bolivia Ambassador Juan Carrillo information about the fact that the Protocol of Viña del Mar did not mention Bolivia. He rationalized that since the United States was unable to press forward a peace agreement with Peru based on conditions demanded by Chile, there was hardly any need to consider the question of Bolivia, but in case that Peru accepted the Chilean offer, the question of Bolivia would then naturally follow immediately after in the discussions. (19)

Some controversial aspects present in the steps taken by Mr. Hurlbut in Peru and Mr. Kilpatrick in Santiago further weakened the negotiating stance of Trescot's mission. The sudden deaths of Ministers Hurlbut and Kilpatrick further complicated things, and Secretary of State Frelinghuysen then took advantage of those events to declare that former negotiations started by his predecessor were closed. In turn he took a new initiative more favorable to Chile than ever, where he accepted territorial conquest achieved by that country and focused on giving Peru the chance to consolidate a stable government that would be able to negotiate the Chilean peace proposal. Such a scheme did not have a clear position regarding the situation of Bolivia.

The US State Department consents to the Maneuvers of Chile

The War of the Pacific, no matter how far from the United States, became an apple of discord in the US Congress, where many groups started active lobbying in favor of Peruvian bond-holders, Chilean diplomats, and other groups involved. President Arthur appointed new envoys to the three belligerent countries following the advise of Secretary of State Frelinghuysen, and gave them instructions to exert their influence in order to have peace as soon as possible. He sent Mr. Cornelius Logan to Chile, Mr. James Partridge to Peru, and Mr. George Maney to Bolivia. (20)

The secretary of state resumed his instructions in this manner:

"It is understood that Chile is in possession of the littoral province of Bolivia and the Peruvian littoral provinces of Tarapaca, Tacna and Arica. It is not supposed that any contingency can happen which will bring about the permanent occupation and annexation by Chile of any larger part of Peru than this. Your efforts, therefore, must be directed towards securing for Peru as large a part of these provinces in the peace treaty as possible, and as large a money indemnity as possible for whatever territory may be retained by Chile." (21)

On the instructions sent to his minister in Bolivia, George Maney indicated:

"If negotiations offered any opportunity to do so, you could help make provisions procuring that Bolivia take part in them but avoiding to commit ourselves without previous knowledge of the president of the United States." (22)

Minister Logan, who had been previously assigned to Chile and held that country in high esteem, became the most dynamic figure among the three American diplomats and followed the steps of his predecessor, Mr. Osborn, in support of Chile's position, in spite of the relative congeniality felt by the American administration towards Peru.

Mr. Logan did not lose time in meeting President Garcia Calderon in prison and in telling him openly that Peru should not place any hopes in the US mediation and that it would be advisable to give up Tarapaca in favor of Chile. And furthermore, that he should consider the possibility of transferring Tacna and Arica to Bolivia. On the other hand, he spoke with Chilean Chancellor Aldunate and expressed to him the reservations of the American government that prevented it from recommending to the Peruvian government acceptance of the provisions contained in the Protocol of Viña del Mar.

Mr. Logan summed up the achievements of his initial actions in search for peace in a note sent to the Chilean chancellor that read as follows:

"1. In order to remove the difficulty regarding the sale of Tacna and Arica, I proposed a treaty on the basis of ceding Tarapaca, with a separate article presenting the question of Tacna and Arica, to the Peruvian congress for its own decision, without any recommendation from Señor Calderon.

2. I proposed to make: the river Azufre the boundary line, giving Arica to Chile and Tacna to Peru. This proposal was not accepted by either party.

3. This suggestion came from your excellency's government, and was made into a formal proposal by myself. Chile was to have military occupation of Tacna and Arica for five years, at the end of which time a vote to be taken by the people of the territory to determine whether they would attach it to Chile or Peru. If the vote took the territory to Chile, the latter was to pay Peru $10,000,000 in compensation. Señor Calderon, however, refused the proposal.

4. I proposed to Señor Calderon that Chile should have military occupation of Tacna and Arica for ten years, and then evacuate it. He declined this, and it was not presented to your excellency.

5. I proposed to submit the following question to the president of the United States, in the capacity of a friendly arbitrator:

Shall the Chilean government as a measure growing out of the necessities and manner of settlement of the war have the right to purchase the Peruvian territory lying between the river Camarones and the river Sama, for the sum of $9,000,000, with the stipulation that Bolivia shall be given the perpetual right to the free and innocent passage over said territory, with perpetual freedom from export and import duties, upon the conclusion of a satisfactory treaty between the latter republic and the Republic of Chile?

Señor Calderón accepted this proposal, but your excellency declined it." (23)

A few weeks later, Mr. Logan personally visited the acting Peruvian president, L. Montero, and advised him to enter into negotiations with Chile. He presented an outline of his actions and reminded the acting president that he should be aware the Bolivian congress approved a resolution in favor of a truce, which would certainly be followed by a peace treaty. Mr. Logan also explained to Mr. Montero that since a separate peace was achieved between Bolivia and Chile, Peru would find itself at a disadvantage for any further negotiations, and therefore he would suggest that Peru accept to sell Tacna and Arica for 10 million dollars, otherwise, Peru might be forced to give them up at a later time without due compensation. (24)

By the end of 1882, President Chester Arthur inserted in His message to Congress the following ideas concerning the American position on the War of the Pacific:

"The war between Peru and Bolivia on the one side and Chile on the other began more than three years ago. On the occupation by Chile in 1880 of all the littoral territory of Bolivia, negotiations for peace were conducted under the direction of the United States. The allies refused to concede any territory, but Chile has since become master of the whole coast of both countries, and of the capital of Peru. A year since, as you have already been advised by correspondence transmitted to you in January last, this government sent a special mission to the belligerent powers to express the hope that Chile would be disposed to accept a money indemnity for the expenses of the war, and to relinquish her demand for a portion of the territory of her antagonist.

This recommendation, which Chile declined to follow, this government did not assume to enforce, nor can it be enforced without resort of measures which would be in keeping neither with the temper of our people nor the spirit of our institutions.

The power of Peru no longer extends over its whole territory, and in the event of our interference to dictate peace would need to be supplemented by the armies and navies of the United States. Such interference would almost inevitable lead to the establishment of a protectorate, a result utterly at odds with our past policy, injurious to our present interest, and full of embarrassments for the future."

President Arthur wrote this part of the presidential message in order to dispel any doubts about a possible American military intervention, so that Peru would understand that the country was standing alone and should accept defeat. Secretary of State Frederick Frelinghuysen sent instructions to Mr. Logan asking him to divulge the substance of President Arthur's message and reminded him that, in evaluating the message, Bolivia should consider itself more fortunate than Peru, since it had merely lost access to the sea in its war with Chile. (25)

For this part, the American envoy in Lima, Mr. James Partridge, approached the Chilean negotiator Novoa and introduced to him the following basic points for peace: First, cession of Tarapaca; second, cession, sale or transfer of Arica and Tacna to Bolivia, but if that proposal were unacceptable, the territories mentioned should remain neutral; third, demilitarization of Arica's port. Partridge's proposal forced Mr. Logan to send a strong note of complaint to Washington; Mr. Frelinghuysen supported him, disavowed the proposals and dismissed Partridge from his post. (26) In addition, reiterated his instructions to Minister Maney in La Paz, asking not to take any initiative and leave all further actions in Logan's hands. (27)

The president prisoner, Mr. Garcia Calderon, complained to Logan about his pro-Chilean leaning and about the way he had incited Bolivia to break the alliance with Peru. Mr. Logan answered that he had not incited Bolivia but reminded Montero that there was a real possibility instead for such an event to happen. Later on President Garcia Calderon pointed out to Mr. Logan that the summary made in his note of October 18, 1882, about the negotiations, contained a false statement where he said that Garcia Calderon would have rejected to cede Arica and Tacna to Bolivia, when in fact, Logan never mentioned this point. Mr. Garcia Calderon, together with other Peruvian personalities, maintained that it was appropriate for Peru to cede Tacna and Arica to Bolivia and that such territorial cession had already been approved by the Peruvian congress itself. Mr. Garcia Calderon made public in that way, and in those days, the position maintained by Peru until today; in other words, that Bolivia's access to the sea through Arica must be a decision adopted by Peru and in no way by Chile. (28)

With Mr. Logan's support, the Chilean negotiators began a peace offensive and promoted with money and weapons the establishment of a Peruvian government under the leadership of Mr. Iglesias. They expected him to accept the peace proposals presented by Chile, or otherwise wanted to use him in a way that would prompt Mr. Montero to enter negotiations and sign the peace proposals as presented. Mr. Novoa succeeded in signing with Mr. Lavalle, a representative of Mr. Iglesias, a first protocol that acknowledged those basic proposals for a peace negotiation, and Mr. Iglesias himself signed it later. Mr. Logan indicated that his own initial proposals to Mr. Garcia Calderon were based on this particular agreement. There was a difference, however because Mr. Logan had suggested that Tacna and Arica would remain under Chilean administration for five years and Mr. Garcia Calderon's stubbornness had only hardened Chile's position, while Mr. Iglesias had accepted that Tacna d Arica remained in Chilean hands for ten years a period which Logan considered long enough for the Chileanization of the territories and their ultimate loss by Peru. (29)

Subsequently, Logan informed about his belief of the existence of an agreement for a separate peace between Chile and Bolivia and concluded that Montero's days as head of his Government were numbered. In addition, Chile canceled its recognition of Mr. Garcia Calderon's government and recommended that the United States give recognition instead to Mr. Iglesias' administration in order to facilitate the peace process, in view of the fact that, after their agreement with Mr. Iglesias, Chilean troops were withdrawing from Northern Peru and their military units were marching towards Arequipa. (30)

The American envoy, Mr. Logan, reported to Mr. Frelinghuysen in June 1883 that the Peruvian Congress, in a meeting convened in Arequipa, had confirmed Mr. Garcia Calderon as president and Mr. Montero as first vice-president. He added that the congress of Peru ratified the protocol signed by Montero with President Campero, in which Peru transferred sovereignty to Bolivia over the provinces of Tacna and Arica, under the provision that Bolivia would maintain its alliance with Peru until the end of the war. Minister Logan viewed this action as a sort of "checkmate" by Montero to Chile, thus preventing Bolivia from signing a separate peace treaty with Chile. (31)

The American minister in Santiago sent to Washington in July 1883 a copy of the peace protocol signed by the government of General Iglesias with the Chilean delegate, Mr. Jovino Novoa, and informed him in the accompanying note that the signing of the protocol caused a great impact on Bolivia, where some public sectors were asking for a separate peace with Chile and for severance of the alliance with Montero. (32)

Meanwhile, the secretary of state in Washington accredited Mr. Seth Phelps as the new American minister in Lima and gave him an outline of the position of the United States in the conflict, as follows:

"The representatives of this government, as you have seen from these instructions, were directed harmoniously to join in a courteous and friendly effort to aid the belligerent powers in reaching an agreement for peace, which, while securing to Chile the legitimate results of success should at the same time not be unduly severe upon Peru and Bolivia.

While greater stress has been given in the instructions of this department to the relations of Peru and Chile, it must not be assumed that the rights and wishes of Bolivia, a sovereign power and a party to the contest, with rights equal to the other contestants, are to be neglected. It is not supposed that any agreement be reached, which shall not receive the assent of that power in all that concerns its interests. As this government has recognized the equal sovereignty of the three republics, and will not depart from that position, of course any agreement, so far as it affects the rights of Bolivia, must receive the consent of that power.

Until Chile and Peru had reached a point where a fair prospect of agreement was seen, it seemed unnecessary to negotiate at La Paz, particularly as Señor Calderon, it was properly assumed, would not act against the interests of his ally. For these reasons the tentative discussions were carried out at Santiago."

On his arrival in Lima, Phelps observed that General Iglesias did not enjoy a favorable political atmosphere in spite of the determined financial and military support from Chile, and recommended accordingly to let some more time pass before granting American recognition to Iglesias' government. He also asserted that Mr. Montero did not count with enough forces and that Peruvian towns in the heartland were particularly exhausted. (33)

Under such prevailing conditions, the Chilean government maintained the situation under control and it even had the option to choose among the alternatives for peace.

Therefore, General Montero accepted from the Chilean negotiator, Mr. Novoa, the following peace proposals:

"a) Cession of Peruvian Tarapaca to Chile.

b) Cession of Peruvian Tacna and Arica to Bolivia.

c) Payment of war reparations to Chile in the sum of 60 million pesos, half this amount to be paid by Bolivia.

d) Peruvian recognition of its obligation to pay the external debt."

Chilean authorities rejected the plan forwarded by Montero because it would mean that Peru could count on Bolivian loyalty in exchange for Tacna and Arica, two regions that some elements within the Chilean government considered should be reserved for Chile. Those same elements were fully convinced of the need to obtain a final break between Bolivia and Peru.

Consequently, Mr. Novoa received instructions to sign the Peace treaty with Iglesias, based on the protocol formerly signed with Lavalle. Iglesias concerted this way with Chile the Treaty of Ancon on October 20, 1883, in which not only territorial conquest was considered legal but, in addition, a bilateral agreement between Chile and Peru to sanction the permanent confinement of Bolivia was legalized for the first time. On the next day Mr. Phelps sent information about Chile's recognition of Iglesias' government as well as on the signing of Ancon's Treaty. (34)

Minister Logan asked the US secretary of state once more for American recognition of the Peruvian government under Iglesias, this time, with a view to consolidate the Peace Treaty of Ancon. (35)

The secretary of state then sent instructions to Mr. Phelps asking him to foster relations with whoever exerted some form of authority, but maintaining a position of friendship and goodwill towards the Peruvian people that would give time for public opinion to express itself about Iglesias' actions. Furthermore, he told Mr. Phelps that the United States would not take sides in connection with the substantive meaning of the Treaty of Ancon and its protocols before having time enough to examine and study them. (36)

By the end of that year, President Chester Arthur sent his third annual message to congress and referred to the war in South America in the following terms:

"The contest of Bolivia, Chile and Peru has passed from the stage of strategic hostilities to that of negotiation, in which the counsels of this government have been exercised. The demands of Chile for absolute cession of territory have been maintained and accepted by the party of General Iglesias to the extent o Peru's concluding a treaty of peace with the government of Chile."

It should be noted that President Arthur did not make any reference to the situation of Bolivia. (37)

While Iglesia's government was confronting Caceres, Chile occupied Arequipa and the south of Peru in order to put pressure upon Bolivia and force that country to sign an agreement for the cessation of hostilities.

It was essential for American diplomacy to get Chile and Peru to sign a treaty while the situation of Bolivia did not have the relevance to demand a more active intervention of the State Department. In this regard, Mr. Frelinghuysen stated that the War of the Pacific ended with the Treaty of Ancon - the same treaty that contained provisions somewhat different to those formerly considered advisable by the United States. (38)

The Truce of 1884 as a Decoy to divide Bolivia and Peru

Minister Logan informed Secretary of State Frelinghuysen about the request sent by the Bolivian government to the Chilean government through the Spanish ambassador -once Arequipa capitulated and General Montero fled - to allow two Bolivian envoys to visit Santiago in order to begin peace negotiations. With Chile's consent, the vice-president of Bolivia, Mr. Belisario Salinas, and his assistant, Mr. Belisario Boeto, traveled to Santiago in November 1883 with instructions to sign a peace agreement that would include a transfer of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia. Mr. Logan noted the complexity of the situation because he was aware since his arrival in Santiago that Chile repeatedly had tried to proceed to such a transfer in reciprocity for the acquisition of the Atacama seashore.

Logan observed as well that in the meantime, Chile had not succeeded in convincing Bolivia to sign a separate peace treaty; on the contrary, the Bolivian government constantly advocated to maintain its alliance with the Peruvian faction of President Montero. The American minister considered that as a result of the factor Chile had ignored Bolivia deliberately - once they had their peace with the Peruvian faction of General Iglesias - and was determined, on the other hand, to consolidate absolutely and unconditionally its possession of Tacna and Arica.

Subsequently, Logan asserted that considering the treaty's provision to allow the 10 year occupation of Tacna and Arica, it was impossible at the moment to adopt any decision over those territories. He also had information that Iglesias' government was against the introduction of any changes to those provisions. Therefore, Logan warned that talks between Bolivia and Chile would be very difficult, but noted that, the mobilization of Chilean troops in Tacna - where five thousand men awaited orders to invade Bolivian territory - would certainly force the issue towards reaching some sort of agreement. He also emphasized that having all its ports under occupation, Bolivia found itself in an indefensible position. Consequently, Logan believed that Chile would force peace through a treaty of its own liking, which would undoubtedly isolate Bolivia from all its maritime ports. He added that some members of the Chilean government nevertheless maintained a magnanimous stance towards Bolivia, which would in any case depend upon the posture adopted by the newly arrived Bolivian commissioners.

Logan made reference in the same note to the fact that Montero had rejected the note of November l3t, 1882, intended to promote the partial transference of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia, as well as to Campero's obstinacy to continue his unconditional alliance with Montero. Therefore, Logan considered that the Bolivian president had lost "the maximum desideratum of Bolivia's access to the sea" on which the national being of the country was dependent and which made evident Campero's incompetence and his lack of a distinct understanding of the true national interests of Bolivia.

After all these considerations, Minister Logan concluded his report noting the total blindness of the national leaders of both countries, Montero and Campero, which precluded them from understanding their failure and from listening to impartial advice. In Logan's view, they would be responsible should an unfortunate situation turn into a real calamity for the allied countries. (39)

Some time later, the American minister sent a confidential note to the secretary of state informing him of progress in peace negotiations being held between Bolivia and Chile. Logan reported on his conversation with Chancellor Aldunate, who told him about the peace proposal presented by the Bolivian commissioners on the basis of the cession of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia. Such a concession was out of the question for the Chilean chancellor because the treaty signed with President Iglesias of Peru prevented it. However, Chile was ready to offer a limitless truce that would allow the resumption of trade and the construction of a railroad from a port of the Bolivian littoral to a given point on the tentative new borders. Chancellor Aldunate mentioned to the American envoy that this offer had been presented in the form of an ultimatum and resulted in its acceptance by Commissioners Salinas and Boeto, but only in principle, because their powers included the signature of a peace treaty and not the signature of a truce; accordingly, they had requested new powers from the Bolivian government.

Minister Logan said that the Chilean counterproposal included payment of reparations to Chile by Bolivia, and this prompted Mr. Aldunate to invite Mr. Logan to be an arbiter on the question of the sum that Bolivia should pay if the success of those talks resulted in a truce agreement. On this account, Logan asked the State Department for instructions, and added that Bolivia would elect a new president and that the question of peace was a very important issue for such election.

In analyzing the situation, Logan indicated that President Campero and his chancellor Quijarro had lost the opportunity to obtain perpetual possession of Tacna and Arica provinces on account of their personal hostility to Chile and of their decision to stake their fate on their loyalty to President Montero of Peru. He added that the Chileans, annoyed by Campero's intransigence, had no other choice but to deal directly with General Iglesias, and thus to close for not less than ten years Bolivian chances of negotiating for the acquisition of Tacna and Arica. Another important point in Logan's commentaries was the sensitivity of Bolivian public opinion against the concept of a railroad that would connect Bolivia to the coast, because of the general belief that such action would open the doors to Chilean immigration and to domination by Chilean capitals.

Such trends could ultimately produce the country's total assimilation by Chile. Further down in his message, Minister Logan expounded the prevailing belief In Bolivian intellectual circles that the nation's existence would be seriously jeopardized if Bolivia could not get a permanent and sovereign access to the sea through Tacna and Arica. He already forecasted, however, that Chile would maintain absolute control over those territories and that Chile would consolidate its entitlement over them once the ten-year time limit, sanctioned by the Treaty of Ancon was over. He further believed that Peru's hands were tied for at least 25 more years.(40)

Early in April 1884, the American envoy, Mr. Phelps, was reporting on his part from Lima to the secretary of state, that he had information leading him to believe that truce negotiations between Chile and Bolivia had failed and that he had learned of large Chilean troop movements in southern Peru for an intent on resuming hostilities against Bolivia. He vouched for Chilean superiority on account of their control of the Mollendo-Puno railroad which allowed them to transport torpedo boats to Puno and use them against Bolivia in the attack that would be launched through Lake Titicaca. Mr. Phelps added that Chile also captured the steamships used for the crossing of the lake and that the situation was secured until Chile could achieve peace with Bolivia. (41)

The US secretary of state sent instructions to the new American minister, Mr. Gibbs, accredited before both the governments of Lima and La Paz, after he weighed Mr. Phelps report. In his instructions, he pointed out US recognition of General lglesia's government and remarked that Mr. Gibbs should do all he could to have Bolivia participate in the peace negotiations that would result from such diplomatic recognition. Mr. Gibbs did not have a chance to carry on those instructions because, in the meantime, negotiations were concluded in Valparaiso. (42)

Facing the threat of renewed hostilities posed by the Chilean troops concentrating in Puno, Tacna, Mollendo and Calama, Bolivia was forced to sign in Valparaiso the Truce Pact of April 4, 1884, accepting the proposals as originally requested by Chile. The provisions of this pact were kept confidential until their approval by the parliaments of both countries, and they were not given to the public until late in 1884.

This chapter is thus intended to show how American diplomatic efforts played contradictory roles that fluctuated with the respective changes taking place in US domestic policy. In general, it could be said that the United States' position favored Peru openly, but that it did not necessarily mean to favor Bolivia, whose interests were normally ignored or forgotten when the major decisions were taken. The fact that their best ministers were subsequently sent to Santiago transformed the initial pro-Peruvian American stance into a subjective pro-Chilean posture that affected mediation results and indeed served to consolidate all claims made by Chile.

Diplomatic correspondence shows that the truce pact was imposed upon Bolivia and that its terms had already been decided by Chile earlier. Although the US played a prevailing role during the negotiations of the Ancon Treaty, it did not take part in the talks leading to the truce between Chile and Bolivia. The latter became totally isolated while maintaining its loyalty to President Montero's

Peru. Moreover, Iglesias' Peru ignored Bolivian loyalty, and in fact buried the alliance. For Minister Logan, the position of Chile was clear and the confinement of Bolivia was already decided in the treaty of 1883. The truce pact was no more than a decoy to divide Bolivia and Peru, thus saving time to consolidate the Chileanization of Arica. That pact already contained all of the main provisions that would find their corollary in the 1904 Treaty and their coda in the 1929 treaty and protocols.

The War of the Pacific had three main outcomes. First it allowed Chile's conquest of the Bolivian seacoast and the Peruvian Tarapaca. The exploitation of the nitrate and other mineral riches of these provinces would allow Chile to play a semiperipheral role in the region. Second, it left the provinces of Arica and Tacna under Chile's occupation with a final decision over them to he made at a later date. At the same time this gave the US a formal role to play in any settlement. Third, the new status of Bolivia as a land-locked country created a conflictive situation, which would endure and shape regional relations as well as it would influence somehow the US performance as the hegemonic power in the Americas.

The US role in this conflict was controversial and gave room for resentment in Chile, Peru and Bolivia. Although that role did not interfere with the rising of the US as a hegemonic power, it was mostly Great Britain, a declining power, that profited most. While British diplomacy did not accrue any gains with this war, British private interest cleverly monopolized all nitrate riches from the Bolivian Littoral and Tarapaca.

Notes

1. Herbert Millington, American Diplomacy and the War of the Pacific. New York, Octagon Books; 1975. Richard S. Phillips Junior, "Bolivia and the War of the Pacific. 1879-1884," Ph.D. Diss., University of Virginia. 1973. Mason, T.B.M., War on the Pacific Coast of South America Washington D. C. 1883. Burr, Robert N., By Reason or Force. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press. Ireland, Gordon, Boundaries, Possessions and Conflicts in South America., Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1938. Talbott, Robert Dean, A History of the Chilean Borders.

2. Dispatches, Peru, Note 304 and 31 1, Pichard Gibbs to William Evarts, Lima, February 10, 19, 1879.

3. Dispatches, Chile, Note 83, Thomas Osborn to William M. Evarts, Santiago, February 20, 1879.

4. Dispatches, Chile, Notes 88 and 89, Thomas Osborn to William Evarts, April 4-10, 1879.

5. Dispatches, Peru, Notes 314, 316, 317, 323 and 326. Richard Gibbs to William Evarts. Lima, February 26;,March 5, 12 and 26; and April 2, 1879.

6. Dispatches, Chile, Note 86, Thomas Osborn to William Evarts, Santiago, April 3. 1879.

7. Dispatches, Bolivia. Note 22, Newton Pettis to William Evarts, August 23, 1879.

8. Dispatches, Peru, Note 200, A. Christiancy to William Evarts, Lima November 2, 1880. Dispatches, Bolivia. Note 46, Charles Adams to William Evarts, La Paz, November 17, 1880.

9. Dispatches, Bolivia, Note 39, Charles Adams to Williams Evarts, La Paz, November 17, 1880.

10. Dispatches, Chile, Notes 132 to 165. Thomas Osborn to William Evarts. Santiago, February 27, September 13, 1880. Instructions, Note 3, William Evarts to Charles Adams, Washington, DC., April 19, 1880.

11. Diplomatic correspondence, Washington D.C., Ladislao Cabrera to William Evarts, February 18, 1881, and William Evarts to Ladislao Cabrera, Washington, D.C., May 5, 1880.

12. Diplomatic correspondence. Ladislao Cabrera to James Blaine. Washington, D.C., May 9, 1881.

13. Blaine's interviews by the New York Herald, April 27 and June 30, 1882. Cited by Enrique Amayo, British Policy in the War of the Pacific, Chile vs. Peru and Bolivia, 1879-1884., Ph.D. Diss. University of Pittsburgh, 1985.

14. Instructions, James Blaine to William Trescot, Washington, D.C., December 1, 1881.

15. Dispatches, Bolivia, Charles Adams to J.P. Zilveti. La Paz, January 10, 1882.

16. Dispatches, Bolivia, J.P. Zilveti to Charles Adams, La Paz, February 2, 1882.

17. Dispatches, Chile, Note 13, William Trescot to F. Frelinghuysen, Viña del Mar, May 4, 1882.

18. Dispatches, Peru, Note 4, Walker Blaine to W. Trescot. Lima, May 8, 1882.

19. Dispatches, Peru, Note 1, Walker Blaine to W. Trescot. Arequipa, March 28, 1882. Instructions, Note 12, F. Frelinghuysen to C. Logan,, Washington, D.C., June 26, 1882.

20. The House of Representatives made an inquiry on the Peruvian bonds and the behavior of American congressmen regarding this matter. See Congress report on Chile and Peru, Washington, D.C., August 1, 1882. Report 1790, 47th Congress. Session l.

21. Instructions, Note 3, F. Frelinghuysen to G. Maney, Washington, D.C., June 2, 1882.

22. Instructions, Note 3, F. Frelinghuysen to G. Maney, Washington, D.C., June 26, 1882.

23. Dispatches, Chile, Note 15, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen. Santiago, October 18, 1882.

24. Dispatches, Chile, C. Logan to Lizardo Montero, Santiago, November 13, 1882.

25. Instructions, Note 41, F. Frelinghuysen to C. Logan, Washington, D.C., March 23, 1883.

26. Instructions, Note 47. F. Frelinghuysen to G. Maney, Washington, D.C., February 10, 1883.

28. Francisco Garcia Calderon, Mediacion de los Estados Unidos de Norte America en la Guerra del Pacifico, el señor doctor don Cornelius A. Logan y el Dr. Don Francisco Garcia Calderon Buenos Aires, 1884. Letters, Garcia Calderon to Logan, January 11 and December 21, 1883.

29. Dispatches, Chile, Note 92, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, May 9, 1883.

30. Dispatches, Chile, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Note 93 of May 9 and telegram dated May 2, 1883.

31. Dispatches, Chile, Note 104, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, June 18, 1883.

32. Dispatches, Chile. Note 113, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen. Santiago, July 2nd, 1883.

34. Dispatches, Peru, Telegram and Note 18, S. Phelps to F. Frelinghuysen. Lima, October 21 and 23, 1883.

35. Dispatches, Chile, Note 146, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, November 1, 1883. Also, Dispatches, Peru. Note 32,S. Phelps to F. Frelighuysen, Lima, November 15, 1883.

36. Instructions, Note 18, F. Frelinghuysen to S. Phelps, Washington, D.C., November 15, 1883.

37. Quoted by Herbert Millington, op. cit. p. 139.

38. Op. cit. p. 140.

39. Dispatches, Chile, Note 158, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, November 30, 1883.

40. Dispatches, Chile, Note 160, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, December 19, 1883.

41. Dispatches, Peru, Notes 83 and 86, S. Phelps to F. Frelinghuysen, April 8 and 11, 1884.

42. Instructions, Note 1, F. Frelinghuysen to R. Gibbs, Washington, May 19, 1884.